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This thesis follows the newly introduced alternative format of papers' portfolio.
All papers are closely related in terms of the subject matter. Each paper includes a
commentary in its introduction section that contextualises and integrates the paper





In an n-country intra-industry trade model we study the formation and stability of
various designs of climate change agreements in the context of international trade. In
the ﬁrst paper we introduce two new features to the literature. Firstly, ﬁrms produce
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, i.e. the same good but in diﬀerent varieties where
each ﬁrm produces one unique variety. Secondly, consumers can have various degrees
of taste for the varieties of this good. Our results in this paper show that if consumers
have a low taste for variety (TFV) agreement formation fails. Only with a suﬃciently
high TFV, strategic interaction among governments is suﬃciently mitigated such that
small agreements are stable.
In the second paper we analyse the eﬀects of instrumenting climate change agree-
ments with a trade policy called border tax adjustment (BTA) in order to assess its
ability of mitigating the free riding incentives. Our results show that when varieties
do not matter to consumers, BTAs lead to a global agreement on climate change
if coalition membership is open to all countries. If membership is exclusive, then
fewer countries form an agreement and do not allow other countries to join. When
consumers have high TFV, large, but not global, agreements are stable.
In the third paper we analyse the case where governments have to deal with two
issues: climate change and trade. We examine coalition formation and stability
under three scenarios where governments are either cooperating on one issue only
or on both issues at the same time. Our results show that whenever governments
cooperate on trade, either individually or with climate change, the grand coalition
is always stable. More interestingly, we ﬁnd that when governments cooperate on
climate change only the grand coalition is also stable. However, this holds only when





Global actions to eﬀectively combat climate change require an unprecedented level of
coordination among countries. This is due to the fact that greenhouse gases (GHGs),
one of the major causes of global warming (Botzen, 2011), mix perfectly in the
atmosphere making climate change a global common problem (Stavins et al., 2014).
In the attempt to streamline such level of international coordination the United
Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was ﬁrst adopted in
1992 at the Rio Earth Summit. The Convention's ultimate objective is stabilization
of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (UNFCCC, 2017).
In order to put the Convention into practice, UNFCCC signatories are required to
meet formally on annual basis and negotiate an international climate change treaty.
One of the main achievements of these negotiations was Kyoto Protocol signed in
1997. In its ﬁrst commitment period (2008-2012), Kyoto Protocol sets binding emis-
sion reduction targets for 37 industrialised countries. Overall, these targets add up
to an average of ﬁve per cent emission reductions compared to 1990 levels, making
them insuﬃcient to achieve the UNFCCC objectives. Under its central principle of
common but diﬀerentiated responsibility, Kyoto Protocol applies only to industri-
alised countries because it recognises their responsibilities for the current high levels
of GHG emissions' concentration in the atmosphere due to more than 100 years of
industrial activities, (UN, 1998).
During this period, signatories of Kyoto Protocol failed to agree on extending the
Protocol to a second commitment period for various reasons. Most notably was
the exclusion of emerging and developing economies, such as China, who are in-
creasingly becoming major contributors to global GHG emissions. Nevertheless, the
annual negotiations were continued in order to reach an alternative global treaty
and in December 2015 Paris Climate Agreement was signed by 197 countries. This
agreement aims to achieve the scientiﬁcally recommended target of limiting the tem-
perature increase by the year 2100 to 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial
levels. In other words, this target is inline with the UNFCCC Convention. However,
despite agreeing on this target, signatories' current emission reduction pledges fall
short of meeting it and will potentially yield a temperature increase of 2.7-3 degrees
Celsius (UNFCCC, 2015). Furthermore, Paris Climate Agreement fails to bind its
signatories to meet their pledges.
Scholars in the game theoretic literature on the formation of international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs) attribute the diﬃculty in reaching an eﬀective climate
change agreement to strong free-riding incentives. These incentives emerge due to
the fact that any non-signatory would enjoy the environmental beneﬁts resulting
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from signatories' emissions reduction eﬀorts without incurring any costs. There-
fore, given the absence of supranational authority that could enforce cooperation on
climate change, any stable agreement has to be self-enforcing. Findings in this liter-
ature show that this free riding phenomenon has either led to agreements with few
signatories and/or with very low and hence ineﬀective emission reduction targets. In
other words, these agreements are either small, shallow or both (see Barrett, 1994;
and Finus, 2003 for surveys).
In the context of international trade and free movement of goods and factors of
production there are additional challenges for eﬀective climate change actions. Uni-
lateral or sub-global actions on climate change could lead to a shift in production
towards non-signatory countries resulting in emission leakage. Furthermore, ﬁrms
operating in signatory countries suﬀer from loss of competitiveness due to the costs
of complying with the climate policy. In other words, when considering international
trade, incentives for coordinating (free riding on) climate change actions are weaker
(stronger) than the case of autarky. Check Zhang (2012) for a survey on the theoretic
literature and empirical evidence.
In order to overcome such pessimistic predictions, further contributions in the game
theoretic literature followed diﬀerent strategies such as analysing various policy in-
struments, markets' structures or trade features. One approach that has been ad-
dressed in the literature when designing a treaty is sanctions used to deter free riding.
An example of non-participation sanctions is in Montreal Protocol, where trading of
the controlled substances with non-participants is banned (Montreal Protocol Article
4). Although sanctions might appeal as suitable measures for deterring free riding
behaviour, in reality they face credibility, institutional and technical problems (Fi-
nus, 2002). Non-participation measures are at odd with the voluntary nature of the
IEAs. Most importantly, implementing the sanctions is a time-consuming and costly
process. Barrett (1997) ﬁnds that sanctions may harm not only non-signatories but
also signatories. Finally, in a world with several multilateral agreements between
countries, sanctions might destabilise or violate the terms of other agreements, such
as those under the World Trade Organisation (Barrett, 2009).
Another approach is compensation measures. IEAs cooperation exhibits asymme-
tries in the welfare of the participants resulting in the instability of the agreement.
In such case compensation measures could serve to balance these asymmetries. Finus
(2003) classify compensation measures into monetary transfers and in-kind transfers
such as technical and technological assistance. Although monetary transfers are more
straightforward form of compensation measures in comparison to in-kind transfers,
few IEAs have provisions for monetary transfers. There are four general arguments
in the literature on the lack of the use of monetary transfers. Firstly, Mäler (1990)
suggests that parties might hide their true preferences in order to extract higher
compensation (commit to lower compensation) in the case of being payee (payer).
Secondly, in the case where transfers are paid to non-participants for them to un-
dertake some abatement eﬀorts, Hoel and Schneider (1997) ﬁnd that such form of
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transfers may create adverse incentives for countries to join the agreement. Thirdly,
Barrett (1994) argues that there might be some incentives for free-riding between the
payers and the payees. For instance the payers are better oﬀ is the payee increases
her abatement eﬀorts without increasing the transfer. Furthermore, there are also
internal free-riding incentives within the group of payers themselves. That is a payer
might free-ride on her transfers' commitments, hoping that they will be fulﬁlled by
other payers in the group. Finally, Finus (2002) suggests that there is a compliance
problem where donors don not fulﬁll their promise or recipients do not meet the
agreed abatement targets (depending on whether transfers are ex-post or ex-ante).
A third approach we mention brieﬂy here is multiple coalitions. Carraro and Sinis-
calco (1998) show that grand coalitions are unlikely to exist and multiple coalitions
tend to prevail. Botteon and Carraro (1997) show that even with the use of com-
pensation mechanisms stability of grand coalitions require small degree of abatement
commitments. Finus (2003) argues that small multiple agreements among diﬀerent
groups of countries on regional levels might achieve higher emission reductions than
stable global agreement with low commitment targets. This is due to the fact that
the degree of asymmetries on regional levels will be minimal. Furthermore, most
regions across the world already cooperate on several agreements, such as on trade
and defense, and hence the mechanisms for reaching consensus on the regional level
are already in place and could facilitate a new agreement. This argument is also
supported by Carraro's et al., (2007) concept of bottom-up approaches to climate
policy.
In the attempt to provide policy makers with alternative designs of international
agreements that may lead to a global and eﬀective action on climate change, this
thesis analyses the formation and stability of international climate change agree-
ments under free trade and explores the eﬀects of various policy instruments and
trade features. Throughout the thesis, our model is an extension of Brander and
Spencer (1985) framework with n ex ante symmetric countries. Governments can
induce emission reductions from domestic production using emission taxes. Each
government is concerned with the domestic ﬁrm's proﬁt, revenues from emission
taxes, the utility of the domestic consumers and the environmental damages result-
ing from a global pollutant. In this setting, we introduce three main contributions
to the literature.
In the ﬁrst paper (Finus and Al Khourdajie, 2017), we introduce two new features
that are common in the trade literature but have not yet been explored in the IEAs
literature. Firstly, ﬁrms produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, i.e. the same
good but in diﬀerent varieties where each ﬁrm produces one unique variety. Sec-
ondly, consumers have taste for the varieties of this diﬀerentiated good. Therefore,
their utility depends not only on the total quantity consumed but also on the com-
position of quantities of the diﬀerentiated varieties. The combination of these two
features allow for analysing IEAs under free trade when consumers' preferences mat-
ter. These features were introduced by Yi (1996 and 2000) to the trade agreements
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literature and we beneﬁt from his contribution. Our results in Finus and Al Khour-
dajie (2017) conﬁrm the pessimistic conclusion which mainly emerges from the IEA
literature. Agreements are small at best and may not exist at all due to strong free-
rider incentives. If consumers have a low taste for variety, i.e. domestic and foreign
varieties are viewed as good substitutes by consumers, agreement formation fails.
Only with a suﬃciently high taste for variety, strategic interaction of governments is
suﬃciently mitigated such that small agreements are stable.
In the second paper (Al Khourdajie et al., 2017), we extend Finus and Al Khourdajie
(2017) and analyse the eﬀects of instrumenting climate change agreements with a
trade policy called border tax adjustment (BTA). Using this policy signatory govern-
ments can impose an additional border tax on imports from non-signatories' ﬁrms.
This border tax amounts to the tax diﬀerential between the high emission tax that
signatory ﬁrms are facing in their domestic markets and the low emission tax that
non-signatory ﬁrms are facing for their exports to signatories' markets. Our results
show that when varieties do not matter to consumers, BTAs lead to global agreement
on climate change if membership is open to all countries. If membership is exclusive,
then fewer countries form an agreement and do not allow other countries to join in
order to generate BTA revenues from them. When consumers have high taste for
varieties, a large, but not global, agreement is stable.
In the third paper (Al Khourdajie, 2017) we address the case of issue linkage between
climate change agreements and customs' union agreements. That is, we analyse a
joint climate change and customs' union agreement. While climate agreements suf-
fer from strong free riding incentives due to positive externalities, customs' unions
are identiﬁed as club good agreements where beneﬁts are exclusive to signatories'
only. Accessing these beneﬁts give countries an incentive to join the joint agreement.
Furthermore, customs' unions exhibit spillovers toward non-signatories, whereby if
these spillovers are negative they create an additional incentive for cooperation. In
order to setup the joint agreement, this paper essentially combines the setup of two
papers: Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017) and Yi (1996). We analyse coalition forma-
tion and stability under three scenarios where governments are either cooperating
on one issue only or on both issues at the same time. Our results show that when-
ever governments cooperate on trade, either individually or with climate change, the
grand coalition is always stable. More interestingly, we ﬁnd that when governments
cooperate on climate change only the grand coalition is also stable. However, this
holds only when varieties are perfect substitutes.
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Abstract
We study the coordination of environmental policy within an agreement in the
context of international trade. In an n-country intra-industry trade model,
ﬁrms produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good and consumers have a taste
for variety. Governments choose strategically an emission tax and their mem-
bership in an international agreement. We show that only a strong taste for
variety reduces the competition among governments suﬃciently enough to al-
low for some form of policy coordination, though full cooperation will never be
obtained.
Keywords: strategic environmental policy, international trade, self-enforcing inter-
national agreements, horizontal product diﬀerentiation, taste for variety
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, F18, Q58.
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1 Introduction
Reaching a meaningful international agreement on climate change has proved diﬃcult
over the last three decades. The Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, could not even stop
the trend of a continuous increase of greenhouse gas emissions world-wide observed
since the last century. In the most recent round of climate change negotiations
in Paris in December 2015, even though many countries around the world signed
an agreement, it is only based on voluntary pledges of governments, without any
enforcement mechanism in case of non-compliance. Moreover, even if all governments
would deliver on their pledges, global temperature is expected to increase by 2.7-3
degrees Celsius, UNFCCC (2015), much above the widely accepted and recommended
target of limiting the temperature increase by 2100 to 2 degrees Celsius compared
to per-industrial levels.
Scholars in the game-theoretic literature on the formation of self-enforcing interna-
tional environmental agreements (IEAs) attribute the diﬃculty in reaching eﬀective
climate change agreement to strong free-riding incentives. These incentives emerge
because any non-signatory can enjoy the environmental beneﬁts from reduced emis-
sions without incurring any cost. In the absence of supranational authority that could
enforce cooperation on climate change, self-enforcing agreements achieve relatively
little. A central ﬁnding of this literature is that either participation in an agreement
is small or if it is large, then the diﬀerence between cooperative and non-cooperative
behaviour is small, i.e cooperation does not really matter. Barrett (1994a) called
this the paradox of cooperation. For a recent survey of the literature, including a
collection of the most inﬂuential papers over the last two decades, see Finus and
Caparrós (2015).
Another body of literature explaining the slow progress in addressing transboundary
pollution problems, in particular climate change, points at the fear of governments
to lose competitiveness in international trade if they pursue a stricter environmental
policy than other governments. Based on an extension of the simple strategic trade
policy model of Brander and Spencer (1985), strategic environmental policy has been
analysed for instance by Barrett (1994b), Conrad (1993) and Kennedy (1994). Un-
der Cournot-competition1, Brander and Spencer have shown that governments have
an incentive to subsidies production of own ﬁrms in order to increase their rent cap-
ture. For environmental policy this means that emission taxes are set below marginal
damages (Barrett 1994b). This result has been modiﬁed in several directions by con-
sidering additional components in governments' welfare function. Adding consumers
to such a model lowers environmental taxes even further as the consumer surplus
increases in the quantity produced and consumed (Kennedy 1994). Similarly, de-
parting from the assumption of a local pollutant and considering transboundary
pollution provides further incentives to lower environmental taxes below marginal
1Barrett (1994b) has shown that, probably not surprisingly, many of the results reverse if
Bertrand-competition is considered.
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damages. Some environmental damages can be externalised and governments un-
derstand that domestic production is substituted by foreign production if heavily
taxed, which may even increase environmental damages if foreign is more dirty than
domestic production (Conrad 1993). However, there is one eﬀect which goes into
the opposite direction (Barrett 1994b and Kennedy 1994): if there is oligopolistic
competition within a country, governments have incentive to increase emission taxes
in order to lower output and to establish a cartel solution. Taken together, strate-
gic trade models oﬀer a rich setting to explain why environmental policies may be
distorted, which is also evident from Ulph (1996a and 1996b), considering also the
incentive of ﬁrms to strategically invest in R&D and by allowing governments to use
diﬀerent environmental policy instruments.
Essentially for a long time, both strands of literature have not been integrated. That
is, the IEA literature did not explicitly consider trade and the strategic environmental
policy and trade literature did not allow for the formation of agreements, i.e. it
did not consider the possibility that governments coordinate their policies. Only
recently, Eichner and Pethig produced a series of papers considering both aspects,
Eichner and Pethig (2012, 2013, 2014a and 2014b), though their trade model is
very diﬀerent from those mentioned above, and hence their results are diﬃcult to
relate to this literature. Overall, these series of papers seem to conﬁrm the paradox
of cooperation, with slightly more positive conclusions if the coalition behaves as
Stackelberg leader. In contrast, we oﬀer an IEA-model which is very much in the
spirit of the strategic environmental policy and trade literature. Our model considers
governments which care for the proﬁts of their ﬁrms, the utility of their consumers
and environmental damages, which are the result of a global pollutant. They choose
strategically an emission tax and their membership in an international agreement.
We allow for horizontal product diﬀerentiation where consumers' taste for variety is
captured. Thus, our paper beneﬁts from contributions by Yi (1996) and (2000) and
Loke and Winters (2012) who look at international trade, trade agreements and taste
for variety, but who ignore environmental damages and their eﬀect on governments'
strategic behaviour.
Our results conﬁrm the pessimistic conclusion which mainly emerges from the IEA
literature. Agreements are small at best and may not exist at all due to strong free-
rider incentives. If consumers have a low taste for variety, i.e. domestic and foreign
varieties are viewed as good substitutes by consumers, agreement formation fails.
Only with a suﬃciently high taste for variety, strategic interaction of governments
is suﬃciently mitigated such that small agreements are stable. In what follows,
section 2 presents our model and some important properties, helpful in analysing
coalition formation. Section 3 develops our results, including an in-depth analysis
of the driving forces of coalition formation and the strategic interaction between
signatories and non-signatories to an agreement. In section 4, we summarise our




Consider an intra-industry trade model with n ex ante symmetric countries with a
representative ﬁrm and consumer in each country. We denote the set of countries
by N . Firms produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, i.e. the same good but in
diﬀerent varieties where each ﬁrm produces one variety. Firms compete in a Cournot-
fashion. Markets are segmented and each ﬁrm supplies its good to the domestic and
all foreign markets. Because of the segmentation of markets, ﬁrms play a separate
Cournot game in each market.2 Transport costs are assumed away as usual.
The welfare of country i is given by:
Wi = CSi + PSi + TRi −Di (1)
where CSi represents country i 's consumer surplus, PSi country i 's producer surplus,
TRi is the tax revenue from the emission tax imposed by the government i on its
domestic ﬁrm, and Di is the pollution damage faced by country i.
Consumers are identical and their preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility
function over two goods (see equation (2) below). The ﬁrst good is the horizontally
diﬀerentiated and traded good. The second good is a numeraire good, representing
the composition of all other goods. Utility is linear in the numeraire good and
quadratic in the diﬀerentiated good.
We assume that consumers have a taste for variety (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). That
is, their utility depends not only on the total quantity consumed but also on the
composition of the quantities of the diﬀerentiated good (Yi, 1996 and 2000). The
taste for variety (abbreviated TFV hereafter) is captured by parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] .
High values of γ imply a low taste for variety and for γ = 1 varieties are perfect
substitutes. In contrast, low values of γ represent a high preference for a diverse and
balanced consumption bundle and for γ = 0 varieties cannot be substituted at all.3
More speciﬁcally, let the representative consumer's utility in country i be given by
ui:








where vi represents the utility from consuming the horizontally diﬀerentiated and
traded good and Mi represents the utility from consuming the numeraire good; qi =
2See Appleyard and Field (2014) as well as Helpman and Krugman (1985) for further background.
3An extension could be the ideal variety approach where consumers have not only a general
preference for the variety of a good but also a preference for a particular variety. One application
is a bias towards the domestically produced variety (Di Comite et al, 2014).
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(qi1, ..., qin) is a vector of varieties consumed by consumers in country i, with qik
representing country i 's consumption of country k 's variety4; a is a positive demand
parameter and Qi. =
∑
k∈N qik is country i 's total consumption of all varieties,
supplied by all countries k.
In this paper, in most parts, we will focus our analysis on two extreme TFV scenarios
for analytic tractability: the no TFV scenario with γ = 1 and the maximum TFV
scenario with γ = 0.








where pik represents the price faced by consumers in country i consuming the variety
of country k and
∑
l∈N,l 6=k qil is the sum of all consumed varieties produced by all
ﬁrms except ﬁrm k in country k.
From (2) and (3) , the consumer surplus in country i is given by :











where the last term in (4) represents consumers' spending.








qki(pki − c− ti) (5)
where piki is ﬁrm i 's proﬁt in market k from selling quantity qki at price pki where
c is the constant marginal cost and ti is the emission tax imposed by country i 's
government on its ﬁrm's output, which assumes that emissions are linked to quantities
by a constant emission-output coeﬃcient. Without loss of generality, we set this
coeﬃcient to 1. Assuming constant marginal costs implies that diﬀerent markets are
independent. That is, given our segmented market structure, under the assumption
of constant marginal cost changes in demand for a diﬀerentiated good in one market
have no eﬀect on marginal costs of production elsewhere, (Loke and Winters, 2012).





4Throughout the paper the ﬁrst subscript indicates the market in which the variety is consumed
and the second subscript indicates the market in which it is produced.
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where δ is a damage parameter,
∑
i∈N Qi. is total consumption in every country i
and hence total emissions (due to our assumption of a constant emission output
coeﬃcient of 1). That is, emissions constitute a pure public bad: damages depend
on total emissions.
2.2 Coalition Formation Game
We assume a three-stage coalition formation game, which unfolds as follows.
Stage 1, Choice of Membership: all countries decide simultaneously whether to join
coalition S with m the cardinality of S. Countries which do not join S act as
singletons. A typical signatory will be denoted by i and a non-signatory by j.
Following d'Aspremont et al (1983), a coalition is called stable if it is internally
and externally stable. Internal stability means that no signatory has an incentive
to leave coalition S, whereas external stability means that no non-signatory has an
incentive to join coalition S. We assume for simplicity that in the case of indiﬀerence
a non-signatory joins coalition S.
Internal stability:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ S (8)
External stability:
Wj(S)−Wj(S ∪ {j}) > 0 ∀ j ∈ N \ S. (9)
Stage 2, Choice of Policy Level: all countries choose simultaneously their emission
tax.
• Signatories choose their joint emission tax ti (implemented uniformly in all









Stage 3, Choice of Output: all ﬁrms choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively
their segmented market outputs by maximising proﬁts: max
q1i,...,qni
PSi .
The game is solved by backwards induction.
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2.3 Properties of the Game
We deﬁne the following properties to analyse the incentive structure to form coalitions
and the associated welfare implications.
For all S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, and for all S ′ = S ∪ {j} where S ′ ⊆ N :












) ≥ (>)Wj(S) ∀ j /∈ S and j /∈ S ′ .

















Superadditivity provides an incentive to join a coalition whereas the positive exter-
nality captures the incentive to free-ride. In terms of forming large stable coalitions,
the two properties work in opposite directions and typically for large coalitions the
positive externality eﬀect is weaker than the superadditivity eﬀect. Full cohesive-
ness justiﬁes the search for large stable coalitions, even if the grand coalition is not
stable. Essentially, global welfare increases when the coalition is enlarged gradually
and obtains its maximum in the grand coalition.
3 Results
3.1 Third Stage
In this section, we derive results for the third stage. The proﬁt of ﬁrm i in market
k is given by piki = qki(pki − c− ti). Substituting the inverse demand function from
equation (3) above, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂piki
∂qki
= a−c− ti−(2−γ)qki−γQk. = 0 ⇐⇒ a−c− ti−2qki−γ
∑
l∈N,l 6=i
qkl = 0 (10)
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where Qk. is the total quantity consumed in market k and
∑
l∈N,l 6=i qkl is the sum of
all consumed varieties by consumers in market k from all ﬁrms except from ﬁrm i.
It is easy to see that reaction functions (qki = ri(
∑
l∈N,l 6=i qkl) have a slope of −γ/2.
Hence, the equilibrium is unique; the absolute value of the slope of the reaction
function increases with the taste of variety parameter γ and as γ approaches zero,
the strategic interaction among ﬁrms vanishes. Moreover, it is easy to see that a
necessary condition for positive quantities is a > c. Below, we will further develop
this non-negativity condition in order to ensure interior solutions.
Solving the n ﬁrst order conditions in market k simultaneously, gives:
qki =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n− 2) + 2) + γ
∑
k∈N,k 6=i tk
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) . (11)
Given our assumption of segmented market structure each ﬁrm supplies its good to
the domestic and all foreign markets. Furthermore, because of the segmentation of
markets, ﬁrms play a separate and identical Cournot game in each market. Therefore,
since the tax imposed on production is not diﬀerentiated based on the target market,
the equilibrium quantity of ﬁrm i 's variety is the same in all markets k.
Equation (11) represents the output of any ﬁrm in the case of no cooperation, i.e.
singletons market structure. It is evident that quantities decrease in own taxes
and increase in foreign taxes. In the case of cooperation, if we already account for
the fact of a symmetric tax in stage 2 with all signatories choosing the same tax
rate ti and all non-signatories choose the same tax rate tj (and typically ti 6= tj),
we can derive the equilibrium quantity for a signatory's and a non-signatory's ﬁrm
as follows. In the case of a signatory's ﬁrm, the last term in the numerator in
(11) (γ
∑
k∈N,k 6=i tk) is split into other signatories' taxes (tiγ(m − 1)) and all non-
signatories' taxes (tjγ(n−m)), and hence we have for a signatory's ﬁrm
q∗·i∈S =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + tj(γ(n−m))
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (12)
In the case of a non-signatory's ﬁrm, the last term in the numerator is split into
all signatories' taxes (tiγm) and other non-signatories' taxes (tjγ(n−m− 1)),5 and
hence we have for a non-signatory's ﬁrm
q∗·j /∈S =
(a− c)(2− γ) + γmti − tj(γ(m− 1) + 2)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (13)
with the total equilibrium consumption in market k, Q∗k. = mq
∗
.i + (n−m)q∗.j, given
by:
5Given that we are dealing with a non-signatory, we change the notation of the second term in




(n− 1)γ + 2 (14)
This leads to the following conclusions.
Proposition 1 - The Eﬀects of Taxes on Equilibrium Quantities
Consider the third stage and a market k. Suppose a coalition S has formed in the
ﬁrst stage and all players have chosen their equilibrium taxes in stage 2.
The quantity of ﬁrm i's (j's) variety in a signatory country (non-signatory country)




























< 0 irrespective of γ.
Proof: Follows directly from equations (12) to (14) above. Q.E.D.
Thus, quantities produced by a ﬁrm for a particular market are negatively aﬀected
by own taxes and positively aﬀected by foreign taxes. Given that a ﬁrm produces the
same quantities for all markets, also the same holds for total production of a ﬁrm.
Only for the maximum TFV, i.e. γ = 0, will a ﬁrm's output not be aﬀected by the
tax of a foreign government imposed on a foreign ﬁrm. Then, essentially, ﬁrms act
in each segmented market like a monopolist as consumers do not substitute diﬀerent
varieties at all. In other words, ﬁrms do not compete and hence are only aﬀected by
their own government's taxes.
The same relationship will hold when considering second stage equilibrium taxes,
with essentially two groups of players. Signatories' taxes inﬂuence non-signatories'
quantities negatively and vice versa, except for γ = 0. Hence, for instance, if gov-
ernments in signatory countries want to boost their ﬁrms' proﬁt by subsidising their
ﬁrms, this will automatically reduce foreign ﬁrms' quantities. However, if they decide
to tax their ﬁrms to reduce total output in order to stabilise the market price, then
this objective is only partially achieved because foreign ﬁrm's output will increase. A
similar conﬂict occurs if signatories tax their ﬁrms to reduce environmental damages
because foreign quantities and hence emissions will increase. Only for γ = 0 this
strategic interaction breaks down.
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3.2 Second Stage
In this section, we derive equilibrium taxes in the second stage. In order to disentan-
gle the incentives present in the payoﬀ function in equation (1) above, we consider 3
additional scenarios of this payoﬀ function representing partial welfare preferences.
This will help understanding the importance of each welfare component in the pay-
oﬀ function and their eﬀects on equilibrium taxes as well as the driving forces for
cooperation. Nevertheless, this is a theoretic exercise only and our main focus in the
paper is on the full model, describe in the last scenario below.
1. W 1i = PSi + TRi
2. W 2i = CSi + PSi + TRi
3. W 3i = PSi + TRi −Di
4. W 4i = CSi + PSi + TRi −Di
The ﬁrst scenario replicates the simple Brander and Spencer (1985) model of trade,
henceforth abbreviated as B&S-model. Consumers are ignored due to the assumption
that all quantities are sold to a third market. The second and the third scenarios
add one welfare component, consumer surplus and damages, respectively. The fourth
scenario represents our full model. For analytic tractability, we henceforth consider
two parameter values of γ, namely the no TFV scenario with γ = 1, and the
maximum TFV scenario with γ = 0. Equilibrium taxes for each welfare scenario
are given in Appendix 1. We denote signatories' equilibrium taxes under welfare
scenario 1 by t∗i (PS, TR), scenario 2 by t
∗
i (CS, PS, TR) and so on, and the same
applies for non-signatories' equilibrium taxes.
Inserting equilibrium taxes into equilibrium quantities reveals that we need to impose
non-negativity constraints on parameter values in order to ensure positive outputs.
Essentially, these constraints boil down to requesting that the demand parameter a
is larger than marginal production cost c plus a multiple of marginal damages. The
exact constraints are stated in Appendix 2, which henceforth are assumed to hold.
We now consider how signatories' and non-signatories' taxes change across the diﬀer-
ent welfare scenarios, taking welfare scenario 1, the B&S scenario, as a benchmark.
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Proposition 2 - Comparing Equilibrium Taxes Across Diﬀerent Welfare
Scenarios
Assume some coalition with m signatories has formed in the ﬁrst stage and let n >
m > 2.
Signatories' taxes:
• t∗i (PS, TR,D) > t∗i (PS, TR) > t∗i (CS, PS, TR) for γ = {0, 1}.
• t∗i (PS, TR,D) > t∗i (CS, PS, TR,D) > t∗i (CS, PS, TR) for γ = {0, 1}.
Non-signatories' taxes:
For γ = 1:
• t∗j(PS, TR,D) < t∗j(PS, TR) < t∗j(CS, PS, TR).
• t∗j(PS, TR,D) < t∗j(CS, PS, TR,D) < t∗j(CS, PS, TR).
For γ = 0:
• t∗j(PS, TR,D) > t∗j(PS, TR) > t∗j(CS, PS, TR).
• t∗j(PS, TR,D) > t∗j(CS, PS, TR,D) > t∗j(CS, PS, TR).
Proof: See Appendix 3. Q.E.D.
We ﬁrst note that signatories' equilibrium taxes are lowered compared to the Brender
and Spencer scenario when consumers enter governments' welfare function and are
increased when instead damages are considered by governments. The reason is that
the consumer surplus is negatively aﬀected by taxes whereas damages are reduced
through taxes. Hence, in terms of equilibrium taxes, consumers call for lower and
damages for higher equilibrium taxes. Since both eﬀects go in opposite directions,
equilibrium taxes in the full model may be higher or lower than those in the B&S-
scenario. De facto this depends on the relative weight of the consumer and damage
component in the welfare function. In our model, the larger the damage parameter
δ compared to the demand parameter a the higher will be the tax and vice versa.
For non-signatories, we observe the same ranking as for signatories if γ = 0 because
then the strategic interaction among ﬁrms vanishes. As shown in Proposition 1, if
γ = 0 , quantities only depend on own taxes. In contrast for γ = 1, the strategic
interaction among ﬁrms is at its maximum and hence also among governments. The
ranking of equilibrium taxes for the diﬀerent welfare scenarios of non-signatories is
reversed to those of signatories. For instance, adding the damages to the B&S welfare
scenario leads to lower equilibrium taxes for non-signatories, already indicating the
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strategic interaction among signatories and non-signatories, where non-signatories
free-ride on signatories' emission reduction eﬀorts. This is one version of the free-
rider behavior of non-signatories undermining the formation of large stable coalitions
which will be analysed in more detail below.
We now turn to comparing signatories' and non-signatories' taxes within each welfare
scenarios, which gives further insights into the strategic interaction among signatories
and non-signatories.
Proposition 3 - Comparing Equilibrium Taxes within each Welfare Sce-
nario
Scenario W 1i = PSi + TRi:

















Scenario W 2i = CSi + PSi + TRi:


















Scenario W 3i = PSi + TRi −Di:


















Scenario W 4i = CSi + PSi + TRi −Di:in which case













0 if δm + c ≤ a < 2nδ + c; t∗i (CS, PS, TR,D) ≤ t∗j(CS, PS, TR,D) and
∂t∗i (CS,PS,TR,D)
∂m






Direction of Change Strategic Interaction
γ = 1 γ = 0 γ = 1 γ = 0
PSi + TRi ↑,↓ 0 , 0 substitutes independent
CSi + PSi + TRi 0 , 0 ↓, 0 independent independent
PSi + TRi −Di ↑,↓ ↑, 0 substitutes independent
CSi + PSi + TRi −Di ↑,↓ ↑↓,0 substitutes independent
6
Proof: See Appendix 4. Q.E.D.
There are at least two interesting aspects in Proposition 3. The ﬁrst aspect relates
to the comparison between signatories' and non-signatories' equilibrium taxes where
the former internalise externalities within their group. The second aspect relates
to the strategic interaction between signatories' and non-signatories' taxes when the
coalition is enlarged.
For the B&S-scenario and for the standard assumption of γ = 1, signatories impose
a higher tax than non-signatories. As ﬁrms compete in a Nash-Cournot fashion,
signatories' governments de facto try to enforce a cartel solution via taxes. These
high taxes result in higher prices and lead to a reduction in signatories ﬁrms' output.
Though taxes reduce ﬁrms proﬁts, the government collects these taxes and hence
taxes are welfare neutral in this model. If the grand coalition forms, output is
identical to the output of a monopolist. For γ = 0, there is no competition among
ﬁrms which act like monopolists for their own variety. Hence, there is no externality
across ﬁrms and hence also not among governments. In other words, there are no
externalities in the B&S-model for γ = 0.
For the second scenario, adding consumers to the B&S-scenario, signatories' and non-
signatories' taxes are the same for γ = 1. As mentioned earlier, in the B&S-scenario
signatories impose higher taxes than non-signatories. In this scenario, adding con-
sumers calls for lower equilibrium taxes in order to subsidise consumption. Therefore,
compared to the B&S-model, we have in this scenario two opposing driving forces:
one calling for a higher tax and the other is calling for a lower tax. We ﬁnd in this
case signatories and non-signatories have the same equilibrium tax for γ = 1, which
means that the two opposing driving forces are canceling themselves leading to no
externalities across countries. In which case, cooperation is this scenario is mean-
ingless since all countries, signatories and non-signatories, are imposing the same
tax. This is diﬀerent for γ = 0. In the B&S-model, there was no externality for
6The ﬁrst column, Direction of Change, illustrates how signatories' and non-signatories' taxes
change with the coalition size. The ﬁrst entry (arrow) relates to signatories' taxes and the second
to non-signatories' ones. An entry of 0 for signatories means that there is no need for coordination
among players. The second column illustrates the strategic interaction between signatories' and non-
signatories' taxes. Intuition would suggest that in terms of forming stable coalitions, for a given
welfare scenario, this will be easier if taxes are independent than if they are strategic substitutes.
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γ = 0 but when adding the consumer, there is a positive externality from subsidising
consumption. Therefore, signatories impose lower tax than non-signatories.
For the third scenario, adding damages to the B&S-scenario, signatories choose a
higher tax than non-signatories in order to internalise the negative externality stem-
ming from emissions. Like the price externality, the emission externality stems from
output and hence taxes of signatories are increased even further compared to the
B&S-scenario. In the fourth scenario, the full model, eﬀects from scenario 2 and
3 play together. For γ = 1, this means that signatories have a higher tax than
non-signatories. For γ = 0, it implies that signatories' taxes can be higher or lower
than non-signatories, depending on the relative importance of the consumer surplus
compared to damages for signatories' internalisation strategy, which, in our model,
relates to the ratio between the demand parameter a, production cost parameter c
and damage cost parameter δ.
The second aspect of Proposition 3 is the strategic interaction between signatories'
and non-signatories' taxes. In the case of no TFV with γ = 1, signatories' and non-
signatories' taxes are strategic substitutes in most welfare scenarios where signatories'
taxes are increasing with the coalition size m whereas non-signatories' taxes are
decreasing. The exception is the second scenario because externalities cancel out.
In the case of maximum TFV with γ = 0, signatories' and non-signatories' taxes
are strategically independent. Signatories' taxes are either increasing or decreasing
with the coalition size depending on the externality they are internalising, except in
the ﬁrst welfare scenario in which they remain constant as there is no externality. In
scenario 2 (3) signatories' taxes decrease (increase) with the coalition size because
because of the positive externality on consumers (damages). Scenario 4 combines the
eﬀects of scenarios 2 and 3 and hence signatories' taxes decrease with coalition size if
the demand parameter a is suﬃciently large compared to marginal production costs
and global marginal damages. For all welfare scenarios with γ = 0, non-signatories'
taxes do not change with the coalition size m due to the independence of varieties.
3.3 Properties of the Coalition Game
In this section, we analyse the properties of each welfare scenario for the two scenario:
no TFV with γ = 1 and maximum TFV with γ = 0. These properties have been
deﬁned in subsection 2.3 above.
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Proposition 4 - Properties of the Coalition Game
In the coalition game, the properties positive externality and full cohesiveness hold
strictly for each of the four welfare scenarios whenever there is an externality across
players. In the scenarios where there is no externality across players, these properties
hold weakly.
For all welfare scenarios, superadditivity holds for γ = 0 and fails for γ = 1. For
γ = 1 it only holds for the move from a coalition with n− 1 signatories to the grand
coalition with n signatories.
More speciﬁcally: (Legend: += holds strictly, 0= holds weakly, and - generally
fails.)
Welfare Scenarios
Positive Externality Superadditivity Full Cohesiveness
γ = 1 γ = 0 γ = 1 γ = 0 γ = 1 γ = 0
PSi + TRi + 0 − 0 + 0
CSi + PSi + TRi 0 + 0 + 0 +
PSi + TRi −Di + + − + + +
CSi + PSi + TRi −Di + + − + + +
Proof: See Appendix 5. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 conﬁrms that the normative property of the game full cohesiveness
holds. The larger are coalitions, the larger will be global welfare, which obtains
its maximum in the grand coalition. It also conﬁrms that non-signatories beneﬁt
from the enlargement of the coalition via positive externalities. This provides an
incentive to free-ride. Interestingly, the incentive to join a coalition, captured by
the property superadditivity, is only positive if γ = 0 but is negative if γ = 1 and
whenever coalition formation would matter (i.e. full cohesiveness holds strictly). In
the latter case, signatories' taxes increase with the coalition size and the reverse is
true for non-signatories as shown in Proposition 3. That is, strategies are substitutes,
and hence the eﬀorts of signatories are undermined by non-signatories' reaction.
This countervailing or leakage eﬀect renders the enlargement of the coalition not
successful. As recently shown in Bayramoglu, Finus and Jacques (2016), if the
move from a coalition with m − 1 to m is not superadditive, then coalition with m
signatories cannot be internally stable. In other words, superadditivity is a necessary
(though not suﬃcient) condition for internal stability in a positive externality game.
Hence, if superadditivity fails for all m ≤ n − 1 for γ = 1, we only need to test for
stability of the grand coalition. Our overall results are summarised in Proposition 5
below, which looks at the stability of coalitions in the ﬁrst stage.
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3.4 First Stage
In this section, we present the results for the ﬁrst stage, i.e. the stability of coalitions.
Proposition 5 - Coalition Stability
Let m∗ denote the size of an internally and externally stable coalition. For the four




6= 0), the following results are obtained:




γ = 1 γ = 0
PSi + TRi m
∗ = 1 -
CSi + PSi + TRi - m
∗ = 3
PSi + TRi −Di m∗ = 1 m∗ = 3
CSi + PSi + TRi −Di m∗ = 1 m∗ = 3
Proof: See Appendix 6. Q.E.D.
Proposition 5 shows that if γ = 1 there are no stable coalitions in the main scenario as
well as scenarios 1 and 3. As we showed in Proposition 4 above, positive externalities
persist in these scenarios. Therefore, the positive spillovers of signatories' eﬀorts
provide the incentives for free riding. This is a common ﬁnding in the IEAs literature,
check Barrett (1994a) and Finus and Caparrós (2015). Furthermore, the incentives
to join a coalition, captured by the property superadditivity, are non-existent under
γ = 1. This is because when varieties are perfect substitutes the eﬀorts of signatories
are undermined by non-signatories' reactions. That is, whenever signatories increase
their taxes to internalise the damage externalities for instance, non-signatories react
by decrease their taxes leading to emission leakage which renders the enlargement
of the coalition not successful. This can be related to two previous results. In
Proposition 3 we showed that taxes are strategic substitutes under γ = 1 because
ﬁrms are interdependent due to perfect substitution, and in Proposition 4 we showed
that this implied that superadditivity failed.
As for scenario 2 under γ = 1, coalition formation is meaningless due to the fact that
signatories' and non-signatories' taxes are the same as we showed in Proposition 3
above. The reason that all countries, signatories and non-signatories, impose the
same tax is that we have in this scenario two opposing driving forces: one calling
for a higher tax (to enforce the cartel solution) and the other is calling for a lower
tax (to subsidise consumption). We ﬁnd in this case signatories and non-signatories
have the same equilibrium tax, which means that the two opposing driving forces
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are canceling themselves leading to no externalities across countries. In which case,
cooperation in this scenario is meaningless as all countries are imposing the same
tax.
Under γ = 0 we show that there is stable coalition of three countries in the main
scenario as well as scenarios 2 and 3. This can also be inferred from our previous
results. When varieties are independent positive externalities also persist due to the
spillovers of signatories' eﬀorts, providing the incentives for free riding. However,
the incentives to join a coalition are stronger under γ = 0. The reason for that
is because of varieties' independence, there is no externality across ﬁrms (as we
showed in Proposition 1) and hence also not among signatory and non-signatory
governments. This is evident from Proposition 3 where non-signatories' taxes do
not change with the coalition size m due to the independence of varieties. In other
words, under γ = 0 the eﬀorts of signatories are not undermined by non-signatories.
For these reasons, we ﬁnd superadditivity holds and hence the incentives to join
a coalition are stronger under γ = 0. Nevertheless, these incentives are not strong
enough to outweigh the positive externalities and hence they only lead to small stable
coalitions. In summary, only when varieties are diﬀerentiated, strategic interaction
among governments is suﬃciently mitigated such that small agreements are stable.
These ﬁndings are inline with the pessimistic conclusion which mainly emerges from
the IEA literature under oligopoly (Barrett 1994b and Kennedy 1994).
As for scenario 1, coalition formation is meaningless due to the fact that under γ = 0
there is no competition among ﬁrms which act like monopolists for their own variety.
Hence, there is no externality across ﬁrms and also not among governments. In other
words, there are no externalities in the B&S-model for γ = 0 and therefore coalition
formation is meaningless.
It is interesting that these results for both values of γ hold irrespective of the weight
consumers and damages perceived in governments' s welfare function (i.e. irrespective
of the welfare scenario), which stresses that they are quite robust.
It is probably not surprising that for intermediate values of γ between 0 and 1, one
ﬁnds that the equilibrium coalition size lies between m∗ = 1 and m∗ = 3. More
speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd for γ = 0.6 the equilibrium coalition size is m∗ = 2, which reﬂect
the monotonicity of our results with respect to γ.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analysed a strategic trade model in the spirit of Brander and Spencer
(1985). We introduced three additional features, which have been considered in the
literature, though in isolation. Firstly, consumers matter for governments because
goods are not sold to a third market. Moreover, environmental damages matter
because production releases a global pollutant. Second, we consider horizontal prod-
uct diﬀerentiation with consumers having a taste for variety (TFV). For analytical
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tractability, we focused on two extreme assumptions of TFV: no TFV and maximum
TFV where the former assumption corresponds to the standard assumption in the
literature that goods are perfect substitutes. Thirdly, we considered the possibility
that governments can coordinate their policy by forming coalitions. Policy coordi-
nation is related to an emission tax, which is de facto an output tax because of a
constant output-emission ratio. Stability of a coalition leading to an agreement was
tested by invoking the concept of internally and externally stable cartels.
We demonstrated that the formation of agreements is globally beneﬁcial. Global
welfare increases with the size of agreements and obtains its maximum if the grand
coalition forms (full cohesiveness). However, the grand coalition or even smaller
coalitions may not be stable because of two reasons. Firstly, the beneﬁts from policy
coordination are non-exclusive, a features which we related to the property of positive
externality of coalition formation. Secondly, the gains from cooperation for those
involved in enlarging coalitions may be small or even negative if policy instruments
are strategic substitutes. That is, superadditivity fails.
We showed that for the no TFV scenario, signatories of an agreement increase
their taxes with the size of the agreement. Signatory governments have an incentive
to internalise two negative externalities, both associated with high quantities. A
reduction of output stabilises the price in the output cartel and also reduces envi-
ronmental damages. Non-signatories free-ride on signatories' eﬀorts and lower their
taxes. Hence, taxes are strategic substitutes between signatories and non-signatories.
In our model, this meant that no agreement was stable. In contrast, for the max-
imum TFV scenario, foreign taxes have no eﬀect on domestic ﬁrms' output. In
the context of an agreement, this implies that taxes of signatories (non-signatories)
have no eﬀect on the output of non-signatories' (signatories') ﬁrms. We found that
this implies that taxes between signatories and non-signatories become strategically
independent. Regardless whether signatories increase or decrease their tax with the
size of the agreement, non-signatories' equilibrium taxes do not change. This reduces
the free-rider incentive, but it remains positive, which explains that this led only to
small stable coalitions.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to introduce consumers' taste for variety
to the literature of international environmental agreements and trade. Our stylized
model allows for exploring future research avenues in terms of additional policy
instruments, like tax border adjustments, relaxing the symmetry assumption and
further investigations of sub-features of TFV, such as ideal varieties or asymmetric
consumers' TFV between countries.
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6 Appendixes
A detailed appendix with the full details of all derivations is available upon request.
Below, we summarise the most important steps in the derivation in a compact form
for γ = 1 and γ = 0.
6.1 Equilibrium Taxes for all Scenarios
For each scenario, we derive the F.O.C.s for signatories and non-signatories in stage
2 of the game. Solving these conditions simultaneously, we ﬁnd the equilibrium taxes
for signatories and non-signatories.
• For γ = 1:
t∗i (PS, TR) = −
(a− c)(n− 2m+ 1)
m(n(n−m+ 1)−m+ 2)
t∗j(PS, TR) = −
(a− c)(n− 1)
n(n−m+ 1)−m+ 2
t∗i (CS, PS, TR) = t
∗
j(CS, PS, TR) = −
a− c
n
t∗i (PS, TR,D) =
δ(n(m(n−m+ 3)− n− 1) +m(2−m))− (a− c)(n− 2m+ 1)
m(n(n−m+ 1)−m+ 2)
t∗j(PS, TR,D) = −
δ(m− 2)(n+ 1) + (a− c)(n− 1)
n(n−m+ 1)−m+ 2
t∗i (CS, PS, TR,D) =
nδ(m(2−m) + n(n(m− 1) +m(3−m)− 1))− (a− c)(m(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
mn(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
t∗j(CS, PS, TR,D) = −
nδ(m− 2)(n+ 1) + (a− c)(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
n(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
• For γ = 0:
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t∗i (PS, TR) = t
∗
j(PS, TR) = 0
t∗i (CS, PS, TR) = −
(a− c)m
2n−m
t∗j(CS, PS, TR) = −
a− c
2n− 1
t∗i (PS, TR,D) = δm
t∗j(PS, TR,D) = δ
t∗i (CS, PS, TR,D) =
(2nδ − a+ c)m
2n−m
t∗j(CS, PS, TR,D) =
2nδ − a+ c
2n− 1
6.2 Deﬁnitions
There are certain terms that repeatedly show up in the following. They are listed
below.
Ψ1 = n(n−m+ 1)−m+ 2 = n2 − nm+ n−m+ 2
Ψ2 = n
2 + (1−m)(n+ 1) = n2 − nm+ n−m+ 1
Ψ3 = n
2(m− 1)− n(m− 1)2 −m(m− 2) = n2m− n2 − nm2 + 2nm− n−m2 + 2m
Ψ4 = n(m− 1)−m(m− 2) = nm− n−m2 + 2m
Ψ5 = (m− 2)(n+ 1) = mn+m− 2n− 2
Ψ6 = (m− 1)(n+ 1) = mn+m− n− 1
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Ψ7 = (n−m)(n−m+ 1)−m(1−m) + 2 = n2 − 2nm+ 2m2 + n− 2m+ 2
Ψ8 = n(n
2 +n+1)−2nm(n−m+1)+m2 = n3−2n2m+2nm2 +n2−2nm+m2 +n
It can be shown that all Ψk > 0, ∀n and ∀m ≤ n.
6.3 Non-negativity Constraints
Inserting equilibrium taxes into equilibrium output levels, gives the quantities below,
from which it is evident that for the ﬁrst two welfare scenarios no non-negativity
constraint needs to be imposed apart from a > c. For the third and fourth scenarios,
additional conditions need to be imposed as explained below.







q∗.i(CS, PS, TR) = q
∗




(a− c)(n−m+ 1)− δΨ3
mΨ1
q∗.j(PS, TR,D) =
n(a− c) + δ(n(m− 1) +m− 2)
Ψ1









δn(n(m− 1) +m− 2)
nΨ2
• For γ = 0:
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q∗.i(CS, PS, TR) =
n(a− c)
2n−m









q∗.i(CS, PS, TR,D) =
n(a− c− δm)
2n−m
q∗.j(CS, PS, TR,D) =
n(a− c− δ)
2n− 1
For the third and fourth scenario, the following non-negativity constraints need to
be imposed.
• For W 3i = PSi + TRi −Di
 For γ = 1: signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by a > a˜1 =
δΨ3
n−m+1 + c, and for non-signatories a > c, with a˜1 > c.
 For γ = 0: signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by a > a˜2 =
δm+ c, and for non-signatories' a > a˜3 = δ + c, with a˜2 > a˜3.
• For W 4i = CSi + PSi + TRi −Di
 For γ = 1: signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by a > a˜4 =
δnΨ3
mΨ2
+ c, and for non-signatories by a > c, with a˜4 > a˜2.
 For γ = 0: non-negativity constraints are the same as in the third scenario
above (a > a˜2 for signatories and a > a˜3 for non-signatories).
It is straightforward to show that a˜1 > a˜4. Throughout the whole paper, we assume
the most restrictive constraint to hold for comparison within a scenario and across
scenarios, noting that n ≥ m ≥ 1.
47
6.4 Proposition 2 - Comparing Equilibrium Taxes Across Dif-
ferent Welfare Scenarios
Assume n ≥ m > 2 and the appropriate non-negativity constraints in section 5.3 to
hold. Then, using equilibrium taxes in section 5.1, and the deﬁnitions in section 5.2,
we ﬁnd:
For γ = 1:












































For γ = 0:
t∗i (PS, TR)− t∗i (CS, PS, TR) =
(a− c)m
2n−m > 0
t∗j(PS, TR)− t∗j(CS, PS, TR) =
a− c
2n− 1 > 0
t∗i (PS, TR)− t∗i (PS, TR,D) = −δm < 0
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t∗j(PS, TR)− t∗j(PS, TR,D) = −δ < 0
t∗i (PS, TR,D)− t∗i (CS, PS, TR,D) =
m(a− c− δm)
2n−m > 0
t∗j(PS, TR,D)− t∗j(CS, PS, TR,D) =
a− c− δ
2n− 1 > 0
t∗i (CS, PS, TR)− t∗i (CS, PS, TR,D) = −
2nmδ
2n−m < 0
t∗j(CS, PS, TR)− t∗j(CS, PS, TR,D) = −
2nδ
2n− 1 < 0
6.5 Proposition 3 - Comparing Equilibrium Taxes within each
Welfare Scenario
Using equilibrium taxes as listed in section 5.1, and the deﬁnitions in section 5.2, we
ﬁnd:
For γ = 1:




t∗i (CS, PS, TR)− t∗j(CS, PS, TR) = 0
t∗i (PS, TR,D)− t∗j(PS, TR,D) =
Ψ6(nδ + a− c)
mΨ1
> 0




For γ = 0:
t∗i (PS, TR)− t∗j(PS, TR) = 0
t∗i (CS, PS, TR)− t∗j(CS, PS, TR) = −
2n(a− c)(m− 1)
(2n−m)(2n− 1) < 0
t∗i (PS, TR,D)− t∗j(PS, TR,D) = δ(m− 1) > 0
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t∗i (CS, PS, TR,D)− t∗j(CS, PS, TR,C) =
2n(2nδ − a+ c)(m− 1)
(2n−m)(2n− 1)
which is positive if δm + c < a ≤ 2nδ + c (where δm + c < a is the non-negativity
constraint) and negative if a > 2nδ + c.
Furthermore:






























































which is positive if δm+ c < a ≤ 2nδ + c (where δm+ c < a is the non-negativity




6.6 Proposition 4 - Properties of the Coalition Game7
Scenario W 1i = PSi + TRi:
• For γ = 1:
EP =
(2n2 − 2nm+ 3n− 2m+ 5)(n+ 1)n2(a− c)2
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0
SAD =
−(n
4 − 2n3m+ n2m2 + nm−m2 − 4n+ 3m− 1)(n+ 1)(a− c)2n
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0, m = n, & < 0 ∀m < n
FC =
(n3 − 2n2m+ nm2 + 2n2 − 3nm+m2 + 3n− 3m+ 1)(n+ 1)2(a− c)2n
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0















; assuming n ≥
m > 1.
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Scenario W 2i = CSi + PSi + TRi:








(32n3 +m(n(−28n+ 8m)−m2 +m− 1))(m− 1)n2(a− c)2




(4n2m− 4nm2 +m3 + 8nm− 3m2 − 8n+ 3m)(m− 1)n2(a− c)2









(16n2m− 13nm2 + 2m3 − 16n2 + 13nm− 2m2)(m− 1)n2(a− c)2
(2n− 1)2(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m)2 > 0
Scenario W 3i = PSi + TRi −Di:
• For γ = 1:
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EP =
(nδ + a− c)2(2n2 − 2nm+ 3n− 2m+ 5)(n+ 1)n2
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0
SAD =
−(nδ + a− c)
2(n4 − 2n3m+ n2m2 + nm)(n+ 1)n
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2
−(nδ + a− c)
2(−m2 − 4n+ 3m− 1)(n+ 1)n
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0, m = n, & < 0 ∀m < n
FC =
(nδ + a− c)2(n3 − 2n2m+ nm2 + 2n2 − 3nm+m2 + 3n− 3m+ 1)(n+ 1)2n
Ψ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 > 0
• For γ = 0:








n(m− 1)(4n− 3m)δ2 > 0
Scenario W 4i = CSi + PSi + TRi −Di:














δ2(−4nm2 − 8n2 + 9nm− 2m2 − 4n+ 3m)(n+ 1)n2
(n2 −Ψ5)2Ψ22












(nδ − a+ c)2(32n3 − 28n2m+ 8nm2 −m3 +m2 −m)(m− 1)n2




(nδ − a+ c)2(4n2m− 4nm2 +m3 + 8nm− 3m2 − 8n+ 3m)(m− 1)n2




(nδ − a+ c)2(32n4 − 52n3m+ 24n2m2 − 3nm3)(m− 1)n2
(2n− 1)2(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m)2 +
1
2
(nδ − a+ c)2(16n2m− 13nm2 + 2m3 − 16n2 + 13nm− 2m2)(m− 1)n2
(2n− 1)2(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m)2 > 0
6.7 Proposition 5 - Coalition Stability
Scenario W 1i = PSi + TRi:
• For γ = 1
Wi(S)−Wi(S\{i}) = −n(a− c)
2(n+ 1)(n4m− 2n3m2 + n2m3 − n4 + 4n3m− 5n2m2 + 2nm3)
mΨ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 −
n(a− c)2(n+ 1)(−4n3 + 13n2m− 10nm2 +m3 − 10n2 + 17nm− 7m2 − 12n+ 15m− 9)
mΨ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 < 0
• For γ = 0:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) = 0
Scenario W 2i = CSi + PSi + TRi:
• For γ = 1:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) = 0
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• For γ = 0:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) =
−1
2
n2(a− c)2(m− 1)(2nm−m2 − 6n+ 3m− 1)
(2n− 1)(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m) > 0,∀m ≤ 3, & < 0,∀m > 3
Scenario W 3i = PSi + TRi −Di:
• For γ = 1
Wi(S)−Wi(S\{i}) = −n(nδ + a− c)
2(n+ 1)(n4m− 2n3m2 + n2m3 − n4 + 4n3m)
mΨ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 −
n(nδ + a− c)2(n+ 1)(−5n2m2 + 2nm3 − 4n3 + 13n2m− 10nm2)
mΨ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 −
n(nδ + a− c)2(n+ 1)(m3 − 10n2 + 17nm− 7m2 − 12n+ 15m− 9)
mΨ21(n
2 − nm+ 2n−m+ 3)2 < 0
• For γ = 0:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) = −1
4
nδ2(m− 1)(m− 3) ≥ 0,∀m ≤ 3, & < 0, ∀m > 3
Scenario W 4i = CSi + PSi + TRi −Di:
• For γ = 1:
Wi(S)−Wi(S\{i}) = −1
2










δ2n2(n+ 1)(28n2m− 12nm2 − 16n2 + 19nm− 2m2 − 8n+ 3m)
mΨ22(n
2 −Ψ5)2 < 0
• For γ = 0:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) =
−1
2
n2(2nδ − a+ c)2(m− 1)(2nm−m2 − 6n+ 3m− 1)
(2n− 1)(2n−m+ 1)2(2n−m) > 0,∀m ≤ 3, & < 0,∀m > 3
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Abstract
Unilateral or sub-global actions on climate change are not very eﬀective but
global action is not stable due to strong free-rider incentives. These incentives
arise because of emissions leakage by non-signatories and the loss of competi-
tiveness by treaty signatories due to higher environmental standards. We study
a policy instrument which has been recently proposed to tackle free-riding:
border tax adjustments (BTAs). We use a simple strategic trade model which
captures consumers' taste for variety to analyse the conditions when BTAs are
able to level the playing ﬁeld and lead to large stable environmental treaties.
We show they are particularly successful provided treaties remain of the open
membership type and do no serve the interests of few countries who may prefer
an exclusive membership rule.
Keywords: self-enforcing international environmental agreements, international trade,
border tax adjustments, consumers' preferences, horizontal products' diﬀerentiation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, F18, H23, Q52, Q54, Q56, Q58.
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1 Introduction
Reaching international agreements on climate change has proved to be a diﬃcult
task over the past two and half decades. One of the most notable achievements of
the climate change negotiations thus far is Paris Climate Agreement, signed in De-
cember 2015. This agreement aims to achieve the scientiﬁcally recommended target
of limiting the temperature increase by the year 2100 to 2 degrees Celsius compared
to pre-industrial levels. However, despite agreeing on this target, signatories' cur-
rent emission reduction pledges fall short of meeting it and will potentially yield a
temperature increase of 2.7-3 degrees Celsius (UNFCCC, 2015). Furthermore, the
agreement fails to bind signatories to meet their pledges.
Scholars in the game theoretic literature on the formation of international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs) attribute the diﬃculty in reaching an eﬀective climate
change agreement to strong free-riding incentives. These incentives emerge due to
the fact that any non-signatory would enjoy the environmental beneﬁts resulting
from signatories' emissions reduction eﬀorts without incurring any costs. There-
fore, given the absence of supranational authority that could enforce cooperation on
climate change, any stable agreement has to be self-enforcing. Findings in this liter-
ature show that this free riding phenomenon has either led to agreements with few
signatories and/or with very low and hence ineﬀective emission reduction targets. In
other words, these agreements are either small, shallow or both (see Barrett, 1994a;
and Finus, 2003 for surveys).
In the context of international trade and free movement of goods and factors of
production there are additional challenges facing eﬀective action on climate change.
Unilateral or sub-global actions on climate change could lead to a shift in production
towards non-signatory countries resulting in emission leakage. Furthermore, ﬁrms
operating in signatory countries suﬀer from loss of competitiveness due to the costs
of complying with the climate policy. In other words, when considering international
trade, incentives for coordinating (free riding on) climate change actions are weaker
(stronger) than the case of autarky. Check Zhang (2012) for a survey on the theoretic
literature and empirical evidence.
This paper is an extension of Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017) in which the authors
introduce horizontal products' diﬀerentiation and consumers' taste for variety (TFV)
to the literature of IEAs under free trade. The authors ﬁnd that only with a suﬃ-
ciently high taste for variety, free riding incentives are suﬃciently mitigated such that
small agreements are stable. In other words, their ﬁndings conﬁrm the pessimistic
conclusion which mainly emerges from the IEA literature, and hence emission taxes
as ﬁrst best solution did not help in reaching the grand coalition.
In order to overcome such pessimistic predictions, further contributions in the lit-
erature followed diﬀerent strategies such as analysing various policy instruments,
markets' structures or trade features. In this paper we analyse the eﬀects of instru-
menting the IEA agreement with a trade policy called border tax adjustment (BTA)
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as a second best solution. Using this policy signatory governments can impose an ad-
ditional border tax on imports from non-signtories' ﬁrms. This border tax amounts
to the tax diﬀerential between the high emission tax that signatory ﬁrms are facing in
their domestic markets and the low emission tax that non-signatory ﬁrms are facing
for their exports to these markets.
There are other trade policy instruments that could be employed to improve the
incentives for cooperation on climate change. One option could be trade tariﬀs,
which government can impose on imports. The main diﬀerences between the BTA
policy and trade tariﬀs are as follows. Firstly, BTAs are policy instruments available
to signatory governments only. They are justiﬁed on the bases that only when
signatories choose higher emission taxes than non-signatories they can impose BTAs
on imports from non-signatories' ﬁrms. This will allow signatory governments to
level the playing ﬁeld in their own markets as well as create additional and explicit
incentives to join the environmental agreement. As for trade tariﬀs, they are available
to all governments of all countries, be it signatory or non-signatory ones. Tariﬀs in
this context are employed as a trade policy instrument. They are widely adopted
worldwide as part of the existing international trade system. One could explore
whether signatory governments can beneﬁt from such existing policies to inﬂuence
participation in climate change agreements. The second diﬀerence between BTAs and
trade tariﬀs is as follows. BTAs are limited to the diﬀerence between signatories'
emission taxes and non-signatories' one. Whereas, trade tariﬀs are not constrained
to any rule. The level of signatories' tariﬀs is chosen to maximise their joint welfare.
In the current literature on BTAs, contributions use a 2-country setup extending
Brander and Spencer (1985) framework of Cournot oligopoly. Most contributions in
this literature show that BTA schemes are Pareto improving, lead to higher emission
taxes as well as higher participation in eﬀective IEAs (Vlassis, 2014; Eyland and
Zaccour, 2013 and 2014; and Anoulies, 2014). Also following B&S (1985) setup, Baksi
and Chaudhuri (2016) assume inﬁnitely repeated games framework and ﬁnd that
BTAs might discourage cooperation for countries with high emission taxes whenever
the discounted gains from the BTAs revenues are larger than the negative eﬀects of
high emissions. Baksi and Chaudhuri (2014) examine the application of BTAs in an
n country model and show that introducing BTAs leads to higher global welfare when
the grand coalition is not stable. Our paper contributes to this body of literature by
analysing the eﬀects of consumers' TFV under imperfect competition in an n country
framework.
Another strand in the literature focuses on estimating the eﬀects of BTAs using
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. Branger and Quirion (2014) conduct
a comprehensive meta-analysis on 25 relevant studies (including Böhringer et al.
2012; and Fischer and Fox, 2012) and show that ﬁndings in all these studies support
the argument that BTAs lead to a decrease in emission leakage. Applying the BTA
case on the Canadian economy, Dissou and Eyland (2011) ﬁnd that BTAs reduce
the competitive disadvantage that domestic industries suﬀer from given the high
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production costs due to emission taxes. The main setback of these CGE studies is
they discount the possibility of allowing other countries to react to BTAs through
adjusting their domestic emission reduction policies. However, Irfanoglu et al. (2015)
overcome this setback and combine a sequential game and CGE model to study the
case of imposing BTAs by the United States against China. The authors ﬁnd that
BTAs lead to compliance by China with the socially optimal taxes.
Our paper also relates to the literature that assesses the conditions under which larger
and more eﬀective IEAs could form under international trade comparing to autarky.
Extending Barrett's (1994b) IEAs autarky model to the case of international trade
under perfect competition, Eichner and Pethig (2013) show that large coalitions could
be stable under Stackelberge coalition formation games comparing to small coalitions
under Nash Cournot games as in E&P (2012). However, they ﬁnd that the emission
reduction eﬀorts of these large coalitions are negligible. In E&P (2014a) the authors
show that the introduction of emissions taxes could lead to the stability of the grand
coalition. Other contributions in this literature strand address the implications of
using trade bans as an additional policy instrument in the climate agreement and
show that such policy leads to large and more eﬀective agreements (Barrett, 1997;
and E&P, 2014b).
Our model is an extension of Brander and Spencer (1985) framework where we as-
sume n ex ante symmetric countries, the governments of which are concerned not
only with their ﬁrms' proﬁts and tax revenues but also with the utility of their con-
sumers and environmental damages resulting from a global pollutant. Each country
has a single ﬁrm that produces a unique variety of a horizontally diﬀerentiated good
and consumers' have taste for these varieties. Thus, our paper beneﬁts from contribu-
tions by Yi (1996) and (2000) who look at international trade, trade agreements and
taste for variety, but ignore environmental damages and their eﬀect on governments'
strategic behaviour.8
Governments in each country can impose emissions tax on their ﬁrm's production in
order to reduce pollution damages. Countries that join the climate change agreement
are able to impose border tax adjustments on imports from non-signatories' ﬁrms.
Revenues from these border taxes represent an additional income for signatories'
governments. In this setup we examine the eﬀects of border tax adjustment in
inﬂuencing countries' decisions on their emission taxes as well as membership status
by comparing two cases: climate change agreements with and without border tax
adjustments, called hereafter: BTA regime and No BTA regime, respectively.
Our results show that when consumers have low or medium taste for varieties, the
BTA regime leads to the grand coalition to be stable if membership is open to
all countries. When consumers have high taste for varieties, the grand coalition is
destabilised under open membership. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we
8Check Loke and Winters (2012) for detailed analysis of the TFV feature in the context of Yi's
papers.
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present the model. In section 3 we present the results with detailed discussion about
their driving forces. In section 4 we conclude.
2 Model
2.1 Payoﬀ Function
Consider an intra-industry trade model of n ex ante symmetric countries with a
representative ﬁrm and consumer in each country. We denote the set of countries
by N . Firms produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, i.e. the same good but in
diﬀerent varieties where each ﬁrm produces one unique variety. Firms compete in
a Cournot-fashion. Markets are segmented and each ﬁrm supplies its good to the
domestic and all foreign markets. Because of the segmentation of markets, ﬁrms
play a separate Cournot game in each market.9 Transport costs are assumed away
as usual.
Analysing the BTA policy is only applicable in the case of partial cooperation. More
speciﬁcally, suppose a coalition S forms, with m the cardinality of S. In order to
analyse the BTA policy, called the BTA regime, we focus on m = [2, n − 1], i.e.
partial cooperation where there is set of signatory countries that impose BTAs on
imports from ﬁrms located in non-signatory countries. Signatories are denoted by
i (i ∈ S set of signatories), and non-signatories are denoted by j (j ∈ N\S set of
non-signatories). The BTA policy plays no role in the singletons coalition structure
and the grand coalition (i.e. m = {1, n}, respectively). However, in some part of the
paper we undertake analysis for the whole range m = [1, n], in which case we refer
to the analysis of Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017), called the No BTA regime. We
also undertake comparative analysis between the BTA and No BTA regimes.
The welfare of a signatory country i ∈ S is given by:
Wi = CSi + PSi +BTRi + TRi −Di (1)
where CSi represents country i
′s consumer surplus, PSi country i′s producer surplus,
BTRi country i
′s tax revenue from border tax adjustments imposed by the domestic
government on imports from non-signatories' ﬁrms, TRi country i
′s emission tax
revenue from the tax imposed by the government on its domestic ﬁrm production,
and ﬁnally Di is the pollution damages faced by country i.
The welfare of a non-signatory country j ∈ N\S is given by:
Wj = CSj + PSj + TRj −Dj (2)
each term represents the same welfare component as in equation (1) after the appro-
priate changes in notations. Note that a non-signatory government will not be able
to impose a border tax adjustment on imports from other countries' ﬁrms.
9See Appleyard and Field (2014) as well as Helpman and Krugman (1985) for further background.
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In what follows some of the functions for the welfare components are identical be-
tween signatories and non-signatories and hence we will present the signatories' ones
only.
Consumers are identical and their preferences are represented by a quasi-linear utility
function over two goods (see equation (3) below). The ﬁrst good is the horizontally
diﬀerentiated and traded good. The second good is a numeraire good, representing
the composition of all other goods. Utility is linear in the numeraire good and
quadratic in the diﬀerentiated good.
We assume that consumers have a taste for variety (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). That
is, their utility depends not only on the total quantity consumed but also on the
composition of quantities of the diﬀerentiated good (Yi, 1996 and 2000). The taste
for variety (abbreviated TFV hereafter) is captured by parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] . High
values of γ imply a low taste for variety and for γ = 1 varieties are perfect substitutes.
In contrast, low values of γ represent a high preference for a diverse and balanced
consumption bundle and for γ = 0 varieties cannot be substituted at all.10
More speciﬁcally, let the representative consumer's utility in a signatory country i
be given by ui:








where vi represents the utility from consuming the horizontally diﬀerentiated and
traded good and Mi represents the utility from consuming the numeraire good; qi =
(qi1, ..., qin) is a vector of the varieties consumed by consumers in country i that
are produced by all signatories' and non-signatories' ﬁrms, with qik representing
country i′s consumption of country k′s variety;11 a is a positive demand parameter
and Qi. =
∑
k∈N qik is country i
′s total consumption of all varieties, supplied by all
countries k (i.e. signatory and non-signatory countries).
In this paper, in most parts, we will focus our analysis on three TFV cases for analytic
tractability: no TFV with γ = 1, partial TFV with γ = 0.5 and full TFV with γ = 0.








10An extension could be the ideal variety approach where consumers have not only a general
preference for the variety of a good but also a preference for a particular variety. One application
is a bias towards the domestically produced variety (Di Comite et al, 2014).
11Throughout the paper the ﬁrst subscript indicates the market in which the variety is consumed
and the second subscript indicates the market in which it is produced.
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where pik represents the price faced by consumers in country i consuming the variety
of country k and
∑
l∈N,l 6=k qil is the sum of all consumed varieties produced by all
ﬁrms except ﬁrm k in country k.
From (3) and (4), the representative consumer surplus in a signatory country i ∈ S
is given by:











where the last term in (5) represents consumers' spending.










Equation (7) reaﬃrms the idea that each non-signatory government taxes the total
output of its domestic ﬁrm irrespective of the destination market to which this output
is being produced.





where δ is a damage parameter,
∑
i∈N Qk. is total consumption in every country
k and hence total emissions (due to our assumption of a constant emission output
coeﬃcient of 1). That is, emissions constitute a pure public bad: damages depend
on total emissions.
For producers, allowing for the possibility of border tax adjustments, we need to
distinguish between ﬁrms located in signatory and non-signatory countries. The
producer surplus of a ﬁrm located in signatory country i is the sum of its proﬁt










qki(pki − c− ti) +
∑
l∈N\S
qli(pli − c− ti) (9)
where piki (pili) represents ﬁrm i's proﬁt in signatory k's (non-signatory l
′s) market
from selling quantity qki (qli) at price pki (pli); c is constant marginal cost and ti is
the tax imposed by country i's government on its ﬁrm's production.
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qkj(pkj − c− tj − Ω) +
∑
l∈N\S
qlj(plj − c− tj) (10)
where pikj (pilj) represents ﬁrm j's proﬁt in signatory k's (non-signatory l
′s) market
from selling quantity qkj (qlj) at price pkj (plj), and tj is the tax imposed by country
j′s government on its ﬁrm's production.
Ω in equation (10) captures the border tax adjustment that ﬁrm j faces when it ex-
ports its variety to a signatory market i. For the BTA policy to be valid, signatories'
emission tax ti must be greater than non-signatories' emission tax tj (i.e. ti > tj), so
that a positive BTA is imposed on the border of signatories' markets. We call this
condition the BTA constraint. If the BTA constraint is violated (i.e. ti ≤ tj) then
the border tax adjustment turns into a border subsidy and hence the BTA analysis
in our context is not valid.
Using Ω we ensure that the BTA constraint is satisﬁed as follows. Ω is a piecewise
function such that Ω =
{
φ(ti − tj) if ti > tj
0 if ti ≤ tj
. The ﬁrst case, Ω = φ(ti − tj),
represents the border tax adjustment that is applicable only when the BTA constraint
is satisﬁed, i.e. ti > tj. The BTA parameter φ > 0 indicates the adjustment level.
12
We impose full adjustment where φ = 1 so that signatories would generate the
highest border tax adjustment revenue by taxing the full diﬀerence between ti and
tj. Furthermore, full adjustment would also fully level the playing ﬁeld for all ﬁrms
operating in each signatory's market. We do not analyse the case of φ > 1 as it
would be diﬃcult to justify this against the rules of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO).
Notice that under full adjustment (i.e. plugging Ω = φ(ti− tj) and φ = 1 in equation
(10) above) non-signatories' ﬁrms are de facto facing ti in total when they export
their variety to signatories' markets. However, given the speciﬁcation in (10), non-
signatories' ﬁrms face tj at home imposed by their own government on all production
irrespective of the destination market, and when they export to signatories' markets
they additionally face the diﬀerence (ti − tj) due to the BTA, bringing the total tax
burden they face for their production to signatories' markets to ti. The second case
of the piecewise function, Ω = 0, represents the situation where the BTA constraint
is not satisﬁed, i.e. ti ≤ tj.
The revenue from the border tax adjustments imposed by a signatory country i ∈ S





12Following Eyland and Zaccour (2013).
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Ω follows the same rational as above. Equation (11) ensures that signatories are able
to collect border tax revenue from the diﬀerence of (ti − tj) only.
2.2 Coalition Formation Game
We assume a three-stage coalition formation game, which unfolds as follows when
solved by backward induction.
Stage 3, Choice of Output: all ﬁrms choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively
their segmented market outputs by maximising their producer surplus: max
q1i,...,qni
PSi
Stage 2, Choice of Policy Level: all countries choose simultaneously their emission
tax.
• Signatories choose their joint emission tax ti (implemented uniformly in all









Stage 1, Choice of Membership: all countries decide simultaneously whether to join
a coalition S with m the cardinality of S. Countries which do not join S act as
singletons. A typical signatory will be denoted by i and a non-signatory by j.
A coalition is called stable following d'Aspremont et al. (1983) if it is internally and
externally stable (I&ES). Internal stability means that no signatory has an incentive
to leave coalition S, whereas external stability means that no non-signatory has an
incentive to join coalition S. We assume for simplicity that in the case of indiﬀerence
a non-signatory joins coalition S.
Internal stability:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S
External stability:three
Wj(S)−Wj(S ∪ {j}) > 0 ∀j ∈ N \ S
2.3 Properties of the Game
We deﬁne the following properties to analyse the incentive structure to form coalitions
and the associated welfare implications.
For all S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, and S ′ = S ∪ {j} where S ′ ⊆ N :
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• Positive Externality: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coalition
S
′
exhibits a (strict) positive externality if:
Wj(S
′
) ≥ (>)Wj(S) ∀j /∈ S and j /∈ S ′
• Negative Externality: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coali-
tion S
′




) < Wj(S) ∀j /∈ S and j /∈ S ′
• Positive Internal Spillover: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to
coalition S
′
exhibits (strict) positive internal spillovers if:
Wi(S
′
) ≥ (>)Wi(S) ∀i ∈ S and i ∈ S ′
• Negative Internal Spillover: in a coalition game a move from coalition S
to coalition S
′




) < Wi(S) ∀i ∈ S and i ∈ S ′
• Superadditivity: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coalition S ′



















• Full Cohesiveness: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coalition
S
′


















Superadditivity provides the incentives to join a coalition, whereas the positive exter-
nality captures the incentive to free ride. In terms of forming large stable coalitions,
the two properties work in opposite directions and typically for large coalitions the
positive externality eﬀects should be dominated by the superadditivity eﬀects. We
introduce two new properties, namely positive and negative internal spillovers that
represent the eﬀects of enlarging the coalition on the current signatories individually.
We characterise the relationship between the internal spillover (positive and nega-
tive) and superadditivity properties in Appendix 1. Full cohesiveness justiﬁes the
search for large stable coalitions, even if the grand coalition is not stable. Essentially,
global welfare increases when the coalition is enlarged gradually and if it obtains its
maximum under the grand coalition then cohesiveness holds.
3 Results
3.1 Third Stage
In this section, we derive the results for the third stage. In the case of cooperation,
if we already account for the fact of symmetric taxes in stage 2 with all signatories
choosing the same tax rate ti and all non-signatories choose the same tax rate tj
(and typically ti 6= tj), we can derive the equilibrium quantity for a signatory's and
a non-signatory's ﬁrm as follows.
Given the segmented markets' structure, markets can be categorised into signatories'
and non-signatories' markets. First we look at markets under the BTA regime. In a
signatory's market, there are two equilibrium quantities. The ﬁrst q∗ki represents sig-
natory ﬁrm i′s production to any signatory's market k. This ﬁrm faces an emission
tax only, imposed by its own government. The second equilibrium quantity q∗kj repre-
sents non-signatory ﬁrm j′s production to any signatory's market k. This ﬁrm faces
an emission tax imposed by its own government, and the BTA adjustment imposed
by the signatory's government of the destination market. The total consumption in
any signatory's market is given by Q∗k..
13 As for non-signatories' markets, there are
also two equilibrium quantities. The ﬁrst q∗li represents signatory ﬁrm i
′s production
to any non-signatory's market l. This ﬁrm faces an emission tax only, imposed by
its own government. The second equilibrium quantity q∗lj represents non-signatory
ﬁrm j′s production to any non-signatory's market l. This ﬁrm faces an emission tax
only, imposed by its own government. The total consumption in any non-signatory's
13Notation: in total consumption we replace the second subscript with a dot (e.g. Q∗k.) in order
to illustrate summing total consumption irrespective of the production source. The same principle
applies to total production as illustrated in the BTA Regime table.
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market is given by Q∗l.. The segmented market structure under the BTA regime can
be illustrated in the following table:
BTA Regime Signatory ﬁrm i Non-signatory ﬁrm j Total Consumption










Total Production Q∗.i Q
∗
.j Q
We now look at markets under the No-BTA regime. Given our assumption of seg-
mented market structure each ﬁrm supplies its good to the domestic and all foreign
markets. Since the tax imposed on production is not diﬀerentiated based on the
destination market and there are no BTA adjustments in the No BTA regime, the
equilibrium quantity of any ﬁrm's variety is the same for all markets. That is, be-
cause of the segmentation of markets ﬁrms play a separate and identical Cournot
game in each market. Therefore, there are two equilibrium quantities in the No BTA
regime irrespective of the destination market. The ﬁrst q∗.i represents signatory ﬁrm
i′s production to any market.14 This ﬁrm faces an emission tax only, imposed by its
own government. The second equilibrium quantity q∗.j represents non-signatory ﬁrm
j′s production to any market. This ﬁrm faces an emission tax only, imposed by its
own government. The segmented market structure under the No BTA regime can be
illustrated in the following table:






.i + (n−m)q∗.jNon-signatory market l






Looking at the BTA regime, we ﬁrst present the equilibrium quantities for all ﬁrms'
varieties produced for a non-signatory's market (q∗li & q
∗
lj). These equilibrium quan-
tities (q∗li & q
∗
lj) have the same functional form of the No BTA regime's equilibrium
quantities (q∗.i & q
∗
.j), respectively. This is true because there are no BTA adjust-
ments in non-signatories' markets under the BTA regime, and of course no BTA
adjustments in the No BTA regime. However, once the equilibrium taxes are in-
serted into quantities, then the actual quantities will be diﬀerent. Therefore, we do
not need to derive q∗.i and q
∗
.j as they will follow the same functional forms as q
∗
li and
q∗lj, respectively. We present the detailed quantities' derivation in Appendix 2.
A signatory ﬁrm i′s variety produced for a non-signatory l′s market is given by:
14Notation: we replace the ﬁrst subscript with a dot in order to illustrate the idea that a sig-
natory's ﬁrm produces the same output irrespective of the destination market. Same applies for a
non-signatory's ﬁrm, as we will show next.
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q∗li =
(a− c)(2− γ)− γ(n−m)(ti − tj)− ti(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (12)
and a non-signatory ﬁrm j′s variety produced for a non-signatory l′s market is given
by:
q∗lj =
(a− c)(2− γ) + γm(ti − tj)− tj(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (13)
with the total equilibrium consumption in a non-signatory l′s market from all vari-
eties (Q∗l. = mq
∗
li + (n−m)q∗lj) is given by:
Q∗l. =
n(a− c)−m(ti − tj)− ntj
(n− 1)γ + 2 (14)
Next, we present the equilibrium quantities for all ﬁrms' varieties produced for a
signatory's market (q∗ki & q
∗
kj). We present the detailed quantities' derivation in
Appendix 2.15
A signatory ﬁrm i′s variety produced for a signatory k′s market is given by:16
q∗ki =
(a− c)(2− γ)− γ(n−m)(ti − tj)(1− φ)− ti(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (15)
and a non-signatory ﬁrm j′s variety produced for a signatory k′s market is given
by:17
q∗kj =
(a− c)(2− γ)− (ti − tj)(γ(m(φ− 1)− φ) + 2φ)− tj(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (16)
with the total equilibrium consumption in a signatory k′s market from all varieties
(Q∗k. = mq
∗
ki + (n−m)q∗kj) is given by:18
Q∗k. =
n(a− c)− (n−m)(ti − tj)(φ− 1)− nti
(n− 1)γ + 2 (17)
15Here we will illustrate the case whereby in the absence of the BTA policy in signatories' markets,
the quantities q∗ki and q
∗




lj above, respectively. In






lj(.). Therefore, in the No BTA regime they boil down to
q∗.i & q
∗
.j , respectively, as the destination market does not matter anymore.
16Notice that one can drive the equilibrium quantity q∗ki for the No BTA regime (ti ≤ tj) by
setting φ = 0 in q∗ki, in which case it becomes the same as q
∗
li above.
17Similar to the previous footnote: q∗kj in (16) under the No BTA regime (φ = 0) becomes the
same as q∗lj .
18Similar to the previous footnote: Q∗k. in (17) under the No BTA regime (φ = 0) becomes the
same as Q∗l..
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Since the BTA policy is only valid when ti > tj and given our assumption of full
adjustment: φ = 1, we can draw the following intuitive conclusions, which can be
veriﬁed from equations (12) to (20). First, consumers in a signatory k′s market
consume the same amount from all varieties, be it produced by signatories' or non-
signatories' ﬁrms: q∗ki = q
∗
kj, ∀γ. This is due to the full adjustment (φ = 1), under
which a non-signatory ﬁrm j de facto faces ti when exporting its variety to a signatory
k′s market. Second, given our assumption that ti > tj, this implies that total
consumption in a signatory k′s market is lower than total consumption in a non-
signatory l′s market: Q∗k. < Q
∗
l., ∀γ. Third, the total production of ﬁrm i′s variety is
lower than total production of ﬁrm j′s variety: Q∗.i < Q
∗
.j, ∀γ. Finally, the quantity
of ﬁrm j′s variety produced for a non-signatory l′s market is higher than its quantity
produced for a signatory k′s market: q∗lj > q
∗
kj, ∀γ, give that ti > tj.
More formal conclusions are presented in Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 below.
Proposition 1 - The Eﬀects of Taxes on Equilibrium Quantities
Suppose a coalition S has formed in the ﬁrst stage and all players have chosen their
equilibrium taxes in the second stage
• In the BTA regime, the quantities of ﬁrms i's and j's varieties in a signatory's



















= 0, irrespective of γ.
• In the BTA regime, the quantity of ﬁrm i's (j's) variety in a non-signatory's



















= 0). The total







< 0, irrespective of γ.
Proof: Follows directly from equations (12) to (17) above. Q.E.D.
Under the BTA regime, quantities of any ﬁrm's variety (a signatory's or non-signatory's
ﬁrm) produced for signatories' markets are negatively aﬀected by signatories' taxes
and not at all aﬀected by non-signatories' taxes. This holds true irrespective of the
TFV assumption, i.e. γ = [0, 1]. In signatories' markets, non-signatories' ﬁrms de




(n−1)γ+2 , which is also
the same for equation (15) q∗ki =
a−c−ti
(n−1)γ+2). In other words, non-signatories' taxes tj
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have no strategic eﬀects on any ﬁrm's production for signatories' markets due to the
full BTA adjustment.
Quantities of any ﬁrm's variety (signatory's or non-signatory's ﬁrm) produced for
non-signatories' markets under the BTA regime are negatively aﬀected by own taxes
and positively aﬀected by foreign taxes. Only under full TFV, i.e. γ = 0, will a ﬁrm's
output not be aﬀected by a foreign tax imposed on a foreign ﬁrm. In which case, each
ﬁrm acts as a monopolist in each market as consumers do not substitutes between
varieties and hence there is no competition among ﬁrms. Notice that these strategic
interactions in non-signatories' markets under the BTA regime also apply under the
No BTA regime not only for non-signatories' markets but also for signatories' ones
as shown in Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017). This is true because there are no BTA
adjustments in non-signatories' markets under the BTA regime, and of course no
BTA adjustments in the No BTA regime.
Overall, these conclusions imply that using the BTA policy signatories' governments
are more able to inﬂuence global emissions given that they control emission taxes in
their own markets; an inﬂuential position they do not enjoy in the absence of the
BTA policy.
Proposition 2 - The Eﬀects of BTAs on Production Patterns
Suppose a coalition S has formed in the ﬁrst stage and all players have chosen their
equilibrium taxes in the second stage
• in a non-signatory's market, a non-signatory ﬁrm j′s output is always higher
than a signatory ﬁrm i′s output, q∗lj > q
∗
li, irrespective of γ.
• a signatory ﬁrm i′s output for any signatory's market is higher than its output
for any non-signatory's market, q∗ki > q
∗




Proof: Follows directly from equations (12) to (17) above. Q.E.D.
Under the BTA regime, all varieties' levels produced for signatories' markets are the





∀γ, where terms of trade are the same for all ﬁrms' (signa-
tories' and non-signatories' ones) due to the full BTA adjustment. However, in non-




lower than non-signatories ﬁrms' one q∗lj =
a−c+m(ti−tj)−tj
n+1




ti > tj, signatories' ﬁrms suﬀer from a comparative disadvantage (−(n−m)(ti − tj)
in q∗li) in non-signatories' market, while non-signatories' ﬁrms beneﬁt from this tax
diﬀerential (+m(ti − tj) in q∗lj).
19This is an example for γ = 1. However, the discussion applies for γ = [0, 1].
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From signatories' ﬁrms perspective, their production for signatories' markets q∗ki =
a−c−ti
n+1




given the comparative disadvantage (−(n−m)(ti − tj)) they face in q∗li. This holds
true whenever varieties are substitutable, γ = (0, 1]. When varieties become in-








In this section, we derive equilibrium taxes for signatories and non-signatories in
the second stage. The equilibrium taxes follow from the F.O.Cs. for signatories'
and non-signatories' welfare functions. Check Appendix 3 below for the equilibrium
taxes' equations. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the S.O.Cs. are satisﬁed.
Inserting equilibrium taxes into equilibrium quantities reveals that we need to impose
non-negativity constraints in order to ensure positive outputs. Essentially, these con-
straints boil down to requesting that the demand parameter a is larger than marginal
production cost c plus a multiple of marginal damages. In other words, this non-
negativity constraint represents a lower threshold a, such that a > a. Furthermore,
as mentioned earlier, in order for the BTA policy to be valid we need to ensure that
the BTA constraint t∗i > t
∗
j is satisﬁed. This is achievable by identifying an upper
threshold for the demand parameter such that a ≤ a. Above this threshold we ﬁnd
t∗i ≤ t∗j as the coalition's joint welfare maximisation calls for lower taxes in order to
maximise consumers' welfare.
We consider three values of TFV parameter: no TFV with γ = 1, partial TFV
with γ = 0.5, and full TFV with γ = 0. Due to the complexity of the analytical
results under the BTA regime we resort to full simulations in order to generate the
constraints (a & a) as well as all the subsequent results of the remainder of the
paper. The parameters' constellations for the simulation are as follows: n = 10,
γ = {0, 0.5, 1}, δ = {10, 50, 100}, c = 0,20 and full adjustment φ = 1.
We present the details of driving both the non-negativity and BTA constraints for
both regimes in Appendix 4, which results in having a parameters' space for each
regime. Then we proceed in the analysis by creating a joint BTA and No BTA
parameters' space such that both constraints are satisﬁed in both regime (i.e. a <
a ≤ a) in order to be able to undertake comparative analysis. The joint parameters'
space for both regimes is as follows:
20Since we have constant marginal costs symmetric across all ﬁrms (signatories' and non-
signatories' ones) such simpliﬁcation, c = 0, will not aﬀect our qualitative results.
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δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
a a a a a a
γ = 0 101 104 501 520 1001 1040
γ = 0.5 120 1000 590 5300 1250 10500
γ = 1 250 5000 1350 25000 2500 50000
In order to cover the whole parameters' space, we break each range (for each δ and γ
combination) into 5 equidistant points using the interval 4 = a−a
5
. The value of a at
each point would be given by ai = ai−1 +4 for i = 1, ..., 5. For instance: a1 = a+4
and a5 = a4 +4 ≤ a. Check Appendix 4 for further details.
In the results presented below we discuss the qualitative results that cover the whole
parameters' space, i.e. all a values for the 5 equidistant points for each δ and γ
combination. We present the detailed results for each equidistant point in Appendix
6. We highlight the deviations in the results under particular values, if any, during
the discussion.
Result 1 - Comparing Equilibrium Taxes Across BTA and No BTA Regimes
Whenever the BTA policy is introduced by the coalition (i.e. shifting to the BTA
regime)
• signatories always increase their equilibrium emission taxes tBTAi > tNoBTAi
• and non-signatories' increase their equilibrium emission taxes tBTAj > tNoBTAj ,
except for γ = 1 they decrease their taxes when the coalition size is below
certain threshold: tBTAj < t
NoBTA
j ,∀m ≤ m˜, then they increase them above this
threshold tBTAj > t
NoBTA
j ,∀m > m˜.
The BTA policy provides signatory governments with an additional strategic tool to
internalise externalities from emissions but also protecting their ﬁrms' competitive-
ness in the domestic markets. Furthermore, and importantly, it also serves as an
additional source to collect taxes from imports produced but ﬁrms located in non-
signatory countries. Therefore, taxes of signatory governments are higher under the
BTA regime than under the No BTA regime.
From non-signatory government's point of view, BTA adjustments have the following
implications. Firstly, their consumers need to pay higher prices for varieties supplied
by ﬁrms located in signatory countries. Secondly, their ﬁrms face an additional tax
burden at the borders to signatories' markets that will negatively aﬀect their proﬁts.
Thirdly, they face a loss of potential tax revenue, i.e. tax revenue generated by their
ﬁrms but which goes into signatory governments' coﬀers. Therefore, non-signatory
governments reaction is complex. On the one hand, non-signatory governments could
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raise their taxes in order to protect their tax revenues. On the other hand, they could
lower their taxes to protect their consumers.
The incentive to protect domestic consumers decreases the lower the value of γ and
vanishes for the full TFV with γ = 0. In our simulations, this incentive is also
suﬃciently low for γ = 0.5, such that for the full and partial TFV, i.e. γ = {0, 0.5}
the tax protection eﬀect dominates the consumer protection eﬀect and hence non-
signatory governments choose a higher tax under the BTA than under No BTA
regime. For no TFV, i.e. γ = 1, this is also true if m > m˜, but is reversed if m ≤ m˜.
That is, the dominance of one driving force over the other depends on the size of the
coalition they are exporting to. For small to medium coalition sizes non-signatories'
governments reduce their emission taxes in order to protect their domestic consumers.
Given that varieties are substitutable, having lower taxes imposed on the domestic
ﬁrm helps consumers to substitute the expensive varieties imported from signatories'
ﬁrms with the cheaper domestic one. For large coalition sizes, non-signatories' ﬁrms
are faced with higher tax burden overall given the high number of signatories and
hence there is a higher loss of potential revenue for the non-signatories' government.
In such situation, non-signatories' governments choose higher taxes.
In all cases, the overall tax level under the BTA regime is higher than under the
No BTA regime such that total output and hence total emissions are always lower
for every coalition size (which does not include the grand coalition). Hence, we can
already conjecture that provided equilibrium stable coalitions are larger under the
BTA regime than under the No BTA regime, global emissions will be lower.
3.3 First Stage
Result 2 - Properties of the No BTA and BTA Coalition Games
In the coalition game of the No BTA Regime, the properties of positive externality,
full cohesiveness and hence cohesiveness hold strictly ∀γ. A signatory's welfare is
always lower than a non-signatory's one ∀γ. Internal spillovers turn from negative
into positive above certain coalition size threshold m˜ (always positive, ∀m) for γ = 1
(γ = {0, 0.5}). Superadditivity generally fails (always holds) for γ = 1 (γ = {0, 0.5}).
More speciﬁcally:21
γ WNoBTAi −WNoBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC
1 − + − then + − +
0.5 − + + + +
0 − + + + +
21Legend: I Spillover: Internal Spillover. SAD: Superadditivity. FC: Full Cohesiveness. The
input of +: implies holds or positive (depending on the property). The input of −: fails or
negative.
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In the coalition game of the BTA Regime, the properties of superadditivity and cohe-
siveness hold strictly ∀γ. Full cohesiveness holds above certain coalition size threshold
m˜ (always holds, ∀m) for γ = {0.5, 1} (γ = 0). Externality is always negative (pos-
itive) for γ = 1 (γ = 0), while for γ = 0.5 turns from negative into positive above
certain coalition size threshold m˜. A signatory's welfare is always higher than a non-
signatory's one, except for γ = 0 there is a threshold of coalition size m˜, above which
this inequality reverses. Internal spillovers turn from positive into negative above
certain coalition size threshold m˜ (always positive, ∀m) for γ = {0.5, 1} (γ = 0 ).
More speciﬁcally:
γ WBTAi −WBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC
1 + − + then − + − then +
0.5 + − then + + then − + − then +
0 + then − + + + +
When signatories shift to the BTA regime, each individual signatory's welfare always
increases ∀γ, and each individual non-signatory's welfare decreases for γ = {0.5, 1},
while for γ = 0 there is a coalition size threshold m˜, above which their individual
welfare increases. M 32ore speciﬁcally:
γ WBTAi −WNoBTAi WBTAj −WNoBTAj
1 + −
0.5 + −
0 + + then −
Findings in Result 2 for the No BTA regime show that the normative property of
full cohesiveness holds with the highest level of global welfare achieved under the
grand coalition. That is, the global welfare is increasing in the coalition size due
to the increasing internalisation of the damage externality. Findings also illustrate
the incentives of free riding on the coalition's eﬀorts, as the externality property is
always positive. The incentives to join the coalition, represented by the property of
superadditivity, exist only for γ = {0, 0.5}. For γ = 1 superadditivity holds only for
the move from a coalition with m∗ = n − 1 signatories to the grand coalition m∗ =
n. Due to full substitutability of varieties (γ = 1), the emission reduction eﬀorts
of signatories are fully undermined by the reaction of non-signatories. However,
when varieties are not fully substitutable, γ = {0, 0.5}, then such leakage eﬀects are
undermined and hence superadditivity holds in these cases. Finally, signatories are
always worse-oﬀ than non-signatories for each possible coalition size and for all ∀γ
as their ﬁrms and consumers are incurring the costs of emission reductions.
Looking at the internal spillovers resulting from enlarging the coalition under the No
BTA regime, we ﬁnd that for γ = {0, 0.5} they are always positive. However, for γ =
1 they are negative for small to medium coalition sizes (−,∀m∗ = [2, 5], ∀a where a <
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a ≤ a), then they turn into positive. Again, this relates to the fact that when varieties
are perfect substitutes under γ = 1 the leakage eﬀects undermine the coalition's
emission reductions eﬀorts. Such eﬀects are less pronounced for large coalitions, and
hence the internal spillovers become positive. Furthermore, signatories' ﬁrms face
strong comparative disadvantage due to the emission tax when varieties are perfect
substitutes, as shown in Proposition 2. Whenever varieties matter (γ = {0, 0.5}),
the internal spillovers are always positive due to low leakage eﬀects.
When signatories shift to the BTA regime, we ﬁnd the incentives to join the coalition
are strong as superadditivity hold in all cases, ∀γ. The more countries join the coali-
tion, the higher are emission reductions eﬀorts. Furthermore, new signatories can
also generate additional tax revenue from the BTA policy. These beneﬁts outweigh
the loss of less BTA tax revenue that existing signatories face when a new country
joins the coalition. Forming and enlarging a coalition under the BTA regime has
two eﬀects on non-signatories. First, the eﬀects of the additional taxes that non-
signatories' ﬁrms face when they export to signatories' markets. These eﬀects are
always negative irrespective of TFV. Second, the eﬀects of the coalition's emission
reduction eﬀorts, which in principle are always positive. However, the degree of these
positive spillovers depend on the TFV. Under γ = 1, these positive spillovers are un-
dermined by non-signatories' reactions due to the full substitutability of varieties.
Hence, in such case the net externalities are negative. Under γ = 0.5, these posi-
tive spillovers are not fully undermined by non-signatories' reactions, and hence they
matter turning the externality into positive for large coalitions. Under γ = 0, these
positive spillovers can not be undermined by non-signatories' reactions and hence
the externality is always positive.
When a new country joins the coalition, this has two eﬀects on the individual welfare
of existing signatories. First, they beneﬁt from the higher emission reductions by the
new signatory. These beneﬁts matter more when TFV is high. Second, they gener-
ate less BTAs revenues, which always has negative eﬀects irrespective of the TFV.
Therefore, for γ = {0.5, 1}, the internal spillovers of enlarging the BTA coalition are
positive for small to medium coalition sizes then they turn into negative due to lower
border tax revenue generated given the very small number of non-signatories. For
γ = 0, the emission reduction eﬀorts always count and hence the internal spillovers
are always positive. Overall, signatories' welfare is always larger than non-signatories'
one given the BTA revenues, except when γ = 0 where non-signatories' welfare is
larger than signatories' one for large coalition sizes as they beneﬁt more from the
coalition's emission reduction eﬀorts.
Looking at the full cohesiveness property for γ = {0.5, 1}, global welfare decreases for
small to medium coalition sizes as the negative externalities toward non-signatories
are very strong and outweigh the BTA tax revenue beneﬁts that signatories are
enjoying. Full cohesiveness turns into positive for large coalitions as more countries
globally are enjoying the BTA tax revenues beneﬁts. For full TFV, i.e. γ = 0,
full cohesiveness always holds given that superadditivity holds and externalities are
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positive.
All in all, the eﬀects of shifting toward the BTA regime can be summarised in two
folds. First, BTAs turn the externality property into negative in most cases for γ =
{0.5, 1} and hence undermining the incentives for free riding. Second, BTAs ensure
that superadditivity holds in all cases ∀γ. Therefore, the BTA policy provide high
incentives for cooperation and result in large coalitions to be stable in equilibrium,
as we will show in Result 3 and 4 below.
Comparing the welfare eﬀects on individual countries after the coalition shifts to the
BTA regime, we ﬁnd that signatories always become better oﬀ given the additional
tax revenue they generate as well as the lower damages. As for non-signatories,
we ﬁnd that for γ = {0.5, 1} they become worse-oﬀ given the negative externalities.
However, when TFV is at the highest level, i.e. γ = 0, non-signatories become better
oﬀ when small coalitions shift to the BTA regime as they beneﬁt from the higher
emission reduction activities. Only when the BTA coalition is large, non-signatories
become worse oﬀ given the higher number of markets in which their ﬁrms face BTAs.
Result 3 - Coalitions under Internal and External Stability
Let m∗ denotes the size of an internally and externally stable coalition. Introducing
the BTA policy leads to the grand coalition, m∗ = n, to be stable in equilibrium under
partial and no TFV, γ = {0.5, 1} respectively. Under full TFV, γ = 0, large, but not
grand, coalitions become stable in equilibrium. More speciﬁcally:
γ No BTA → BTA Regime
1 m∗NoBTA = 1 → m∗BTA = n
0.5 m∗NoBTA = 2 → m∗BTA = n
0 m∗NoBTA = 3 → m∗BTA < n
We ﬁnd that shifting to the BTA regime yields the grand coalition to be always
stable in equilibrium for γ = {0.5, 1}. This is true for the whole parameters' space.
For γ = 0 large coalitions are stable in equilibrium, m∗ = {8, 9}, where the exact
size depends on the parameter a values (i.e. between a and a).22 One can look at
these results from another angle: the eﬀects of TFV reverses when comparing the
No BTA versus BTA regimes. Under the No BTA regime higher TFV renders larger
coalitions to be stable. Under the BTA regime higher TFV leads to less cooperation.
As we showed in Result 2 above, the incentives for free riding on the coalition's
emission reduction eﬀorts under the No BTA regime always exist as the externality
property is always positive. The incentives to join the coalition are represented by
the property of superadditivity. We ﬁnd that these incentives depend on the level
22Check Appendix 6 for more detailed results for each value of a.
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of consumers' taste for variety. Starting with γ = 1, due to the full substitutabil-
ity of varieties the emission reduction eﬀorts of signatories are fully undermined by
the reaction of non-signatories. Therefore, superadditivity fails and we ﬁnd no sta-
ble coalition in equilibrium. However, when varieties are not fully substitutable,
γ = {0, 0.5}, then such leakage eﬀects are lower and hence superadditivity holds in
these cases, providing stronger incentives for cooperation. Nevertheless, the positive
externalities are strong enough to outweigh the beneﬁt from cooperation and hence
we ﬁnd for γ = 0.5 a stable coalition of m∗ = 2 and for γ = 0 a stable coalition of
m∗ = 3. It is evident that when varieties are completely independent (γ = 0) the
leakage eﬀects are at the minimal and hence the largest No BTA coalition of m∗ = 3,
comparing to other levels of TFV, forms.
Introducing the BTA policy provides stronger incentives to join the coalition due
to the beneﬁts of the BTAs revenues for signatories. Furthermore, signatories are
also able to enforce stronger emission reductions in their own markets as their taxes
also apply to non-signatories' imports. From non-signatories' perspective, under the
BTA regime the incentives for free riding are undermined, in most cases, due to
the negative eﬀects of BTAs on their ﬁrms. Therefore, under the BTA regime we
ﬁnd larger stable coalitions comparing to the No BTA regime for any given level
of TFV. In the case of partial and no TFV, γ = {0.5, 1} respectively, the BTA
policy mitigates any free riding incentives through the posed negative externalities
toward non-signatories and hence the grand coalition becomes stable in equilibrium,
comparing to small or no coalitions under No BTA regime. However, for high TFV,
γ = 0, non-signatories enjoy positive rather than negative externalities. The reason
for this is that when varieties are not substitutable, signatories impose higher taxes
as they will not face a large negative response (leakage eﬀects) from non-signatories.
This in turn leads to positive externalities given the higher emission reductions.
Nevertheless, the incentives for forming coalitions are high enough to yield large
coalitions to be stable in equilibrium.
In the next result we look for a coalition size that achieves the highest individual
welfare of all signatories. We consider that if exclusive membership rule is allowed,
then it is in the interest of countries to search for and form such coalition, and not
allow additional countries to join it. The coalition formation process is based on our
internal spillover property.
Result 4 - Coalitions under Exclusive Membership
Let m∗ denotes the size of a BTA stable coalition under exclusive membership. The
size of stable coalitions under partial and no TFV, γ = {0.5, 1} respectively, is given
by m∗ = [5, 8].
Under the BTA regime, higher signatory's individual welfare can be achieved under
smaller coalitions' sizes than the grand coalition. The deriving force behind this is
given by the internal spillovers property: when a new country joins the coalition
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the individual welfare of existing signatories would increase up to a certain coali-
tion size threshold, after which the individual welfare of existing signatories starts
to decrease. This is true because signatories' individual welfare is maximised when
there are few countries outside the coalition from whom they can generate BTA rev-
enues. The negative eﬀects on consumers are minimal as varieties are fully/partially
substitutable.
More speciﬁcally, the size of such coalition under γ = 1 is given by m∗ = {5, 6},
and under γ = 0.5 is given by m∗ = [5, 8]. The exact size depends on the parameter
a values (i.e. between a and a).23 Generally, the size of the stable coalition is
decreasing with the parameter a values , i.e. it is decreasing as demand increases.
This is intuitive given that allowing additional country to join the coalition would
generate higher losses of missing on potential BTA revenues given the very high
demand.24
4 Concluding Remarks
In an intra-industry trade model with horizontal products' diﬀerentiation and con-
sumers' taste for variety (TFV) we studied the formation and stability of inter-
national climate change agreements under free trade. We extended Finus and Al
Khourdajie (2017) paper by providing the climate change agreement's signatories
with an additional policy instrument called border tax adjustment (BTA). Using
this policy signatory governments can impose an additional border tax on imports
from non-signtories' ﬁrms. This border tax amounts to the tax diﬀerential between
the high emission taxes that signatory ﬁrms are facing in their domestic markets and
the low emission taxes that non-signatory ﬁrms are facing for their exports to these
markets.
In generating our results we focused on three cases of TFV. Firstly, no TFV under
which varieties are perfect substitutes. Secondly, partial TFV that implies some
degree of substitutability among varieties. Thirdly, full TFV under which con-
sumers have high preference for a balanced consumption bundle and varieties are
independent. Stability of the coalition leading to an agreement was tested using the
internally and externally stability concept. We also introduced an extension of this
concept to allow for exclusive membership rule. In this setup we examined the eﬀects
of border tax adjustments in inﬂuencing countries' decisions on their emission taxes
as well as membership status by comparing two cases: climate agreements with and
without border tax adjustments, BTA and No BTA regimes, respectively.
23Check Appendix 6 for more detailed results for each value of a.
24As for γ = 0, the internal spillovers are always positive under the BTA regime for all coalition
sizes as we showed in Result 2 above. In other words, m∗ = n is the coalition that achieves the
highest individual signatory's welfare under γ = 0. We do not consider this result here as it is
diﬃcult to justify against an internally and externally stable coalition of m∗ = 7.
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Relating the TFV feature to the intuition of loss of competitiveness, one has to note
the following. Under no (or partial) TFV, there exists (some) loss of competitiveness
facing ﬁrms in signatory countries. This eﬀect however disappears under high TFV
as varieties are independent and ﬁrms de facto act as monopolists over their unique
variety. Therefore, when varieties are not (or somewhat) important, BTAs play an
important role in tackling loss of competitiveness and hence free riding. However,
when varieties do matter to consumers, BTAs become merely a policy tool for addi-
tional tax revenue generation for signatories. Nevertheless, they do tackle free riding
given the additional costs on non-signatories ﬁrms' exports.
Similarly, relating the TFV feature to the intuition of emission leakage, under no (or
partial) TFV, given the full (partial) substitutability of varieties non-signatories can
fully (partially) undermine signatories' emission reduction eﬀorts leading to emission
leakage. However, under full TFV, varieties are independent and hence there are no
leakage eﬀects.
We found that introducing BTAs under no or partial TFV enhances the incentives to
join the coalition as signatories generate additional tax revenues given the BTA pol-
icy. Furthermore, BTAs undermine the free riding incentives as the coalition exhibits
negative externalities toward non-signatories. Under internal and external stability,
these driving forces together led to the grand coalition to be stable in equilibrium.
When the exclusive membership rule is considered, we found only medium-sized
coalitions are stable in equilibrium, as signatories of these coalitions are enjoying the
additional tax revenues they are generating through the BTAs and hence they do
not allow all countries to join the coalition.
Looking at the full TFV case, introducing BTAs doesn't lead to negative externalities
against non-signatories anymore. Since varieties are independent, signatories' emis-
sion reduction eﬀorts can not be undermined by non-signatories' reactions. There-
fore, signatories impose higher taxes as they will not face a large negative response
(leakage eﬀects) from non-signatories. As a result, each non-signatory beneﬁts from
signatories' eﬀorts. These beneﬁts outweigh the negative eﬀects of the BTAs, lead-
ing to positive externalities. Nevertheless, given the additional BTA revenue that
signatories enjoy, countries always have the incentives to join the coalition and hence
large coalitions are stable in equilibrium under internal and external stability.
To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to introduce the combination of border tax
adjustment, horizontal products' diﬀerentiation and consumers' TFV features to the
literature of self-enforcing IEAs under free trade. Future research avenues could be
explored in terms of relaxing the symmetry assumption, and understanding the eﬀect
of ideal varieties or asymmetric consumers' TFV between countries. Furthermore,
one can introduce an additional policy instrument for non-signatories such as tax
rebates that allow them to mitigate the BTAs negative eﬀects on their ﬁrms' proﬁt
when they export to signatories' markets.
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6 Appendixes
A detailed appendix with the full details of all derivations is available upon request.
Below, we summarise the most important steps in the derivation in a compact form.
6.1 Appendix 1: Properties of the Game
For all S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, and S ′ = S ∪ {j} where S ′ ⊆ N :
• Positive Internal Spillover: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to
coalition S
′
exhibits (strict) positive internal spillovers if:
Wi(S
′
) ≥ (>)Wi(S) ∀i ∈ S and i ∈ S ′
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• Negative Internal Spillover: in a coalition game a move from coalition S
to coalition S
′
exhibits strict negative internal spillovers if:
Wi(S
′
) < Wi(S) ∀i ∈ S and i ∈ S ′
• Superadditivity: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coalition S ′








Wi(S) +Wj(S) ∀j /∈ S
We characterise the relationship between the internal spillover (positive and negative)
and superadditivity properties as follows.
There are two main cases. The ﬁrst case is where the non-signatory re\9mains at
least as well oﬀ after joining the coalition as being a singleton, i.e. Wj(S ∪ {j}) −
Wj(S) ≥ 0. In which case if the positive internal spillover (PIS) property holds then
superadditivity (SAD) must hold. That is, if PIS holds Wi(S ∪ {j}) −Wi(S) ≥ 0,
knowing that the new signatory is at least as well oﬀ as before joining the coalition
Wj(S ∪ {j}) −Wj(S) ≥ 0, then it must be the case that SAD also holds (weekly
or strictly), i.e.
(∑
i∈SWi(S ∪ {j}) +Wj(S ∪ {j})
) − (∑i∈SWi(S) +Wj(S)) ≥ 0.
If the negative internal spillover (NIS) property holds Wi(S ∪ {j}) − Wi(S) < 0
(i.e. PIS doesn't hold) then there are two scenarios to determine whether or not





i∈SWi(S) < 0) is at most equals to the
individual beneﬁt of the new signatory (i.e. the non-signatory who just joined, given
byWj(S∪{j})−Wj(S) > 0), then in this case SAD holds strictly or weekly. That is,
|∑i∈SWi(S∪{j})−∑i∈SWi(S)| ≤ |Wj(S∪{j})−Wj(S)|, then SAD holds (strictly
or weekly). The second scenario is where the joint loss of the current signatories is
greater than the individual beneﬁt of the new signatory , then in this case SAD fails.
That is, |∑i∈SWi(S ∪ {j})−∑i∈SWi(S)| > |Wj(S ∪ {j})−Wj(S)|.
The second case is when the non-signatory becomes worse oﬀ after joining the coali-
tion than being a singleton, i.e. Wj(S∪{j})−Wj(S) < 0. In which case if the negative
internal spillover (NIS) property holds, then superadditivity (SAD) must fail. That
is, if NIS holds Wi(S ∪ {j}) −Wi(S) < 0, knowing that the new signatory is worse
oﬀ after joining the coalition Wj(S∪{j})−Wj(S) < 0, then it must be the case that
SAD fails, i.e.
(∑
i∈SWi(S ∪ {j}) +Wj(S ∪ {j})
)− (∑i∈SWi(S) +Wj(S)) < 0. If
the positive internal spillover (PIS) property holds strictly Wi(S ∪ {j})−Wi(S) > 0
(i.e. NIS doesn't hold) then there are two scenarios to determine whether or not su-
peradditivity (SAD) holds. The ﬁrst scenario is where the joint beneﬁt of the current
signatories (given by
∑
i∈SWi(S ∪ {j}) −
∑
i∈SWi(S) > 0) is at least equal to the
individual loss of the new signatory (i.e. the non-signatory who just joined, given by
Wj(S ∪{j})−Wj(S) < 0), then in this case SAD holds (strictly or weekly). That is,
85
|∑i∈SWi(S∪{j})−∑i∈SWi(S)| ≥ |Wj(S∪{j})−Wj(S)|, then SAD holds (strictly
or weekly). The second scenario is where the joint beneﬁt of the current signatories
is less than the individual loss of the new signatory, then in this case SAD fails. That
is, |∑i∈SWi(S ∪ {j})−∑i∈SWi(S)| < |Wj(S ∪ {j})−Wj(S)|.
6.2 Appendix 2: Equilibrium Quantities Derivations
6.2.1 BTA Regime
The segmented market structure under the BTA regime is given by:
BTA Regime Signatory ﬁrm i Non-signatory ﬁrm j Total Consumption














We use the replacement functions method in order to derive the equilibrium quanti-
ties produced for a non-signatory's market q∗li & q
∗
lj.
The proﬁt of ﬁrm i in market l is given by pili = qli(pli − c − ti). Substituting the
inverse demand function from equation (4) above after the appropriate changes in
notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂pili
∂qli
= a− c− ti− (2−γ)qli−γQl. = 0 ⇐⇒ a− c− ti−2qli−γ
∑
h∈N,h6=i
qlh = 0 (18)
where Ql. is the total quantity consumed in market l and
∑
h∈N,h6=i qlh is the sum
of all consumed varieties by consumers in market l from all ﬁrms except ﬁrm i.
Equation (21) shows that the reaction functions (qli = ri(
∑
h∈N,h6=i qlh) have a slope
of −γ/2 . Hence, the equilibrium is unique; the absolute value of the slope of the
reaction function increases with the taste of variety parameter γ, and as γ approaches
zero the strategic interaction among ﬁrms vanishes. Moreover, a necessary condition
for positive quantities is a > c. Below, we will further develop this non-negativity
conditions in order to ensure interior solutions.
The proﬁt of ﬁrm j in market l is given by pilj = qlj(plj − c − tj). Substituting the
inverse demand function from equation (4) above after the appropriate changes in




= a−c−tj−(2−γ)qlj−γQl. = 0 ⇐⇒ a−c−tj−2qlj−γ
∑
h∈N,h6=j
qlh = 0 (19)
In order to derive the equilibrium quantities, we note that, as mentioned in the
game setup above, in stage 2 the equilibrium taxes are symmetric with all signatories
choosing the same tax rate ti and all non-signatories choose the same tax rate tj, given
symmetry. Furthermore, given our segmented market structure quantities produced
for non-signatories' markets are the same; signatories' ﬁrms produce the same output
for all non-signatories' markets, and non-signatories' ﬁrms produce the same output
for their domestic market as well as all other non-signatories' markets.
Summing up the ﬁrst order conditions in (18) and (19) above after multiplying them
by the number of signatoriesm and the number of non-signatories n−m respectively,
we ﬁnd Q∗l. is given by:
Q∗l. =
n(a− c)−m(ti − tj)− ntj
(n− 1)γ + 2 (20)
Next we plug Q∗l. from (20) into (18) and solve for q
∗
li, which is the signatory ﬁrm i
′s
output for a non-signatory lj′s market:
q∗li =
(a− c)(2− γ)− γ(n−m)(ti − tj)− ti(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (21)
Similarly, we plug Q∗l. from (20) into (19) and solve for q
∗
lj, which is the non-signatory
ﬁrm j′s output for a non-signatory l′s market:
q∗lj =
(a− c)(2− γ) + γm(ti − tj)− tj(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (22)
Signatories' Markets:
We also use the replacement functions method in order to derive the equilibrium
quantities produced for a signatory's market q∗ki & q
∗
kj.
The proﬁt of ﬁrm i in market k is given by piki = qki(pki − c− ti). Substituting the
inverse demand function from equation (4) above after the appropriate change in
notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂piki
∂qki
= a−c−ti−(2−γ)qki−γQk. = 0 ⇐⇒ a−c−ti−2qki−γ
∑
h∈N,h6=i
qkh = 0 (23)
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The proﬁt of ﬁrm j in market k is given by pikj = qkj(pkj− c− tj−φ(ti− tj)). Notice
that we are deriving the ﬁrst order condition in the case where the BTA policy
(ti > tj) is valid and hence Ω = φ(ti − tj). Check equation (10) above for further
details. Substituting the inverse demand function from equation (4) above after the
appropriate change in notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂pikj
∂qkj





Summing up the ﬁrst order conditions in (23) and (24) above after multiplying them
by the number of signatoriesm and the number of non-signatories n−m respectively,
we ﬁnd Q∗k. is given by:
Q∗k. =
n(a− c)− (n−m)(ti − tj)(φ− 1)− nti
(n− 1)γ + 2 (25)
Next we plug Q∗k. from (25) into (23) and solve for q
∗
ki, which is signatory ﬁrm i
′s
output to a signatory k′s market:
q∗ki =
(a− c)(2− γ)− γ(n−m)(ti − tj)(1− φ)− ti(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (26)
Similarly, we plug Q∗k. from (25) into (24) and solve for q
∗
kj, which is non-signatory
ﬁrm j′s output to a signatory k′s market:
q∗kj =
(a− c)(2− γ)− (ti − tj)(γ(m(φ− 1)− φ) + 2φ)− tj(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (27)
6.2.2 No BTA Regime
We now look at markets under the No-BTA regime. Given our assumption of seg-
mented market structure each ﬁrm supplies its good to the domestic and all foreign
markets. Since the tax imposed on production is not diﬀerentiated based on the
destination market and there are no BTA adjustments in the No BTA regime, the
equilibrium quantity of any ﬁrm's variety is the same for all markets. That is, be-
cause of the segmentation of markets ﬁrms play a separate and identical Cournot
game in each market. Therefore, there are two equilibrium quantities in the No BTA
regime irrespective of the destination market. The ﬁrst q∗.i represents signatory ﬁrm
i′s production to any market.25 The second equilibrium quantity q∗.j represents non-
25Notation: we replace the ﬁrst subscript with a dot in order to illustrate the idea that a sig-
natory's ﬁrm produces the same output irrespective of the destination market. Same applies for a
non-signatory's ﬁrm, as we will show next.
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signatory ﬁrm j′s production to any market. The segmented market structure under
the No BTA regime can be illustrated in the following table:






.i + (n−m)q∗.jNon-signatory market l






We use the replacement functions method in order to derive the equilibrium quanti-
ties produced for a non-signatory's market q∗.i & q
∗
.j.
The proﬁt of ﬁrm i in any market is given by pi.i = q.i(p.i − c − ti)32. Substituting
the inverse demand function from equation (4) above after the appropriate changes
in notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂pi.i
∂q.i
= a− c− ti− (2− γ)q.i− γQ = 0 ⇐⇒ a− c− ti− 2q.i− γ
∑
h∈N,h6=i
q.h = 0 (28)
where Q is the total quantity consumed in any market and
∑
h∈N,h6=i q.h is the sum
of all consumed varieties from all ﬁrms except ﬁrm i.
The proﬁt of ﬁrm j in any market is given by pi.j = q.j(p.j − c − tj). Substituting
the inverse demand function from equation (4) above after the appropriate changes
in notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂pi.j
∂q.j
= a− c− tj− (2−γ)q.j−γQ = 0 ⇐⇒ a− c− tj−2q.j−γ
∑
h∈N,h6=j
q.h = 0 (29)
Summing up the ﬁrst order conditions in (28) and (29) above after multiplying them
by the number of signatoriesm and the number of non-signatories n−m respectively,
we ﬁnd Q∗ is given by:
Q∗ =
n(a− c)−m(ti − tj)− ntj
(n− 1)γ + 2 (30)
Next we plug Q∗ from (30) into (28) and solve for q∗.i,32 which is the signatory ﬁrm
i′s output for any market:
q∗.i =
(a− c)(2− γ)− γ(n−m)(ti − tj)− ti(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (31)
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Similarly, we plug Q∗ from (30) into (29) and solve for q∗.j, which is the non-signatory
ﬁrm j′s output for any market:
q∗.j =
(a− c)(2− γ) + γm(ti − tj)− tj(2− γ)
((n− 1)γ + 2)(2− γ) (32)
6.3 Appendix 3: Equilibrium Taxes
6.3.1 No BTA Regime Equilibrium Taxes
We derive the F.O.C.s for signatories and non-signatories in stage 2 of the game.
Solving these conditions simultaneously, we ﬁnd the equilibrium taxes for signatories
and non-signatories as follows:
• For γ = 1:
t∗i =
nδ(m(2−m) + n(n(m− 1) +m(3−m)− 1))− (a− c)(m(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
mn(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
t∗j = −
nδ(m− 2)(n+ 1) + (a− c)(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
n(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
• For γ = 0.5:
t∗i =
(a− c)(n(−2n3 − 10n2 + n(2m2 − 8m− 9) + 6m2 − 27m+ 9) + 9m)
n(2n4 + 14n3 − n2(2m2 +m− 32)− n(7m2 + 5m− 18)− 3m2 − 9m− 18) + 9m
+
nδ(n3(9m− 3)− n2(3m2 − 48m+ 9)− n(9m2 − 54m)− 27m)
n(2n4 + 14n3 − n2(2m2 +m− 32)− n(7m2 + 5m− 18)− 3m2 − 9m− 18) + 9m
t∗j =
(a− c)(n(−2n3 − 10n2 + n(2m2 +m− 18) + 6m2 − 18) + 9m)
n(2n4 + 14n3 − n2(2m2 +m− 32)− n(7m2 + 5m− 18)− 3m2 − 9m− 18) + 9m
+
nδ(6n3 − n2(3m2 − 3m− 36)− n(9m2 − 54)− 27m)
n(2n4 + 14n3 − n2(2m2 +m− 32)− n(7m2 + 5m− 18)− 3m2 − 9m− 18) + 9m
• For γ = 0:
t∗i =
(2nδ − a+ c)m
2n−m
t∗j =
2nδ − a+ c
2n− 1
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6.3.2 BTA Regime Equilibrium Taxes
Due to the size of these equations, they are provided in PDF format with the CD
attached to the thesis.
6.4 Appendix 4: Parameters Constellations
Inserting equilibrium taxes into equilibrium quantities reveals that we need to impose
non-negativity constraints in order to ensure positive outputs. Essentially, these con-
straints boil down to requesting that the demand parameter a is larger than marginal
production cost c plus a multiple of marginal damages. In other words, this non-
negativity constraint represents a lower threshold a, such that a > a. Furthermore,
as mentioned earlier, in order for the BTA policy to be valid we need to ensure that
the BTA constraint t∗i > t
∗
j is satisﬁed. This is achievable by identifying an upper
threshold for the demand parameter such that a ≤ a. Above this threshold we ﬁnd
t∗i ≤ t∗j as the coalition's joint welfare maximisation calls for lower taxes in order to
maximise consumers' welfare.26
6.4.1 Non-negativity Constraints
We ﬁrst start with the No BTA regime. Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017) present
the analytical non-negativity constraints for the No BTA regime for γ = {0, 1}.
In Appendix 5 of this paper we present these non-negativity constraints again and
introduce the non-negativity constraint for γ = 0.5. There are two equilibrium
quantities in the No BTA regime: q∗.i for signatories and q
∗
.j for non-signatories.
Each of them has a non-negativity constraint and we look for the most restrictive
constraint a such that q∗.i > 0 and q
∗
.j > 0 are satisﬁed.
In the case of the BTA regime, we also establish the non-negativity constraints for
γ = {0, 0.5, 1}. There are four equilibrium quantities in the BTA regime: q∗ii, q∗ij,
q∗ji, and q
∗
jj as presented above. Each of these quantities have a non-negativity
constraint and we look for the most restrictive constraint a, such that q∗ii > 0,
q∗ij > 0, q
∗
ji > 0, and q
∗
jj > 0 are satisﬁed. Due to the complexity of the constraints
we resort to numerical simulations, and therefore we also present the corresponding
constraints for the No BTA regime in numerical values too so that we undertake
comparative analysis for both regimes. All values are presented in the Parameters'
Space subsection below.
26Other BTA papers in the literature also had to address this issue (BTA Constraint) in order
for the analysis to be valid, albeit they followed diﬀerent strategies to suit their model setup. For
example check Eyland and Zaccour (2012 & 2014).
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6.4.2 BTA Constraints
Although the BTA constraints are not required for the No BTA regime we note the
following. In Proposition 3 in Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017), it was established
analytically that for γ = 1 it is always the case that t∗i > t
∗
j . For γ = 0 we have
t∗i > t
∗
j only for a ≤ a, where a = 2nδ + c. For γ = 0.5 we establish in this paper
the threshold a such that t∗i > t
∗
j is given by a = n
2δ + 2nδ + c. The reason such
threshold emerges for partial and high TFV only is that when consumers prefer
varieties then above certain level of high demand (represented by the thresholds)
joint maximisation of signatories calls for lowering the tax in order to maximise their
consumers' welfare.
The reason we establish the BTA constraint for the No BTA regime is to check
whether there is a level of demand (represented by an a value) under which signa-
tories' taxes are lower than non-signatories' ones in the No BTA regime, tNoBTAi <




j . Such case could be







same time. As we will show in the next section, the parameter a values that result
into tNoBTAi < t
NoBTA
j violate the BTA constraint for the BTA regime. Therefore,
we are unable to conduct such comparative analysis.
As for the BTA regime, we deﬁne the BTA constraints under γ = {0, 0.5, 1}. Due
to the complexity of the constraints we resort to numerical simulations. Therefore,
we also present the corresponding constraints for the No BTA regime in numerical
values in the Parameters' Space subsection.
6.4.3 Parameters' Space
We populate these thresholds for both the BTA and No BTA regime under the
following parameters' constellations: n = 10, γ = {0, 0.5, 1}, δ = {10, 50, 100},
c = 0,27 and full adjustment φ = 1.
The No BTA regime's non-negativity constraints a and the thresholds for t∗i > t
∗
j ,
i.e. a, are given by:
δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100








γ = 0.5 1200 6000 12000
γ = 1 ∞ ∞ ∞
27Since we have constant marginal costs symmetric across all ﬁrms (signatories' and non-
signatories' ones) such simpliﬁcation will not aﬀect our qualitative results.
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The BTA regime's non-negativity constraints a and BTA constraints a are given
by:28
δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
a a a a a a
γ = 0 85 104 430 520 850 1040
γ = 0.5 120 1000 590 5300 1250 10500
γ = 1 250 ∞ 1350 ∞ 2500 ∞
Notice that for γ = 1 it turns out that a = ∞ for the BTA regime, inline with the
analytical ﬁnding for the No BTA regime from Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017).
6.4.4 Analysis Strategy
We proceed in the analysis by creating a joint BTA and No BTA parameters' space
such that both constraints are satisﬁed in both regime (i.e. a < a ≤ a) in order
to be able to undertake comparative analysis. The joint parameters' space for both
regimes is as follows:
δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
a a a a a a
γ = 0 101 104 501 520 1001 1040
γ = 0.5 120 1000 590 5300 1250 10500
γ = 1 250 5000 1350 25000 2500 50000
Notice that in order to put an upper limit on the BTA constraint under γ = 1 (where
a = ∞), we multiply the BTA constraint under γ = 0.5 by 5 (approx.) to set the
limit.29
In order to cover the whole parameters' space, we break each rage (for each δ and γ
combination) into 5 equidistant points using the interval 4 = a−a
5
. The value of a at
each point would be given by ai = ai−1 +4 for i = 1, ..., 5. For instance: a1 = a+4
and a5 = a4 +4 ≤ a. The value for these equidistant points for the joint BTA and
No BTA parameters space are:
28For full range of γ = [0, 1], check below.
29Given our ﬁndings in Appendix 6 below we can conﬁrm that we are not eliminating any quali-
tative results by following such strategy to set an upper threshold a¯ for γ = 1.
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δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100 Value
a a a a
γ = 0
101.6 504.8 1008.8 Low - L
102.2 508.4 1016.6 Lower Middle - LM
102.8 512.4 1024.5 Middle - M
103.4 516.2 1032.2 Upper Middle - UM
104 520 1040 High - H
γ = 0.5
296 1532 3100 Low - L
472 2474 4950 Lower Middle - LM
648 3416 6800 Middle - M
824 4358 8650 Upper Middle - UM
1000 5300 10500 High - H
γ = 1
1200 6080 12000 Low - L
2150 10810 21500 Lower Middle - LM
3100 15540 31000 Middle - M
4050 20270 40500 Upper Middle - UM
5000 25000 50000 High - H
6.5 Appendix 5: Non-negativity Constraints for the No BTA
Scenario
Inserting the equilibrium taxes of the No BTA regime into equilibrium output levels,
gives the quantities below.





2(m− 1)− n(m− 1)2 −m(m− 2))





δn(n(m− 1) +m− 2)
n(n2 + (1−m)(n+ 1))
• For γ = 0.5:
q∗.i =
2n(a− c)(n(2n2 + 10n+ 9) + nm(2− 2m) +m(9− 6m)− 9)
n(2n4 + 14n3 + n2(32− 2m2 −m) + n(18− 7m2 − 5m)− 3m2 − 9m− 18) + 9m
+
2nδ(3n(n2 + 3n) + nm(−3n2 + 3nm− 18n+ 9m− 27) + 9m)
n(2n4 + 14n3 + n2(32− 2m2 −m) + n(18− 7m2 − 5m)− 3m2 − 9m− 18) + 9m
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q∗.j =
2n(a− c)(2n3 − 2nm2 + 10n2 − nm− 6m2 + 12n)
n(2n4 + 14n3 + n2(32− 2m2 −m) + n(18− 7m2 − 5m)− 3m2 − 9m− 18) + 9m
+
2nδ(3n2m2 − 3n2m+ 9nm2 − 6n2 − 9nm− 18n+ 9m)
n(2n4 + 14n3 + n2(32− 2m2 −m) + n(18− 7m2 − 5m)− 3m2 − 9m− 18) + 9m







These equilibrium quantities reveal the need for non-negativity conditions to be
imposed to guarantee ﬁrms are producing positive quantities. Essentially, these
constraints boil down to requesting that the demand parameter a is larger than
marginal production cost c plus a multiple of marginal damages.
• For γ = 1: signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by
a > a1 =
δn(n2(m−1)−n(m−1)2−m(m−2))
m(n2+(1−m)(n+1)) +c, and non-signatories' constraint is given
by a > a2 = c, with a1 > a2.
• For γ = 0.5: signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by
a > a3 = c − δ(0.375n
2(n−nm+m2)+1.125(n2(1−2m)+m(nm−3n+1))
0.25(n(n2+m−m2)−3m2)+1.125(n+m−1)+1.25n2 , and non-signatories'
constraint is given by
a > a4 = c− δ(0.75(n
2(0.5(m2−m)−1))+1.125(n(m2−2)+m(1−n)))
0.25(n(n2+5n+6)−m(nm+0.5n+3m)) , with a3 > a4.
• For γ = 0: signatories' non-negativity constraint is given by a > a5 := δm+ c,
and non-signatories' constraint is given by a > a6 := δ + c, with a5 > a6.
It can be shown that al > 0, ∀l ∈ [1, 6]. Notice that for γ = {0, 0.5, 1}, ∂a1∂m > 0,
∂a3
∂m
> 0, and ∂a5
∂m
> 0. Therefore, the most restrictive non-negativity constraint for
any of them can be found for m = n, where a1 = a3 = a5 = nδ + c. Throughout the
paper, we assume the most restrictive constraint to hold.
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6.6 Appendix 6: Detailed Results
Low a Value
Result 2 - Welfare Properties of the No BTA and BTA Coalition Games - Low a Value
BTA Regime30
γ δ WBTAi −WBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ + − +,∀m = [2, 6] + +,∀m = [2, 6] +
0.5 ∀δ + −,∀m = [3, 4] +,∀m = [2, 8] + + +
0 ∀δ +,∀m = [2, 4] + + + + +
31
No BTA Regime
γ δ WNoBTAi −WNoBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ − + −,∀m = [2, 5] −,∀m = [2, 9] + +
0.5 ∀δ − + + + + +
0 ∀δ − + + + + +
Result 3 - Coalitions under Internal and External Stability - Low a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0.5 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9
30Whenever a result is presented in an interval format such as +,∀m = [1, 4], this implies that ∀m = [1, 4] the property is positive/holds and
∀m = [5, 10] the property is negative/fails.
31Legend: I Spillover: Internal Spillover. SAD: Superadditivity. FC: Full Cohesiveness. The entry of +: implies holds or positive (depending
on the property). The input of −: fails or negative.
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No BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1
0.5 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2
0 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3
Result 4 - Coalitions under Exclusive Membership - Low a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
Exclusive
1 m∗ = 6 m∗ = 6 m∗ = 6
0.5 m∗ = 8 m∗ = 8 m∗ = 8
0 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9
Lower Middle a Value
Result 2 - Welfare Properties of the No BTA and BTA Coalition Games - Lower Middle a Value
BTA Regime
γ δ WBTAi −WBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ + − +,∀m = [2, 6] + −, ∀m = [5, 8] +
0.5
10
+ −,∀m = [3, 9] +,∀m = [2, 6] +
−∀m = [7, 8]
+50 −∀m = [6, 8]
100
0 ∀δ +,∀m = [2, 4] + + + + +
No BTA Regime
97
γ δ WNoBTAi −WNoBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ − + −,∀m = [2, 5] −,∀m = [2, 9] + +
0.5 ∀δ − + + + + +
0 ∀δ − + + + + +
Result 3 - Coalitions under Internal and External Stability - Lower Middle a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0.5 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0 m∗ = 8 m∗ = 8 m∗ = 8
No BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1
0.5 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2
0 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3
Result 4 - Coalitions under Exclusive Membership - Lower Middle a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
Exclusive
1 m∗ = 6 m∗ = 6 m∗ = 6
0.5 m∗ = 6 m∗ = 6 m∗ = 6
0 m∗ = 8 m∗ = 8 m∗ = 8
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Middle a Value
Result 2 - Welfare Properties of the No BTA and BTA Coalition Games - Middle a Value
BTA Regime
γ δ WBTAi −WBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ + − +, ∀m = [2, 5] + −,∀m = [4, 8] +
0.5 ∀δ + −,∀m = [2, 8] +, ∀m = [2, 6] + −,∀m = [4, 8] +
0 ∀δ +,∀m = [2, 4] + + + + +
No BTA Regime
γ δ WNoBTAi −WNoBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ − + −,∀m = [2, 5] −,∀m = [2, 9] + +
0.5 ∀δ − + + + + +
0 ∀δ − + + + + +
Result 3 - Coalitions under Internal and External Stability - Middle a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0.5 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 8
No BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1
0.5 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2
0 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3
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Result 4 - Coalitions under Exclusive Membership - BTA Regime - Middle a Value
BTA Scenario γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
Exclusive
1 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5
0.5 m∗ = 6 m∗ = 6 m∗ = 6
0 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 8
Upper Middle a Value
Result 2 - Welfare Properties of the No BTA and BTA Coalition Games - Upper Middle a Value
BTA Regime
γ δ WBTAi −WBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ + − +, ∀m = [2, 5] + −,∀m = [3, 8] +
0.5 ∀δ + −,∀m = [2, 8] +, ∀m = [2, 5] + −,∀m = [2, 7] +
0 ∀δ +,∀m = [2, 4] + + + + +
No BTA Regime
γ δ WNoBTAi −WNoBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ − + −,∀m = [2, 5] −,∀m = [2, 9] + +
0.5 ∀δ − + + + + +
0 ∀δ − + + + + +
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Result 3 - Coalitions under Internal and External Stability - Upper Middle a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0.5 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9
No BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1
0.5 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2
0 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3
Result 4 - Coalitions under Exclusive Membership - BTA Regime - Upper Middle a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
Exclusive
1 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5
0.5 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5
0 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9
High a Value
Result 2 - Welfare Properties of the No BTA and BTA Coalition Games - High a Value
BTA Regime
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γ δ WBTAi −WBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ + − +, ∀m = [2, 5] + −,∀m = [2, 8] +
0.5 ∀δ + −,∀m = [2, 8] +, ∀m = [2, 5] + −,∀m = [2, 7] +
0 ∀δ +,∀m = [2, 5] + + + + +
No BTA Regime
γ δ WNoBTAi −WNoBTAj Externality I Spillover SAD FC C
1 ∀δ − + −,∀m = [2, 5] −,∀m = [2, 9] + +
0.5 ∀δ − + + + + +
0 ∀δ − + + + + +
Result 3 - Coalitions under Internal and External Stability - High a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0.5 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10 m∗ = 10
0 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9
No BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
I&ES
1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1 m∗ = 1
0.5 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2 m∗ = 2
0 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3 m∗ = 3
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Result 4 - Coalitions under Exclusive Membership - BTA Regime - High a Value
BTA Regime γ δ = 10 δ = 50 δ = 100
Exclusive
1 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5
0.5 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5 m∗ = 5
0 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9 m∗ = 9
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Alaa Al Khourdajie
August, 2017
(Preliminary version - please do not quote)
Abstract
In an n-country intra-industry trade model governments deal with two issues:
climate change and trade. Firms produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good
and consumers have a taste for the varieties of this good. We analyse coalition
formation and stability under three scenarios where governments are either
cooperating on one issue only or on both issues at the same time. Our results
show that whenever governments cooperate on trade, either individually or
with climate change, the grand coalition is always stable. More interestingly,
we ﬁnd that when governments cooperate on climate change only the grand
coalition is also stable. However, this holds only when varieties are perfect
substitutes.
Keywords: self-enforcing international environmental agreements, international trade,
customs' unions, consumers' preferences, horizontal products' diﬀerentiation.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, F12, F18, H23, Q52, Q56, Q58.
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1 Introduction
Reaching international agreements on climate change has proved to be a diﬃcult
task over the past two and half decades. One of the most notable achievements of
the climate change negotiations thus far is Paris Climate Agreement, signed in De-
cember 2015. This agreement aims to achieve the scientiﬁcally recommended target
of limiting the temperature increase by the year 2100 to 2 degrees Celsius compared
to pre-industrial levels. However, despite agreeing on this target, signatories' cur-
rent emission reduction pledges fall short of meeting it and will potentially yield a
temperature increase of 2.7-3 degrees Celsius (UNFCCC, 2015). Furthermore, the
agreement fails to bind signatories to meet their pledges.
Scholars in the game theoretic literature on the formation of international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs) attribute the diﬃculty in reaching an eﬀective climate
change agreement to strong free-riding incentives. These incentives emerge due to
the fact that any non-signatory would enjoy the environmental beneﬁts resulting
from signatories' emissions reduction eﬀorts without incurring any costs. There-
fore, given the absence of supranational authority that could enforce cooperation on
climate change, any stable agreement has to be self-enforcing. Findings in this liter-
ature show that this free riding phenomenon has either led to agreements with few
signatories and/or with very low and hence ineﬀective emission reduction targets. In
other words, these agreements are either small, shallow or both (see Barrett, 1994a;
and Finus, 2003 for surveys).
In order to overcome such pessimistic predictions, further contributions in the liter-
ature followed diﬀerent strategies such as analysing various policy instruments, mar-
kets' structures or trade features. The main objective of this paper is to address the
case of issue linkage between climate change agreements and customs' union agree-
ments. That is, we analyse a joint climate change and customs' union agreement.
While climate agreements suﬀer from strong free riding incentives due to positive
externalities, customs' unions are identiﬁed as club good agreements where beneﬁts
are exclusive to signatories only (Yi, 1996). Accessing these beneﬁts may give coun-
tries an incentive to join the joint agreement. Furthermore, customs' unions exhibit
spillovers toward non-signatories, whereby if these spillovers are negative they create
an additional incentive for cooperation.
In order to setup the joint agreement, this paper essentially combines the setup of
two papers. The ﬁrst is Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017) representing the climate
change agreement and the second is Yi (1996) representing the customs' union agree-
ment. In Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017) the authors introduce horizontal products'
diﬀerentiation and consumers' taste for variety (TFV) to the literature of IEAs under
free trade. By introducing such features consumers' tastes and preferences matter
and hence they inﬂuence governments' decisions in terms of coalition membership
and level of emission taxes. The authors ﬁnd that high consumers' TFV gives the
incentives for forming a small climate change agreement. Their ﬁndings are inline
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with the literature in terms of size of the agreement being small due to free riding
incentives. Therefore, emission taxes as ﬁrst best solution did not help in reaching
the grand coalition. In Yi (1996) the author analyses customs' unions (with no en-
vironmental aspect) that deploy the use of trade tariﬀs. In his setup, the author
examines the eﬀects of horizontal products' diﬀerentiation and consumers' TFV on
coalition stability in a multiple coalition formation game. The author ﬁnds that the
incentives to join customs' unions are strong leading to the stability of the grand
coalition.32
In the literature on issue linkage, the majority of current contributions examine link-
ing IEAs with research and development (R&D) agreements and show that such
linkage leads to higher contribution to the environmental agreement. For instance
Botteon and Carraro (1997) ﬁnd that the free riding incentives under IEAs are mit-
igated by the incentives of accessing the R&D beneﬁts within the coalition. Carraro
and Siniscalco (1997) show that this is true even if the R&D beneﬁts are imperfectly
excludable (i.e. the inevitable leakage to non-signatories through reverse engineering
for instance). Katsoulacos (1997) allows for governments to engage in subsidising
Research Joint Ventures (RJV) initiatives and ﬁnds that this induces higher contri-
bution to the environmental issue. However, Kemfert (2004) analyses a similar joint
agreement in an integrated assessment model and ﬁnds that, unsurprisingly, issue
linkage fails to completely mitigate free riding incentives when positive externalities
are very strong. Finally, Carraro and Marchiori (2004) argue that the number of
participants in the joint agreement is always smaller than or equal to the number
of participants in the original R&D club good agreement. They show that while
beneﬁts from the public good agreement are always monotonically increasing in the
number of participants, beneﬁts from the club good agreement have an incomplete
monotonicity. We contribute to this literature by analysing joint cooperation in an
n-country model under international trade with consumers' taste for varieties.
Some contributions in this literature analysed issue linkage with trade agreements.
For instance, Nordhaus (2015) uses the Coalition DICE model (the Coalition Dy-
namic Integrated Climate-Economy model) to study the stability of climate clubs:
under which signatories of a climate agreement can impose trade penalties on im-
ports from non-signatories. In line with the literature, the author ﬁnds that the use
of trade penalties leads to the stability of large coalitions. Kuhn et al. (2015) follow
Eichner and Pethig's (2013) perfect competition framework and analyse the eﬀects
of issue linkage between climate agreements that use emissions caps and free trade
areas. The authors ﬁnd that such issue linkage mitigates the free riding incentives
leading to the grand coalition. Our paper contributes to this body of literature by
analysing the eﬀects of consumers' TFV under imperfect competition where countries
use emission taxes and trade tariﬀs as policy instruments.
32Check Yi's (2000) analysis of free trade area formation and stability, and Loke and Winters
(2012) for detailed analysis of the TFV feature in the context of Yi's papers.
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Another body of literature assesses the conditions under which larger and more eﬀec-
tive IEAs could form under the international trade comparing to autarky. Extending
Barrett's (1994b) IEAs autarky model to the case of international trade under perfect
competition, Eichner and Pethig (2013) show that large coalitions could be stable
under Stackelberge coalition formation games comparing to small coalitions under
Nash Cournot games as in E&P (2012). However, they ﬁnd that the emission re-
duction eﬀorts of these large coalitions are negligible. In E&P (2014a) the authors
show that the introduction of emission taxes could lead to the stability of the grand
coalition. The reason for this is that they ﬁnd taxes are strategic complements while
caps are strategic substitutes and hence free riding is stronger under caps. Some
contributions in this literature strand address the implications of using trade bans as
an additional policy instrument in the climate agreement and show that such policy
leads to large and more eﬀective agreements (Barrett, 1997; and E&P, 2014b).
Our model is an extension of Brander and Spencer (1985) framework where we
assume n ex ante symmetric countries. Governments have two policy instruments.
First, they can impose emission taxes on their domestic ﬁrm's production in order to
reduce pollution damages. Second, they can impose trade tariﬀs on imports. Each
government is concerned with the domestic ﬁrm's proﬁt, revenues from emission taxes
and trade tariﬀs, the utility of the domestic consumers and ﬁnally the environmental
damages resulting from a global pollutant. Each ﬁrm produces a unique variety of
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good and consumers have taste for these varieties (Yi,
1996).
In this setup we examine the eﬀects of issue linkage between climate change and
customs' union agreements in inﬂuencing countries' decisions on their taxes and tar-
iﬀs as well as coalition membership. We analyse three scenarios. The ﬁrst is called
environmental cooperation scenario, where signatories coordinate their climate pol-
icy and set their emission taxes collectively in order to maximise the joint welfare
of the whole coalition. As for the trade policy, they neither coordinate their trade
tariﬀs, nor abolish them within the coalition. The second scenario is called trade
cooperation scenario, where signatories coordinate their trade tariﬀs only, i.e. coop-
erate on trade and form a customs' union, with no coordination of climate policy;
emission taxes. In this scenario, signatories abolish trade tariﬀs within the coalition
and impose tariﬀs on imports from non-signatories to maximise the joint welfare of
the coalition. As for the climate policy, each signatory chooses an emissions tax that
maximises its own welfare. The third scenario is called joint cooperation, which is
essentially a combination of both previous scenarios illustrating the case of issue link-
age. Signatories coordinate both their trade tariﬀs and emission taxes, i.e. forming
a joint climate change and customs' union agreement. In this scenario, signatories
abolish trade tariﬀs within the coalition and impose tariﬀs on imports from non-
signatories to maximise the joint welfare of the coalition. They also jointly choose a
uniform emission tax that maximises the joint welfare of the coalition. In all three
scenarios non-signatories choose their own emission taxes and trade tariﬀs in order
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to maximise their individual welfare.
For analytic tractability, we focus on two cases of taste for varieties (TFV). The
ﬁrst is where consumers have no TFV and hence varieties are considered perfect
substitutes. The second case is where taste for varieties is high and hence varieties
are independent and consumers have a high preference for a diverse and balanced
consumption bundle since varieties cannot be substituted at all.
Our results present new insights into environmental cooperation when governments
are dealing with more than one issues, namely climate change and free trade in our
context, and have two policy instruments to deal with them. In the case where
consumers have no taste for varieties, i.e. varieties are perfect substitutes following
the standard assumption in the literature, we ﬁnd the incentives for cooperation on
climate change are strong when countries coordinate their emission taxes even though
they do not coordinate their trade policy. That is, providing signatories with an
additional policy instrument, such as trade tariﬀs that can be imposed on all imports,
makes them more powerful in the sense of having the ability to generate additional
revenues as well as pose negative externalities toward non-signatories. These driving
forces together lead to the stability of the grand coalition. Unfortunately, when
varieties become independent the incentives for forming large coalitions breakdown.
The fact that signatories have an additional policy instrument does not help with
the stability of large coalitions when varieties are independent and we ﬁnd only small
coalitions are stable in equilibrium. A more detailed discussion on these ﬁndings is
presented later in the paper.
As for the trade cooperation scenario, we ﬁnd that the exclusive beneﬁts of free trade
and the negative externalities posed toward non-signatories are both providing the
incentives for cooperation leading to the stability of the grand coalition irrespective
of consumers' taste for variety. These driving forces also carry over when signatories
form a joint agreement and coordinate both their emission taxes and trade tariﬀs
leading to the grand coalition to be stable in equilibrium. In relating these results
to the current literature, while the incentives for forming climate change coalitions
are not strong enough due to positive externalities (Finus and Al Khourdajie, 2017),
the incentives for forming customs' unions are stronger given the beneﬁts of joining
the coalition and the incentives to avoid negative externalities (Yi, 1996). In our
environmental cooperation scenario we show that proving signatories with additional
policy instrument might sometimes lead to strong incentive for cooperation. As for
our joint cooperation scenario, we show that the joint agreement combines both
features of strong incentives for cooperation brought about by the customs' unions
as well as the policy instrument to deal with the damages' externality.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In section 3 we




Consider an intra-industry trade model of n ex ante symmetric countries with a
representative ﬁrm and consumer in each country. We denote the set of countries
by N . Firms produce a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, i.e. the same good but in
diﬀerent varieties where each ﬁrm produces one unique variety. Firms compete in
a Cournot-fashion. Markets are segmented and each ﬁrm supplies its good to the
domestic and all foreign markets. Given markets' segmentation, ﬁrms play a separate
Cournot game in each market.33 Transport costs are assumed away as usual.
The welfare of a country i is given by:
Wi = CSi + PSi + TRi + τRi −Di (1)
where CSi represents country i
′s consumer surplus, PSi country i′s producer surplus,
TRi country i
′s emission tax revenue from the tax imposed by each government on
its domestic ﬁrm's production, τRi country i
′s trade tariﬀs revenue from the tariﬀs
imposed by each government on all imports, and ﬁnally Di represents the pollution
damages faced by country i.
Consumers are identical with a quasilinear utility function over two goods. The
ﬁrst good is the horizontally diﬀerentiated and traded good. The second good is a
numeraire good, representing the composition of all other goods. Utility is linear
in the numeraire good and quadratic in the diﬀerentiated good. We assume that
consumers have a taste for the variety of the diﬀerentiated good (Dixit and Stiglitz,
1977). That is, consumers' utility depends not only on the total quantity consumed
but also on the composition of quantities of the diﬀerentiated good. To capture all
these features, we use the representative consumer's utility function presented in Yi
(1996), where for a country i consumers' utility ui is given by:








where vi represents the utility from consuming the horizontally diﬀerentiated and
traded good and Mi represents the utility from consuming the numeraire good; qi =
(qi1, ..., qin) is a vector of the varieties consumed by consumers in country i that
are produced by all ﬁrms, with qik representing country i
′s consumption of country
k′s variety;34 a is a positive demand parameter and Qi. =
∑
k∈N qik is country i
′s
total consumption of all varieties, supplied by all countries k. Consumers' taste for
33See Appleyard and Field (2014) as well as Helpman and Krugman (1985) for further background.
34Throughout the paper the ﬁrst subscript indicates the market in which the variety is consumed
and the second subscript indicates the market in which it is produced.
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variety (abbreviated TFV hereafter) is captured by parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] . High values
of γ imply a low taste for varieties and for γ = 1 varieties are perfect substitutes.
In contrast, low values of γ represent a high preference for a diverse and balanced
consumption bundle and for γ = 0 varieties cannot be substituted at all.35 In this
paper, in most parts, we will focus our analysis on two TFV cases for analytic
tractability: no TFV with γ = 1 and full TFV with γ = 0.









where pik represents the price faced by consumers in country i consuming the variety
of country k, and
∑
l∈N,l 6=k qil is the sum of all consumed varieties produced by all
ﬁrms except ﬁrm k.
From (2) and (3), the representative consumer surplus in country i is given by:











where the last term in (4) represents consumers' spending.












l∈N,l 6=i qil represents consumption of all varieties in market i except the
domestically produced one by ﬁrm i, i.e. consumption of all imports.





where δ is a damage parameter,
∑
k∈N Qk. is total consumption in every country k
and hence total emissions (due to our assumption of a constant emission to output
35An extension could be the ideal variety approach where consumers have not only a general
preference for the variety of the good but also a preference for a particular variety. One application
is a bias towards the domestically produced variety (Di Comite et al., 2014).
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coeﬃcient of 1). That is, emissions constitute a pure public bad and hence damages
depend on total emissions.
Producer surplus for country i′s ﬁrm is the sum of its proﬁt in each market:
PSi = piii +
∑
l∈N,l 6=i
pili = qii(pii − c− ti) +
∑
l∈N,l 6=i
qli(pli − c− ti − τl) (8)
where piii (pili) represents ﬁrm i
′s proﬁt in its domestic market i (in all other countries'
markets l ∈ N, l 6= i) from selling quantity qii (qli) at price pii (pli), c is constant
marginal cost, ti is the emission tax imposed by country i
′s government on its ﬁrm's
total production, and τl is the per-unit trade tariﬀ that ﬁrm i faces for its exports
to each markets l ∈ N, l 6= i.
2.2 Coalition Formation Game
We assume a three-stage coalition formation game, which unfolds as follows.
Stage 1, Choice of Membership: all countries decide simultaneously whether to join
coalition S with m the cardinality of S. Countries which do not join S act as
singletons. A typical signatory will be denoted by i (i ∈ S) and a non-signatory by
j (j ∈ N\S).
Following d'Aspremont et al. (1983), a coalition is called stable if it is internally
and externally stable. Internal stability means that no signatory has an incentive
to leave coalition S, whereas external stability means that no non-signatory has an
incentive to join coalition S. We assume for simplicity that in the case of indiﬀerence
a non-signatory joins coalition S.
Internal stability:
Wi(S)−Wi(S \ {i}) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S
External stability:
Wj(S)−Wj(S ∪ {j}) > 0 ∀j ∈ N \ S
Stage 2, Choice of Policy Level: all countries choose simultaneously their emission
taxes and trade tariﬀs. We will discuss these choices in more details in the next
section.
Stage 3, Choice of Output: all ﬁrms choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively
their segmented market outputs by maximising their producer surplus: max
q1i,...,qni
PSi
The game is solved by backwards induction.
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2.3 Choices of Policy
As mentioned in the previous section, in the second stage of the coalition formation
game all countries choose simultaneously their emission taxes and trade tariﬀs. In
order to address the case of issue linkage between climate change agreements and
customs' unions, we analyse the following three scenarios:
1. Environmental cooperation: in this scenario signatories cooperate on climate
change, but they do not cooperate on trade. Therefore, the policy choices are
as follows:
• Signatory countries:
 maximise their joint welfare by choosing a common emission tax ti
implemented uniformly by all signatory countries and imposed on




 and maximise their individual welfare by choosing a trade tariﬀ τi im-
posed on imports from all countries (signatories and non-signatories):
max
τi
Wi. Notice that signatories do not abolish trade tariﬀs on im-
ports from other signatories' ﬁrms and hence cooperation is limited
to climate change only.
• Non-signatory countries:
 maximise their individual welfare by choosing an emission tax tj im-
posed on their domestic ﬁrm's production, as well as a trade tariﬀ τj
imposed on all imports from all countries' ﬁrms: max
tj ,τj
Wj.
2. Trade cooperation: in this scenario signatories cooperate on trade and form a
customs' union, but they do not cooperate on climate change. Therefore, the
policy choices are as follows:
• Signatory countries:
 abolish trade tariﬀs on imports from other signatories' ﬁrms
 maximise their joint welfare by choosing a common trade tariﬀ τi
implemented uniformly by all signatory countries and imposed on




 and maximise their individual welfare by choosing an emission tax ti




 maximise their individual welfare by choosing an emission tax tj im-
posed on their domestic ﬁrm's production, as well as a trade tariﬀ τj




3. Joint cooperation on climate change and customs' union: in this scenario sig-
natories cooperate on both climate change and trade. Therefore, the policy
choices are as follows:
• Signatory countries:
 abolish trade tariﬀs on imports from other signatories' ﬁrms
 and maximise their joint welfare by choosing a common trade tariﬀ
τi implemented uniformly by all signatory countries and imposed on
imports from non-signatories' ﬁrms, as well as choosing an emission
tax ti implemented uniformly in all signatory countries and imposed





 maximise their individual welfare by choosing an emission tax tj im-
posed on their domestic ﬁrm's production, as well as a trade tariﬀ τj
imposed on all imports from all countries' ﬁrms: max
tj ,τj
Wj.
2.4 Properties of the Game
We deﬁne the following properties to analyse the incentive to form coalitions and the
associated welfare implications.
Consider S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, and S ′ = S ∪ {j} where S ′ ⊆ N :
• Positive Externality: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coalition
S
′
exhibits a (strict) positive externality if:
Wj(S
′
) ≥ (>)Wj(S) ∀j /∈ S and j /∈ S ′
• Negative Externality: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coali-
tion S
′
exhibits a strict negative externality if:
Wj(S
′
) < Wj(S) ∀j /∈ S and j /∈ S ′
• Superadditivity: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coalition S ′
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• Full Cohesiveness: in a coalition game a move from coalition S to coalition
S
′
















Superadditivity provides the incentives to join a coalition, whereas the positive exter-
nality captures the incentive to free ride. In terms of forming large stable coalitions,
the two properties work in opposite directions and typically for large coalitions the
positive externality eﬀects should be dominated by the superadditivity eﬀects. Full
cohesiveness justiﬁes the search for large stable coalitions, even if the grand coali-
tion is not stable. Essentially, global welfare increases when the coalition is enlarged




In this section, we derive the results for the third stage of all three scenarios. Notice
that the segmented market structure is exactly the same for the trade cooperation
and joint cooperation scenarios. The reason for that is in both scenarios signato-
ries abolish the trade tariﬀs with the coalition. Meanwhile, the segmented market
structure for the environmental cooperation scenario is diﬀerent from the other two
scenarios given that signatories do not abolish the trade tariﬀs within the coalition.
We will present the equilibrium quantities for all three scenarios below as compactly
as possible.
Given the segmented markets' structure, markets can be categorised into signatories'
and non-signatories' markets. In a signatory's market, there are three equilibrium
quantities. The ﬁrst q∗i represents the domestic ﬁrm's production for its own mar-
ket.36 This ﬁrm faces an emission tax only, imposed by its own government. The
second equilibrium quantity q∗ii represents other signatories ﬁrms' production to this
signatory's market. There are two cases for q∗ii depending on the scenario analysed.
In the case of the environmental cooperation scenario, these ﬁrms face an emission
tax imposed by their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ imposed on their ex-
ports to this signatory's market. Meanwhile, in the case of the other two scenarios,
trade cooperation and joint cooperation, signatories abolish trade tariﬀs within the
coalition and therefore these ﬁrms face only an emission tax imposed by their own
36Notation: in q∗i we used one sub-script only as the quantity represents domestic ﬁrm production
for the domestic market.
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governments. In other words, under trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenar-
ios q∗i = q
∗
ii, given that trade tariﬀs are abolished within the coalition and emission
taxes are implemented uniformly by all signatories. The third equilibrium quantity
q∗ij represents non-signatories ﬁrms' exports to this signatory's market. These ﬁrms
face an emission tax imposed by their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ
imposed on their exports to this signatory's market.
In a non-signatory's market, there are always three equilibrium quantities which are
the same irrespective of the scenario analysed. The ﬁrst q∗j represents the domestic
ﬁrm's production for its own market.37 This ﬁrm faces an emission tax only, imposed
by its own government. The second equilibrium quantity q∗jj represents other non-
signatories ﬁrms' exports to this non-signatory's market. These ﬁrms face an emission
tax imposed by their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ imposed on their
exports to this non-signatory's market. Finally, the third equilibrium quantity q∗ji
represents signatories ﬁrms' exports to this non-signatory's market. These ﬁrms face
an emission tax imposed by their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ imposed
on their exports to this non-signatory's market.
This segmented markets' structure can be illustrated in the following table:38
Segmented Markets Signatory's Firm Non-signatory's Firm Total Consumption





















We present these quantities below. The detailed derivations are available in Appendix
1.
We ﬁrst look at signatories' markets. In the case of the environmental cooperation
scenario, the equilibrium quantity that a signatory's ﬁrm produces for its domestic
markets (q∗i ) is diﬀerent from the one it produces for any other signatory's market
(q∗ii), given that trade tariﬀs are not abolished within the coalition. In which case,
the domestic ﬁrm i′s variety produced for its domestic market is given by:
q∗i =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + γtj(n−m) + γτi(n− 1)
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (9)
while its variety produced for other signatories' markets is given by:
q∗ii =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + γtj(n−m)− 2τi
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (10)
37Notation: in q∗j we used one sub-script only as the quantity represents domestic ﬁrm production
for the domestic market.
38Notation: recall that in each quantity (e.g. qij) the ﬁrst subscript indicates the market in which
the variety is consumed and the second subscript indicates the market in which it is produced. In
the Segmented Markets table under the Total Consumption column we replace the second subscript
with a dot (e.g. Q∗i.) in order to illustrate summing total consumption irrespective of the production
source. The same principle applies to the ﬁrst subscript under the Total Production row.
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In the case of trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios, trade tariﬀs are
abolished within the coalition and therefore a signatory ﬁrm i′s variety produced for




(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + γ(tj + τi)(n−m)
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (11)
Check Appendix 1 for further justiﬁcations.
In the case of environmental cooperation scenario, a non-signatory ﬁrm j′s variety
produced for a signatory i′s market is given by:
q∗ij =
(a− c)(2− γ)− tj(γ(m− 1) + 2) + γmti − 2τi
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (12)
while in the case of trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios, it is given by:
q∗ij =
(a− c)(2− γ)− (tj + τi)(γ(m− 1) + 2) + γmti
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (13)
As for the total consumption in a signatory i′s market from all varieties (Q∗i. =
q∗i + (m− 1)q∗ii + (n−m)q∗ij), in the case of environmental cooperation scenario it is
given by:
Q∗i. =
n(a− c)−mti − tj(n−m)− τi(n− 1)
γ(n− 1) + 2 (14)
while in the case of trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios, it is given by:
Q∗i. =
n(a− c)−mti − (tj + τi)(n−m)
γ(n− 1) + 2 (15)
We now look at non-signatories' markets where equilibrium quantities are the same
irrespective of the scenario analysed.39 The domestic ﬁrm j′s variety produced for
its domestic market is given by:
q∗j =
(a− c)(2− γ)− tj(γ(m− 1) + 2) + γmti + γτj(n− 1)
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (16)
while its variety produced for other non-signatories' markets is given by:
q∗jj =
(a− c)(2− γ)− tj(γ(m− 1) + 2) + γmti − 2τj
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (17)
39The equilibrium emission taxes and trade tariﬀs themselves will of course be diﬀerent depending
on the scenario analysed given the diﬀerent maximisation procedures.
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and a signatory ﬁrm i′s variety produced for a non-signatory j′s market is given by:
q∗ji =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + tj(γ(n−m))− 2τj
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (18)
with the total consumption in a non-signatory j′s market from all varieties (Q∗j. =
q∗j + (n−m− 1)q∗jj +mq∗ji) is given by:
Q∗j. =
n(a− c)−mti − tj(n−m)− τj(n− 1)
γ(n− 1) + 2 (19)
We now look at the eﬀects of emission taxes on ﬁrms' output.
Proposition 1 - The Eﬀects of Emission Taxes on Equilibrium Quantities
























































= 0). The total quantity












< 0, irrespective of γ.
Proof: Follows directly from equations (9) to (19) above. Q.E.D.
Quantities of any ﬁrm's variety (signatory's or non-signatory's ﬁrm) produced for any
individual market (signatories' and non-signatories' markets) are negatively aﬀected
by own taxes and positively aﬀected by foreign taxes imposed on foreign counter-
parts. Only under full taste for variety (TFV), i.e. γ = 0, will a ﬁrm's output not
beneﬁt from a foreign tax imposed on a foreign ﬁrm. In which case, each ﬁrm acts
as a monopolist in each market as consumers do not substitutes between varieties
and hence there is no competition among ﬁrms. As for total consumption in any
market (signatory's or non-signatory's), it is always negatively aﬀected by any tax
(signatories' and non-signatories' taxes).
We now look at the eﬀects of trade tariﬀs on ﬁrms' output. Given that trade tariﬀs
aﬀect only imports from foreign ﬁrms, we can draw the following intuitive conclusions,
which can be veriﬁed from equations (9) to (19). The quantity of any ﬁrm's variety in



















= 0. The same intuition also applies to total consumption
in any market. That is, total consumption in a signatory's (non-signatory's) market
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All these results hold true ∀γ. More formal conclusions are presented in Proposition
2 below.
Proposition 2 - The Eﬀects of Trade Tariﬀs on Equilibrium Quantities
• Under environmental cooperation scenario, the quantity of any signatory ﬁrm
i's variety produced for its own (any other signatory's or any non-signatory's)






















• Under all scenarios, the quantity of any non-signatory ﬁrm j's variety produced
for its own (any signatory's or other non-signatory's) market increases (de-










respec.), except for γ = 0 in which case
∂q∗j
∂τj
= 0 (irrespective of γ).
• Under all scenarios, the total quantity consumed in any market decreases in






< 0, irrespective of γ.
Proof: Follows directly from equations (9) to (19) above. Q.E.D.
Under environmental cooperation scenario, the quantity of any ﬁrm's variety (signa-
tory's or non-signatory's ﬁrm) produced for its domestic market is positively aﬀected
by the trade tariﬀ that the domestic government imposes on imports from foreign
ﬁrms. These tariﬀs provide the domestic ﬁrms with comparative advantage in the
domestic market. Only under full taste for variety (TFV), i.e. γ = 0, will a ﬁrm
not beneﬁt from the trade tariﬀ imposed on its competitors due to the independence
of varieties. Exports of any ﬁrm's variety (signatory's or non-signatory's ﬁrm) to
other markets (signatories' or non-signatories' markets) are negatively aﬀected by
the trade tariﬀs imposed by the domestic government in the destination markets.
This holds true irrespective of consumers' taste for variety.
In the case of non-signatories' ﬁrms these results from the environmental cooper-
ation scenario above can be extended to the other cooperation scenarios, namely
trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios. Meanwhile, in the case of signa-
tories' ﬁrms such interactions change when comparing the environmental cooperation
scenario with the trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios. In the latter
two scenarios trade tariﬀs are abolished within the coalition. Therefore, signatories
ﬁrms' exports to other signatories' markets are not negatively aﬀected by the do-
mestic trade tariﬀs operating in those markets. On the contrary, they beneﬁt from
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them. In other words, the comparative advantage that signatories' ﬁrms enjoy in
their domestic markets is now extended to other signatories' markets. Nevertheless,
these positive eﬀects disappear under the highest level of taste for variety (TFV),
γ = 0.
Total consumption in any market (signatory's or non-signatory's) is always decreasing
in the domestic trade tariﬀ that operates in this market. Therefore, by extension,
global consumption (or production) of all countries is always decreasing in any trade
tariﬀ.
One summarising conclusion for both Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 is that from
ﬁrms' perspective the negative eﬀects of taxes or tariﬀs always exist. Meanwhile,
the positive eﬀects of having counterparts facing tax or tariﬀs disappear under the
highest level of taste for variety (TFV), γ = 0.
3.2 Second Stage
In this section, we derive equilibrium emission taxes and trade tariﬀs for signatories
and non-signatories in the second stage. They follow from the F.O.Cs. for signatories'
and non-signatories' welfare functions. Check Appendix 2 for the relevant equations.
We ﬁnd that the S.O.Cs. are satisﬁed.
Inserting equilibrium emission taxes and trade tariﬀs into equilibrium quantities re-
veals that we need to impose non-negativity constraints in order to ensure positive
outputs. Essentially, these constraints boil down to requesting that the demand
parameter a is larger than marginal production cost c plus a multiple of marginal
damages. In other words, the demand parameter a must be large than certain thresh-
old a, a > a. The exact constraints are stated in Appendix 3, which are assumed to
hold henceforth.
We will focus our analysis on two taste for varieties (TFV) cases for analytic tractabil-
ity: no TFV with γ = 1 and full TFV with γ = 0. Due to the complexity of the
analytical results, despite assuming speciﬁc values on TFV, we resort to numerical
simulations for the remainder of the paper. The parameters' constellations are as
follows: n = 10, m ≤ n, γ = {0, 1}, δ = {10, 50, 100}, and c = 0.40
We now look at signatories' and non-signatories' equilibrium trade tariﬀs and emis-
sion taxes in the three scenarios. It is expected that there will be a lot of interactions
between both of these policy instruments. These interactions are a result of the
fact that both instruments aﬀect consumer surplus, producer surplus, taxes/tariﬀs
revenues, as well as pollution damages. The main diﬀerence between the two instru-
ments is that emission taxes target domestic production, whereas trade tariﬀs target
imports, i.e. foreign production.
40Since we have constant marginal costs symmetric across all ﬁrms (signatories' and non-
signatories' ones) such simpliﬁcation, c = 0, will not aﬀect our qualitative results.
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Therefore, before we present the results it is important to understand the incen-
tives structure at play here. In setting these policies, the contesting incentives are:
supporting domestic consumption (through lower emission taxes and/or trade tar-
iﬀs), improving the competitiveness of the domestic producer (through lower emission
taxes and/or higher trade tariﬀs on imports), generating tax/tariﬀ revenues (through
higher emission taxes and trade tariﬀs), and ﬁnally reducing damages (through higher
emission taxes and trade tariﬀs). In short, these incentives can all be served using
both policy instruments. Furthermore, these interactions are also shaped by the level
of taste for variety (TFV), which deﬁnes the substitutability among varieties from
consumers' perspective, the level of competition among producers and the spillovers
of emission reductions among countries. Finally, these interactions are also inﬂuenced
by the diﬀerent maximisation procedures under each scenario.
In the next result we compare signatories' and non-signatories' emission taxes and
trade tariﬀs across all three scenarios. For the purpose of distinguishing taxes and
tariﬀs between scenarios, we use the superscript EC to indicate environmental coop-
eration (e.g. τECi or t
EC





JC to indicate joint cooperation (e.g. τJCi or t
JC
i ).
Result 1 - Signatories' and Non-signatories' Equilibrium Emission Taxes
and Trade Tariﬀs
Under the environmental cooperation scenario:
• for γ = 1: tECi > tECj ∀m > 3, and τECi > τECj ∀m,
• for γ = 0: tECi > tECj ∀m, and τECi > τECj ∀m.
Under the trade cooperation scenario:
• for γ = 1: tTCi > tTCj ∀m > 6, and τTCi < τTCj ∀m,
• for γ = 0: tTCi > tTCj ∀m > 4, and τTCi > τTCj ∀m > 2.
Under the joint cooperation scenario:
• for γ = 1: tJCi > tJCj ∀m > 7, and τJCi < τJCj ∀m,
• for γ = 0: tJCi > tJCj ∀m > 5, and τJCi > τJCj ∀m > 2.
Under the environmental cooperation scenario, we ﬁnd that signatories' emission
taxes are higher than non-signatories' ones under γ = {0, 1}, with the only excep-
tion for small coalitions when varieties are perfect substitutes (i.e. γ = 1). In other
words, signatories almost always impose higher emission taxes than non-signatories as
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they internalise the damages externality for the whole coalition. There are two cases
(m = {2, 3} under γ = 1) where signatories' taxes are lower than non-signatories'
ones. The rationale for this is as follows. When varieties are perfect substitutes,
the positive spillovers of emission reductions' activities taking place in any country
are high toward other countries given perfect substitution. In other words, signa-
tories of these small coalitions (m = {2, 3}) are fully beneﬁting from the emissions
reduction eﬀorts taking place in the large number of non-signatories' markets. As
the coalition size increases, m > 3, signatories start to impose higher taxes than
non-signatories. Such interactions however change when varieties are independent
(i.e. γ = 0) since reducing emissions from all varieties becomes equally important
due to lower spillovers of beneﬁts. Therefore, we ﬁnd signatories' emission taxes are
always higher than non-signatories' ones under γ = 0.
As for trade tariﬀs, signatories' tariﬀs are always higher than non-signatories' ones
under the environmental cooperation scenario, irrespective of the taste for varieties
(TFV) assumption (i.e. γ = {0, 1}). Recall that under the environmental coopera-
tion scenario, signatories do not abolish trade tariﬀs within the coalition. Therefore,
they beneﬁt from imposing high tariﬀs in three ways. First, they generate high tariﬀs
revenues from all countries (other signatories and all non-signatories). Second, high
tariﬀs provide domestic producers with comparative advantage in the domestic mar-
ket (particularly under γ = 1, as we showed in Proposition 2). Finally, high trade
tariﬀs lead to higher emission reductions from imports. As for domestic consumers,
they are negatively aﬀected by the high prices of domestic and foreign varieties. Nev-
ertheless, the beneﬁts of high revenues, strong comparative advantage for domestic
producers and lower emissions outweigh the negative eﬀects on domestic consumers.
Overall, under the environmental cooperation scenario it is clear that signatories are
not only undertaking strong emission reductions activities within the coalition but
also able to force emission reductions on imports by imposing high trade tariﬀs. In
other words, providing signatories with an additional instrument such as trade tariﬀs
might alter the incentives for free riding even if this additional policy instrument is
used to maximise the welfare of each signatory individually.
We now move to the trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios. One of
the key diﬀerences between these two scenarios and the previous one, apart from the
maximisation procedure, is that trade tariﬀs are abolished within the coalition under
these two scenarios. On the one hand, this implies that revenues from trade tariﬀs
decline as the coalition size increases. On the other hand, accessing the tariﬀ-free
block will provide an additional incentive for cooperation. Furthermore, abolishing
trade tariﬀs will lead to an inward shift of production and consumption within the
coalition, which is particularly useful for consumers when varieties are perfect substi-
tutes. We will discuss the results of both scenarios together as the intuition follows
closely in both cases.
First we start with emission taxes. Under γ = 1 we ﬁnd signatories' taxes are always
higher than non-signatories' ones for large coalition sizes only. This holds true in both
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trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios. As mentioned earlier, given the
perfect substitution of varieties signatories are fully beneﬁting from the spillovers of
emission reductions eﬀorts taking place in non-signatories' markets. However, as the
coalition size increases, signatories start to impose higher taxes than non-signatories
given the lower level of spillovers with fewer non-signatories. When varieties become
independent (i.e. γ = 0), reducing emissions from all varieties becomes equally
important due to the lower spillovers and hence signatories start imposing higher
emission taxes for medium to large coalition sizes.
As for trade tariﬀs, whenever varieties are perfect substitutes (i.e. γ = 1) we ﬁnd
signatories' trade tariﬀs are always lower than non-signatories' ones. This holds true
in both trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios. The reason for imposing
lower trade tariﬀs is to support domestic consumption for the whole coalition given
the joint welfare maximisation, which is a key diﬀerence between these two scenarios
and the previous one. Although signatories' ﬁrms would beneﬁt from higher tariﬀ
imposed on foreign imports as we showed in Proposition 1, they are still enjoying
the access to tariﬀ-free markets within the coalition. Such favorable terms of trade
within the coalition result in an inward shift of production and consumption, and
consequently higher proﬁts for the coalition's ﬁrms within these markets. Further-
more, given the perfect substitution of varieties, signatories are fully beneﬁting from
the spillovers of emissions reduction eﬀorts taking place in non-signatories' markets
whenever non-signatories' tariﬀs and/or taxes are higher. Such interactions however
change when varieties are independent (i.e. γ = 0) since reducing emissions from all
varieties becomes equally important. That is, signatories also need to ensure that
emissions from domestically consumed imports are also reduced. Therefore, whether
signatories are cooperating on trade only or on both trade and climate change they
impose higher trade tariﬀs than non-signatories ∀m > 2.
In summary, when varieties are independent (i.e. γ = 0), signatories almost always
impose higher taxes and tariﬀs than non-signatories as reducing emissions from all
varieties is equally important. This holds true for all three scenarios. However, when
varieties are perfect substitutes (i.e. γ = 1) then the segmented market structure
under each scenario plays an important role here. In the case of the environmental
cooperation scenario, trade tariﬀs are not abolished within the coalition. Further-
more, they are imposed to maximise the individual welfare of each country only. This
provides the incentive to impose high trade tariﬀs as the potential tariﬀs' revenues
are high. Furthermore, signatories always impose higher emission taxes than non-
signatories in order to internalise the damages' externality for the whole coalition.
The negative eﬀects of high taxes on consumers and producers are outweighed by
the high revenues and lower damages. In the case of trade cooperation and joint
cooperation scenarios under γ = 1, trade tariﬀs are abolished within the coalition.
Furthermore, they are imposed to maximise the joint welfare of the whole coalition.
Therefore, in choosing their trade tariﬀs signatories take into account the negative
eﬀects on all consumers within the coalition, rather than within their own country
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only. This leads to lower trade tariﬀs in signatory markets than non-signatory ones.
As for emission taxes, signatories' taxes are higher than non-signatories' ones for
medium to large coalitions.
3.3 First Stage Results
In this section we will start by analysing the welfare properties, which will help us
understanding the coalition's stability ﬁndings.
Result 2 - Game Properties
Under the environmental cooperation scenario:
• For γ = 1: the property of superadditivity and full cohesiveness hold, the ex-
ternality property is positive for ∀m < 7, and a signatory's welfare is always
higher than a non-signatory's one Wi −Wj > 0,∀m.
• For γ = 0: the property of positive externality holds ∀m > 2, superadditivity
fails ∀m = [3, 8], full cohesiveness holds ∀m > 7, and a signatory's welfare is
higher than a non-signatory's one Wi −Wj > 0,∀m < 5.
Under the trade cooperation scenario:
• For γ = 1: the property of superadditivity holds ∀m > 5, externality is negative
∀m > 5, full cohesiveness holds, and a signatory's welfare is always higher than
a non-signatory's one Wi −Wj > 0,∀m.
• For γ = 0: the properties of superadditivity and negative externality hold, full
cohesiveness fails ∀m > 3, and a signatory's welfare is always higher than a
non-signatory's one Wi −Wj > 0,∀m.
Under the joint cooperation scenario:
• For γ = 1: the property of superadditivity holds ∀m > 5, the externality prop-
erty is negative ∀m > 6, full cohesiveness always holds, and a signatory's
welfare is always higher than a non-signatory's one Wi −Wj > 0,∀m.
• For γ = 0: the properties of superadditivity and negative externality hold, full
cohesiveness fails ∀m = [4, 8], and a signatory's welfare is always higher than
a non-signatory's one Wi −Wj > 0, ∀m.
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Forming and enlarging coalitions under the environmental cooperation scenario has
the following implications on signatories' welfare under perfect substitution (i.e.
γ = 1). Since signatories impose high trade tariﬀs and emission taxes, they beneﬁt
from the high revenues as well as the high reductions in production and consumption
emissions. Furthermore, despite the high emission taxes, signatories' ﬁrms beneﬁt
from the comparative advantage in their domestic market given that trade tariﬀs
target all imports (from other signatories' ﬁrms as well as all non-signatories' ones).
Meanwhile, signatories' consumers are negatively aﬀected by the high prices of do-
mestic and foreign varieties. However, given the perfect substitution of varieties,
they can substitute the expensive imported varieties with the cheaper domestically
produced one. In other words, there is an inward shift of consumption within each
signatory's market individually. We ﬁnd that the net eﬀects of all these forces is pos-
itive, leading to the property of superadditivity to hold and hence providing strong
incentives for cooperation.
As for non-signatories, on the one hand they beneﬁt from the emission reductions
activities undertaken by the coalition. On the other hand, their ﬁrms' exports proﬁts
suﬀer from the high tariﬀs operating in signatories' markets. For small coalitions,
the positive eﬀects of emission reductions outweigh the negative eﬀects of the high
tariﬀs imposed by the coalition leading to positive externalities. However, for large
coalitions the negative eﬀects of tariﬀs are much stronger and hence externalities be-
come negative for these coalitions, in which case free riding is undermined. Overall,
the incentives for forming coalitions under the environmental cooperation scenario
with γ = 1 are high leading to the stability of the grand coalition as we will show in
the next result. Global welfare is always increasing with the coalition size given the
beneﬁts that signatories generate from joining the coalition and the high emission re-
ductions activities. Finally, signatories' welfare is always higher than non-signatories'
one given the high revenues from tariﬀs and taxes.
When varieties become independent (i.e. γ = 0), superadditivity fails in most cases
and hence the incentives to cooperate are undermined. The reasons for this are as
follows. Firstly, signatories' ﬁrms do not beneﬁt from the high tariﬀs imposed on
their counterparts under γ = 0, as we showed in Proposition 2. Secondly, the high
taxes and tariﬀs imposed by signatories have stronger negative eﬀects on their con-
sumers given the high taste for varieties (γ = 0). As for the eﬀects of environmental
cooperation under γ = 0 on non-signatories, we ﬁnd that externalities are positive
and hence the incentives to free ride are high. The reason externalities become posi-
tive under γ = 0 is as follows. Generally, the externality from the coalition's emission
reduction eﬀorts is in principle always positive. However, the degree of these posi-
tive spillovers depend on the taste for variety (TFV). Under γ = 1, these positive
spillovers can be undermined by non-signatories' reactions in the form of emission
leakage due to the full substitutability of varieties. However, under γ = 0 these pos-
itive spillovers can not be undermined by non-signatories' reactions due to varieties'
126
independence and hence the externality is always positive in this case.41 Given these
driving forces, the incentives for forming coalitions are low leading to the stability
of small coalitions as we will show in the next result. As for full cohesiveness, it
holds only for large coalitions given the high beneﬁts from emission reductions for
signatories as well as the positive externalities toward non-signatories and therefore
global welfare increases with the coalition size for these large coalitions.
Forming and enlarging coalitions under the trade cooperation scenario has the fol-
lowing implications on signatories' welfare under perfect substitution (i.e. γ = 1).
Starting with the positive implications, signatories' consumers beneﬁt from consum-
ing tariﬀs-free varieties within the coalition which also face low emission taxes when
the coalition size is small to medium. They also beneﬁt from consuming the imports
that face low trade tariﬀs. As for signatories' producers, they beneﬁt from the trade
tariﬀs imposed on non-signatories' imports and from accessing tariﬀs-free markets
within the coalition as well as the low emission taxes, something that provides the
incentives for an inward shift of production within the coalition. Looking at the
negative implications of trade cooperation under perfect substitution (i.e. γ = 1)
on signatories, their governments tariﬀs' revenues are decreasing with the coalition
size given that tariﬀs are abolished within the coalition. Meanwhile, signatories'
production emissions are high and increasing with the coalition size given the low
tariﬀs and taxes. We ﬁnd that the beneﬁt for consumers and producers outweigh the
negative eﬀects of low revenues and emission reductions whenever the coalition size
is medium to large and therefore superadditivity holds, which illustrates the high
incentives for forming large coalitions.
We now look at the welfare implications on non-signatories that result from form-
ing and enlarging coalitions when signatories cooperate only on trade under perfect
substitution (i.e. γ = 1). Non-signatories' producers beneﬁt from exporting to sig-
natories' markets given the low trade tariﬀs (as oppose to other non-signatories'
markets). As for non-signatories' consumers, they beneﬁt from consuming imported
signatories' varieties, which are cheaper than the varieties imported from other non-
signatories' ﬁrms due to low emission taxes facing signatories' ﬁrms. However, as
the coalition size increases these taxes increase (as we showed in Result 1) and hence
non-signatories' consumers become worse oﬀ given that the majority of varieties be-
come more expensive. As for non-signatories' governments, even though their tariﬀs
are always higher than signatories' ones, they do not generate a lot of revenue for
two reasons. Firstly, due to the inward shift of production within the coalition,
for the reasons mentioned earlier. Secondly, non-signatories' ﬁrms also face better
terms of trade in signatories' markets and hence they shift their exports more to-
ward signatories' markets than non-signatories' ones (other than the domestic one).
Furthermore, non-signatories also suﬀer from the increasing emissions generated by
signatories' producers and consumers given the increasing access to tariﬀ-free mar-
41We showed similar eﬀect in Al Khourdajie et al (2017), where the BTA regime exhibits positive
externalities under γ = 0 for the same rationale.
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kets. The net eﬀect of all these forces is negative for large coalitions and hence the
externality property is negative, which discourages free riding under these coalition
sizes.
These two properties combined help us understanding the net eﬀects of coalition
formation on global welfare, which is illustrated in the property of full cohesive-
ness. They also help us to understand the comparison of signatories' versus non-
signatories' welfare. As for the full cohesiveness property, it always holds since
for small to medium coalition sizes externalities are positive, while for large coali-
tions even though externalities become negative signatories beneﬁt from cooperation.
Global welfare is at the highest level at the grand coalition as we ﬁnd that the cohe-
siveness property holds. As for the welfare comparison, signatories' welfare is always
higher than non-signatories' one. Overall, it is evident that the incentives for forming
coalitions when signatories cooperate on trade only are high under perfect substitu-
tion (i.e. γ = 1), leading to the stability of the grand coalition as we will show in
the next result.
The incentives for forming coalitions when signatories cooperate on trade only are
also strong when varieties are independent (i.e. γ = 0). As we discussed in Result 1,
when varieties are independent it is important to reduce emissions from all varieties.
This has led signatories to always impose high trade tariﬀs and emission taxes for
almost all coalition sizes. While signatories' consumers are negatively aﬀected by the
high prices, their producers still beneﬁt from the tariﬀ-free access to markets within
the coalition. As for signatories' governments they beneﬁt from higher tariﬀs' and
taxes' revenues as well as the higher emission reductions. The net eﬀect of all these
forces is positive and hence superadditivity holds, which illustrates the high incen-
tives for forming coalitions. Looking at non-signatories, their producers (consumers)
face higher tariﬀs (prices) for their exports (consumption) to signatories' markets (of
signatories' varieties). Despite the fact that they beneﬁt from higher emission reduc-
tions, the net eﬀect of all these forces is negative and hence the externality property
is negative, which undermines the incentives for free riding. Given these negative
externalities and the strong beneﬁts from joining the coalition, signatories' welfare is
always higher than non-signatories' one. The net eﬀects on global welfare is mostly
negative as full cohesiveness fails due to the strong negative externalities. Overall,
the incentives for forming coalitions when signatories cooperate on trade only are
also high when varieties are independent (i.e. γ = 0), leading to the stability of the
grand coalition as we will show in the next result.
We now look at the third scenario where signatories cooperate on both trade and
climate change. Under perfect substitution (i.e. γ = 1) signatories impose lower
trade tariﬀs than non-signatories, while their emission taxes become higher than
non-signatories' one only for large coalitions given the joint welfare maximisation as
we showed in Result 1. Therefore, signatories' consumers and producers increasingly
beneﬁt from the access to tariﬀs-free markets as the coalition size increases, and
at the same time damages decrease for large coalition sizes given the higher taxes.
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Put together, this lead to superadditivity to hold for medium to large coalitions and
hence the incentives for cooperation are high. Meanwhile, incentives for free riding
are undermined for medium to large coalition sizes as non-signatories face negative
externalities. Even though non-signatories' ﬁrms beneﬁt from the low-tariﬀs markets,
their consumers suﬀer from the increase costs of signatories' varieties. Furthermore,
the inward shift of production within the coalition means that non-signatories' gov-
ernment generate low tariﬀs' revenues. Therefore, for large coalitions these forces
lead to net negative eﬀects and hence negative externalities.
Looking at global welfare, it is not surprising that full cohesiveness always holds for
this scenario given that for small to medium coalitions non-signatories enjoy the posi-
tive externalities, while for medium to large coalitions superadditivity holds. Finally,
signatories' welfare is always higher than non-signatories' one given the increasing
access to tariﬀs-free markets for their consumers and producers. Overall, the incen-
tives for forming coalitions under this scenario are strong leading to the stability of
the grand coalition.
Finally, we brieﬂy look at the intuition of the properties' ﬁndings under the joint
cooperation scenario for γ = 0, as it follows closely from the intuition of the trade
cooperation scenario for γ = 0. Given that signatories impose higher tariﬀs and
taxes, they generate higher revenues and enjoy lower level of damages leading to
superadditivity to always hold. These high tariﬀs also mean that the negative ef-
fects on non-signatories' ﬁrms are high and hence externalities are always negative.
The combination of these two properties explain why signatories' welfare is always
higher than non-signatories' one. In terms of global welfare, full cohesiveness fails for
medium to large coalitions given the negative externalities. Overall, the incentives
for forming coalitions under this scenario are also strong, given that superadditivity
holds and externalities are negative, leading to the stability of the grand coalition.
We now look at the coalition's stability results.
Result 3 - Coalition Stability
Let m∗ denotes the size of an internally and externally stable coalition. If signatories
cooperate on climate change only then m∗ = n = 10 for γ = 1, while m∗ = 4 for
γ = 0. Meanwhile, if signatories cooperate on trade only or on both trade and climate
change then m∗ = n = 10 for both γ = {0, 1}.
Intuition for ﬁndings in this result follows closely from the ﬁndings and discussion in
Result 2 above. When signatories cooperate on climate change only, the incentives
for forming large coalitions under γ = 1 are strong given that superadditivity always
holds and externalities are negative for large coalition sizes. We showed in previous
results that using high trade tariﬀs signatories can enforce emission reductions from
imports and generate additional revenues at the same time. What is more, these high
trade tariﬀs have led to negative externalities toward outsiders. Given these driving
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forces, we ﬁnd the grand coalition m∗ = n = 10 stable in equilibrium when varieties
are perfect substitutes (i.e. γ = 1). Essentially, what we have here is a design of
a climate change agreement with two policy instruments emission taxes and trade
tariﬀs. In order to form the climate change agreement, governments coordinate their
emission taxes only. Having an additional policy instrument, such as trade tariﬀs
imposed on all countries (signatories and non-signatories), provides an additional
tool for signatories to discourages free riding.
Unfortunately, when varieties become independent (i.e. γ = 0) the incentives for
forming large coalitions breakdown. The key for such result is the lack of varieties'
substitutability, which leads to the following. Firstly, signatories' consumers are more
negatively aﬀected by the high tariﬀs imposed on all imports given their high taste
for variety / lack of varieties' substitutability under γ = 0. Secondly, signatories'
ﬁrms do not beneﬁt from the tariﬀs imposed on their counterparts as we showed
in Proposition 2. Finally, externalities become positive as the spillovers from the
coalition's emission reductions can not be undermined by non-signatories' reactions
due to varieties' independence, and hence the externality is always positive in this
case. All these driving forces led to a small stable coalition of m∗ = 4.
We now compare these ﬁndings of the environmental cooperation scenario with those
of Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017) as this paper is the closest paper in the literature
to ours. The authors show that irrespective of consumers' taste for variety climate
change coalitions always exhibit positive externalities toward non-signatories and
hence incentives for free riding are strong. We show here that providing signatories
with an additional instrument that could target foreign emissions such as trade tariﬀs
might alter the incentives for free riding even if this additional policy instrument is
used to maximise the welfare of each signatory individually. Unfortunately, these
optimistic results only hold when varieties are perfect substitutes (i.e. γ = 1) but
not when they are independent (i.e. γ = 0).
Cooperation on trade, such as forming customs' unions, is very attractive due to the
exclusive beneﬁts of free trade within the coalition as well as the in order to avoid the
negative externalities of being outside the coalition. This intuition is shown by Yi
(1996) who analyses customs' unions formation and stability under consumers' taste
for variety. The author does not consider the environmental damages from produc-
tion and trade. He ﬁnds that customs' unions always exhibit negative externalities
toward non-signatories, while signatories always beneﬁt from joining the coalition.
Therefore, the grand coalition is stable. Essentially in this paper we beneﬁt from his
work and extend his model to include environmental damages as well as introduce
emission taxes as a policy instrument. Signatories can either form a customs' union
and coordinate their trade tariﬀs only, or form a joint customs' union and climate
change agreement and coordinate both their trade tariﬀs and emission taxes. In
both cases we ﬁnd that the incentives for cooperation are also strong (inline with Yi,
1996). We ﬁnd that the grand coalition is stable under both γ = {0, 1}. In other
words, the strong cooperation incentive brought about by the customs' union also
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carry over when the coalition considers environmental damages from production and
coordinate its emission taxes.
3.4 Further Simulations
The results presented above hold for the non-negativity constraints. As explained in
the introduction of the Second Stage section above, inserting equilibrium emission
taxes and trade tariﬀs into equilibrium quantities reveals that we need to impose
non-negativity constraints on parameter values in order to ensure positive outputs.
Essentially, these constraints boil down to requesting that the demand parameter a
is larger than marginal production cost c plus a multiple of marginal damages. In
other words, the demand parameter a must be large than certain lower threshold a,
a > a. The exact constraints are stated in Appendix 3.
We conduct further simulations by increasing the demand parameter a above the
non-negativity constraints to see whether our results hold for high levels of demand.
Starting with the non-negativity constraints a for both levels of taste for variety
γ = {0, 1} for all three scenarios, we increase the level of demand using a scalar λ
such that: λa for λ = {2, 5, 10}.42
Under the environmental cooperation scenario, we ﬁnd the results presented above
to hold for all levels of λ. In other words, our ﬁndings under the environmental
cooperation scenario are robust. Under γ = 1 there are strong incentives for coop-
eration leading to the grand coalition to always be stable. Meanwhile, under γ = 0
the incentives for cooperation breakdown leading to the stability of small coalitions
only.
Under the trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios, we ﬁnd the results
presented above to hold for all levels of λ only when taste for varieties are high
(under γ = 0). That is, our ﬁndings under these two scenarios are robust when
γ = 0. Inline with the ﬁndings above, for all levels of λ externalities are negative and
superadditivity holds providing strong incentives for cooperation and hencem∗ = 10.
The rationale for these ﬁndings follows from the discussion presented above.
Unfortunately, when consumers have no taste for varieties (i.e. γ = 1) the incentives
for cooperation break down and m∗ = 1 for both trade cooperation and joint co-
operation scenarios. In driving the intuition for such ﬁndings we focus on the main
driving forces for cooperation: the externality property and superadditivity. We
ﬁnd that as demand increases, negative externalities turn into positive in most cases
making free riding more attractive. Meanwhile, superadditivity increasingly fails and
hence leading to lower incentives for cooperation. Under high levels of demand all
countries (signatories' and non-signatories') reduce their emission taxes as well as
trade tariﬀs. Furthermore, signatories' taxes and tariﬀs become lower than those of
42∀λ > 10 the results do not change for all scenarios.
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non-signatories in most cases, given the joint welfare maximisation.43 On the one
hand, non-signatories' consumers (producers) beneﬁt from accessing the cheap va-
rieties (markets), leading to positive externalities. On the other hand, signatories'
governments generate less revenues while global emissions are increasing leading to
lower incentives for cooperation.
4 Concluding Remarks
In an intra-industry trade model with horizontal products' diﬀerentiation and con-
sumers' taste for variety (TFV) we studied the eﬀects of issue linkage between climate
change agreements and customs' unions. Our model essentially combines both mod-
els' setup from Finus and Al Khourdajie (2017) representing the climate change
agreement and Yi (1996) representing customs' unions. In order to establish the is-
sue linkage case we looked into three diﬀerent scenarios of cooperation. Furthermore,
we analysed how governments' policy and incentives to form coalitions change under
each scenario. In checking for the size of stable coalitions we invoked the concept of
internal and external stability.
Our model is an extension of Brander and Spencer (1985) framework where we
assume n ex ante symmetric countries. Governments have two policy instruments.
First, they can impose emission taxes on their domestic ﬁrm's production in order to
reduce pollution damages. Second, they can impose trade tariﬀs on imports. Each
government is concerned with the domestic ﬁrm's proﬁt, revenues from emission taxes
and trade tariﬀs, the utility of the domestic consumers and ﬁnally the environmental
damages resulting from a global pollutant. Each ﬁrm produces a unique variety of
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good and consumers have taste for these varieties (Yi,
1996).
We analyse three scenarios. The ﬁrst is called environmental cooperation scenario,
where signatories coordinate their climate policy and set their emission taxes col-
lectively in order to maximise the joint welfare of the whole coalition. As for the
trade policy, they neither coordinate their trade tariﬀs, nor abolish them within the
coalition. The second scenario is called trade cooperation scenario, where signatories
coordinate their trade tariﬀs only, i.e. cooperate on trade and form a customs' union,
with no coordination of climate policy; emission taxes. The third scenario is called
joint cooperation, which is essentially a combination of both previous scenarios illus-
trating the case of issue linkage. Signatories coordinate both their trade tariﬀs and
emission taxes, i.e. forming a joint climate change and customs' union agreement. In
43We do not ﬁnd such interactions under the environmental cooperation scenario because sig-
natories are maximising their own welfare only when they set their trade tariﬀs and hence they
do not take into account the eﬀects of high tariﬀs on other signatories' consumers. Furthermore,
there are strong incentives to keep the tariﬀs high given that they can impose them on both other
signatories' imports as well as non-signatories' ones.
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all three scenarios non-signatories choose their own emission taxes and trade tariﬀs
in order to maximise their individual welfare.
For analytic tractability, we focus on two cases of taste for varieties (TFV). The
ﬁrst is where consumers have no TFV and hence varieties are considered perfect
substitutes. The second case is where taste for varieties is high and hence varieties
are independent and consumers have a high preference for a diverse and balanced
consumption bundle since varieties cannot be substituted at all.
Our results present new insights into environmental cooperation when governments
are dealing with more than one issues, namely climate change and free trade in our
context, and have two policy instruments to deal with them. In the case where
consumers have no taste for varieties, i.e. varieties are perfect substitutes following
the standard assumption in the literature, we ﬁnd the incentives for cooperation
on climate change are strong when countries coordinate their emission taxes even
though they do not coordinate their trade policy. That is, providing signatories with
an additional policy instrument, such as trade tariﬀs that can be imposed on all
imports, makes them more powerful in the sense of having the ability to generate
additional revenues as well as pose negative externalities toward non-signatories.
These driving forces together lead to the stability of the grand coalition.
Unfortunately, when varieties become independent the incentives for forming large
coalitions breakdown. The key for such result is the lack of varieties' substitutability,
which leads to the following. Firstly, signatories' consumers are more negatively
aﬀected by the high tariﬀs imposed on all imports given their high taste for variety /
lack of varieties' substitutability. Secondly, signatories' ﬁrms do not beneﬁt from the
tariﬀs imposed on their counterparts. Finally, externalities become positive as the
spillovers from the coalition's emission reductions can not be undermined by non-
signatories' reactions due to varieties' independence. In conclusion, the fact that
signatories have an additional policy instrument does not help with the stability of
large coalitions when varieties are independent. We ﬁnd only small coalitions are
stable in equilibrium.
Several studies in the literature show that cooperation on trade, such as forming
customs' unions and free trade areas, is very attractive due to the exclusive beneﬁts of
free trade within the coalition as well as the in order to avoid the negative externalities
of being outside the coalition, check Yi (1996 and 2000). In this paper, our trade
cooperation scenario is essentially derived from this literature with the inclusion of
environmental damages as well as the introduction of emission taxes as a policy
instrument. Signatories in the trade cooperation scenario form a customs' union and
coordinate their trade tariﬀs only. We ﬁnd that the exclusive beneﬁts of free trade
and the negative externalities posed toward non-signatories are both providing the
incentives for cooperation leading to the stability of the grand coalition irrespective
of consumers' taste for variety. These driving forces also carry over when signatories
form a joint agreement and coordinate both their emission taxes and trade tariﬀs
leading to the grand coalition to be stable in equilibrium.
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To our knowledge this is the ﬁrst attempt to introduce the combination of issue link-
age with customs' unions, horizontal products' diﬀerentiation and consumers' TFV
features to the literature of self-enforcing IEAs with trade. Future research avenues
could be explored in terms of relaxing the symmetry assumption, and understanding
the eﬀect of ideal varieties or asymmetric consumers' TFV between countries.
Finally, there are other trade policy instruments that could be employed to improve
the incentives for cooperation on climate change. One of which is border tax adjust-
ments (BTAs) analysed in Al Khourdajie et al (2017). Using this policy signatory
governments can impose an additional border tax on imports from non-signtories'
ﬁrms. This border tax amounts to the exact tax diﬀerential between the high emis-
sion tax that signatory ﬁrms are facing in their domestic markets and the low emission
tax that non-signatory ﬁrms are facing for their exports to these markets. The au-
thors show that when consumers have low or medium taste for varieties, BTAs lead
to the stability of the grand coalition. Whereas, if consumers have a very high taste
for varieties then only large coalitions are stable, but not the grand coalition.
The main diﬀerences between the BTA policy and trade tariﬀs are as follows. Firstly,
BTAs are policy instruments available to signatory governments only. They are
justiﬁed on the bases that only when signatories choose higher emission taxes than
non-signatories they can impose BTAs on imports from non-signatories' ﬁrms. This
will allow signatory governments to level the playing ﬁeld in their own markets as
well as create additional and explicit incentives to join the environmental agreement.
As for trade tariﬀs, they are available to all governments of all countries, be it
signatory or non-signatory ones. Tariﬀs in this context are employed as a trade policy
instrument. They are widely adopted worldwide as part of the existing international
trade system. In this paper, we explore whether signatory governments can beneﬁt
from existing policies to inﬂuence participation in climate change agreements. The
second diﬀerence between BTAs and trade tariﬀs is as follows. BTAs are limited to
the diﬀerence between signatories' emission taxes and non-signatories' one. Whereas,
trade tariﬀs are not constrained to any rule. The level of signatories' tariﬀs is chosen
to maximise their joint welfare. Indeed, it could also be the case the signatories'
trade tariﬀs are lower than non-signatories' one as we showed in this paper.
Overall, combining the results of these two papers (Al Khourdajie et al, 2017, and
Al Khourdajie, 2017) we can show that using trade tariﬀs in the context of joint
cooperation on climate change and customs' unions achieve more superior results to
using BTAs. Irrespective of the level of production diﬀerentiation and consumers'
taste for variety, joint cooperation on climate change and trade always leads to the
grand coalition to be stable in equilibrium. Whereas, in the case of BTAs the grand
coalition is only stable when consumers have low or medium taste for varieties. If
they have a very high taste for varieties then only large coalitions are stable, but
not the grand coalition. The justiﬁcation for such ﬁnding could be found in Al
Khourdajie et al (2017).
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6 Appendixes
A detailed appendix of all derivations is available upon request. Below, we summarise
the most important steps in the derivations in a compact form.
6.1 Appendix 1: Equilibrium Quantities Derivations
In this appendix we use the replacement functions method in order to derive the equi-
librium quantities for all three scenarios. Given the segmented markets' structure,
quantities can be illustrated in the following table:
Segmented Markets Signatory's Firm Non-signatory's Firm Total Consumption






















In deriving the equilibrium quantities, we distinguish between the environmental
cooperation scenario and the trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios.
6.1.1.1 Environmental Cooperation Scenario
In a signatory's market, there are three equilibrium quantities. The ﬁrst q∗i represents
the domestic ﬁrm's production for its own market.44 This ﬁrm faces an emission tax
44Notation: in q∗i we used one sub-script only as the function represents domestic ﬁrm production
for the domestic market.
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only, imposed by its own government. The second equilibrium quantity q∗ii represents
other signatories ﬁrms' production to this signatory's market. In the case of the
environmental cooperation scenario, these ﬁrms face an emission tax imposed by
their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ imposed on their exports to this
signatory's market. The third equilibrium quantity q∗ij represents non-signatories
ﬁrms' exports to this signatory's market. These ﬁrms face an emission tax imposed
by their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ imposed on their exports to this
signatory's market.
The proﬁt of the domestic signatory's ﬁrm i in its domestic market i is given by
pii = qi(pi − c − ti). Substituting the inverse demand function from equation (3)




= a− c− ti− (2− γ)qi− γQi. = 0 ⇐⇒ a− c− ti− 2qi− γ
∑
l∈N\{i}
qil = 0 (20)
where Qi. is the total quantity consumed in market i and
∑
l∈N\{i} qil is the sum of all
consumed varieties by consumers in market i (ﬁrst subscript) from all ﬁrms except the
domestic ﬁrm i (second subscript) . Equation (20) shows that the reaction functions
(qi = ri(
∑
l∈N\{i} qil) have a slope of −γ/2 . Hence, the equilibrium is unique;
the absolute value of the slope of the reaction function increases with the taste of
variety parameter γ, and as γ approaches zero the strategic interaction among ﬁrms
vanishes. Moreover, a necessary condition for positive quantities is a > c. Below,
we will develop this non-negativity conditions further in order to ensure interior
solutions.
The proﬁt of any other signatories ﬁrms i (except the domestic one) in this domestic
signatory market i is given by piii = qii(pii − c − ti − τi). Notice that the diﬀerence
between the domestic signatory's ﬁrm's proﬁt function and other signatories' ﬁrms'
proﬁt functions is the trade tariﬀ τi. Substituting the inverse demand function from









The proﬁt of any non-signatory's ﬁrm j in market i is given by piij = qij(pij − c −
tj − τi). Substituting the inverse demand function from equation (3) above after the
appropriate change in notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂piij
∂qij






In order to derive the equilibrium quantities, we note that, as mentioned in the game
setup above, in stage 2 the equilibrium emission taxes and trade tariﬀs are symmetric
with all signatories choosing the same tax rate ti as well as the same trade tariﬀ τi,
and all non-signatories choosing the same tax rate tj as well as the same trade tariﬀ
τj, given symmetry. Furthermore, given our segmented market structure quantities
produced for signatories' markets are the same; each signatory's ﬁrm produces the
same output for it domestic market and the same output for all other signatories'
markets, and each non-signatory's ﬁrm produces the same output for all signatories'
markets.
Summing up all three ﬁrst order conditions above after multiplying equation (21)
by the number of all other signatories' ﬁrms except the domestic one (m − 1) and
equation (22) by the number of non-signatories (n −m), we ﬁnd the total quantity
consumed in a signatory's market Q∗i. is given by:
Q∗i. =
n(a− c)−mti − tj(n−m)− τi(n− 1)
γ(n− 1) + 2 (23)
Next we plug Q∗i. from (23) into (20) and solve for qi, which is signatory ﬁrm i
′s
output for its domestic market:
q∗i =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + γtj(n−m) + γτi(n− 1)
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (24)
Similarly, we plug Q∗i. from (23) into (21) and solve for qii, which is the output of
other signatories ﬁrms is′ (other than the domestic one) for this signatory i′s market:
q∗ii =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + γtj(n−m)− 2τi
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (25)
Finally, we plug Q∗i. from (23) into (22) and solve for qij, which is non-signatory ﬁrm
j′s output for a signatory i′s market:
q∗ij =
(a− c)(2− γ)− tj(γ(m− 1) + 2) + γmti − 2τi
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (26)
6.1.1.2 Trade Cooperation and Joint Cooperation Scenarios:
In a signatory's market, there are three equilibrium quantities. The ﬁrst q∗i represents
the domestic ﬁrm's production for its own market.45 This ﬁrm faces an emission tax
only, imposed by its own government. The second equilibrium quantity q∗ii represents
other signatories ﬁrms' production to this signatory's market. In the case of the trade
cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios signatories abolish trade tariﬀs within
45Notation: in q∗i we used one sub-script only as the function represents domestic ﬁrm production
for the domestic market.
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the coalition and therefore these ﬁrms face an emission tax only, imposed by their
own governments. In other words, under trade cooperation and joint cooperation
scenarios q∗i = q
∗
ii. The third equilibrium quantity q
∗
ij represents non-signatories
ﬁrms' exports to this signatory's market. These ﬁrms face an emission tax imposed
by their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ imposed on their exports to this
signatory's market.
The proﬁt of the domestic signatory's ﬁrm i in its domestic market i is given by
pii = qi(pi − c − ti). Substituting the inverse demand function from equation (3)




= a− c− ti− (2− γ)qi− γQi. = 0 ⇐⇒ a− c− ti− 2qi− γ
∑
l∈N\{i}
qil = 0 (27)
The proﬁt of any other signatories ﬁrms i (except the domestic one) in this domestic
signatory market i is given by piii = qii(pii − c− ti). Notice that unlike the environ-
mental cooperation scenario, in the trade cooperation and joint cooperation scenarios
there are no diﬀerences between the domestic signatory's ﬁrm and other signatories'
ﬁrms proﬁt function when they produce for any signatory's market since trade tariﬀs
are abolished within the coalition. Substituting the inverse demand function from




= a− c− ti− (2− γ)qii− γQi. = 0 ⇐⇒ a− c− ti− 2qii− γ
∑
l∈N,l 6=i
qil = 0 (28)
The proﬁt of any non-signatory's ﬁrm j in market i is given by piij = qij(pij − c −
tj − τi). Substituting the inverse demand function from equation (3) above after the
appropriate change in notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂piij
∂qij





Summing up all three ﬁrst order conditions above after multiplying equation (28)
by the number of all other signatories' ﬁrms except the domestic one (m − 1) and
equation (29) by the number of non-signatories (n −m), we ﬁnd the total quantity
consumed in a signatory's market Q∗i. is given by:
Q∗i. =
n(a− c)−mti − (tj + τi)(n−m)
γ(n− 1) + 2 (30)
Next we plug Q∗i. from (30) into (27) and solve for qi, which is signatory ﬁrm i
′s
output for its domestic market:
q∗i =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + γ(tj + τi)(n−m)
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (31)
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Similarly, we plug Q∗i. from (30) into (28) and solve for qii, which is the output of
other signatories ﬁrms is′ (other than the domestic one) for this non-signatory i′s
market:
q∗ii =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + γ(tj + τi)(n−m)
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (32)
Equations (31) and (32) illustrate why q∗i = q
∗
ii under the trade cooperation and joint
cooperation scenarios.
Similarly, we plug Q∗i. from (30) into (29) and solve for qij, which is non-signatory
ﬁrm j′s output for a signatory i′s market:
q∗ij =
(a− c)(2− γ)− (tj + τi)(γ(m− 1) + 2) + γmti
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (33)
6.1.2 Non-signatories' Markets
In a non-signatory's market, there are always three equilibrium quantities which are
the same irrespective of the scenario analysed.46 The ﬁrst q∗j represents the domestic
ﬁrm's production for its own market.47 This ﬁrm faces an emission tax only, imposed
by its own government. The second equilibrium quantity q∗jj represents other non-
signatories ﬁrms' exports to this non-signatory's market. These ﬁrms face an emission
tax imposed by their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ imposed on their
exports to this non-signatory's market. Finally, the third equilibrium quantity q∗ji
represents signatories ﬁrms' exports to this non-signatory's market. These ﬁrms face
an emission tax imposed by their own governments as well as a trade tariﬀ imposed
on their exports to this non-signatory's market.
The proﬁt of the domestic non-signatory's ﬁrm j in its domestic market j is given
by pij = qj(pj − c− tj). Substituting the inverse demand function from equation (3)




= a− c− tj− (2−γ)qj−γQj. = 0 ⇐⇒ a− c− tj− 2qj−γ
∑
l∈N\{j}
qjl = 0 (34)
The proﬁt of any other non-signatory's ﬁrm j (except the domestic one) in this
domestic non-signatory's market j is given by pijj = qjj(pjj−c−tj−τj). Substituting
46The emission taxes and trade tariﬀs themselves will of course be diﬀerent depending on the
scenario analysed given the diﬀerent maximisation procedures.
47Notation: in q∗j we used one sub-script only as the function represents domestic ﬁrm production
for the domestic market.
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the inverse demand function from equation (3) above after the appropriate change
in notation, we derive the following ﬁrst order condition:
∂pijj
∂qjj





The proﬁt of a signatory's ﬁrm i in a non-signatory's market j is given by piji =
qji(pji − c − ti − τj). Substituting the inverse demand function from equation (3)









Summing up all three ﬁrst order conditions above after multiplying equation (35) by
the number of all other non-signatories' ﬁrms except the domestic one (n−m−1) and
equation (36) by the number of signatories (m), we ﬁnd the total quantity consumed
in a non-signatory's market Q∗j. is given by:
Q∗j. =
n(a− c)−mti − tj(n−m)− τj(n− 1)
γ(n− 1) + 2 (37)
Next we plug Q∗j. from (37) into (34) and solve for qj, which is non-signatory ﬁrm
j′s output for its domestic market:
q∗j =
(a− c)(2− γ)− tj(γ(m− 1) + 2) + γmti + γτj(n− 1)
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (38)
Similarly, we plug Q∗j. from (37) into (35) and solve for qjj, which is the output of
other non-signatories' ﬁrms j′s (other than the domestic one) for this non-signatory
j′s market:
q∗jj =
(a− c)(2− γ)− tj(γ(m− 1) + 2) + γmti − 2τj
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (39)
Finally, we plug Q∗j. from (37) into (36) and solve for qji, which is a signatory ﬁrm
i′s output for any non-signatory j′s market:
q∗ji =
(a− c)(2− γ)− ti(γ(n−m− 1) + 2) + tj(γ(n−m))− 2τj
(γ(n− 1) + 2)(2− γ) (40)
6.2 Appendix 2: Equilibrium Emission Taxes and Trade Tar-
iﬀs
Due to the size of these equations, they can be provided in separate PDF ﬁles upon
request.
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6.3 Appendix 3: Non-negativity Constraints
Inserting equilibrium emission taxes and trade tariﬀs into equilibrium quantities re-
veals that we need to impose non-negativity constraints in order to ensure positive
outputs. These constraints depend on the scenario considered. Essentially, they boil
down to requesting that the demand parameter a is larger than marginal produc-
tion cost c plus a multiple of marginal damages. These constraints are established
analytically but due to the complexity of the results we resort to numerical simu-
lations. The parameters' constellations are as follows: n = 10, m ≤ n, γ = {0, 1},
δ = {10, 50, 100}, and c = 0.48
6.3.1 Environmental Cooperation scenario
For the environmental cooperation scenario, we establish the non-negativity con-
straints numerically requesting that the demand parameter a is larger than a cer-
tain threshold, i.e. larger than a lower threshold a. In order to establish the non-
negativity constraints for γ = {0, 1}, we look for the most restrictive a (i.e. for all
m under each quantity) and ﬁnd the following:
a γ = 1 γ = 0
q∗i c+ 25δ c+ 10δ
q∗ii c+ 10δ c+ 10δ
q∗ij c+ 55δ c+ 10δ
q∗j c+ 15δ c+ 10δ
q∗jj c+ 28δ c+ 10δ
q∗ji c+ 10δ c+ 10δ
Therefore, the most restrictive non-negativity constraint for γ =
{
1 a = c+ 60δ
0 a = c+ 15δ
.
6.3.2 Trade Cooperation scenario
Similarly for the trade cooperation scenario, in order to establish the non-negativity
constraints for γ = {0, 1}, we look for the most restrictive a (i.e. for all m under
each quantity) and ﬁnd the following:
48Since we have constant marginal costs symmetric across all ﬁrms (signatories' and non-
signatories' ones) such simpliﬁcation, c = 0, will not aﬀect our qualitative results.
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a γ = 1 γ = 0
q∗i & q
∗
ii c+ 10δ c+ 10δ
q∗ij c+ 118δ c+ 10δ
q∗j c+ 50δ c+ 10δ
q∗jj c+ 175δ c+ 10δ
q∗ji c+ 40δ c+ 11δ
Therefore, the most restrictive non-negativity constraint for γ =
{
1 a = c+ 180δ
0 a = c+ 15δ
.
6.3.3 Joint Cooperation scenario
Similarly for the trade cooperation scenario, in order to establish the non-negativity
constraints for γ = {0, 1}, we look for the most restrictive a (i.e. for all m under
each quantity) and ﬁnd the following:
a γ = 1 γ = 0
q∗i & q
∗
ii c+ 10δ c+ 10δ
q∗ij c+ 118δ c+ 10δ
q∗j c+ 42δ c+ 10δ
q∗jj c+ 138δ c+ 10δ
q∗ji c+ 28δ c+ 10δ
Therefore, the most restrictive non-negativity constraint for γ =
{
1 a = c+ 150δ
0 a = c+ 15δ
.
Under cross-scenario analyses, we assume the most restrictive constraint among the
three scenarios to hold.
6.4 Appendix 4: First Stage Results






In this thesis, we studied the formation and stability of various designs of climate
change agreements. Our model is an extension of Brander and Spencer (1985)
Cournot oligopoly framework where we assume n ex ante symmetric countries. Gov-
ernments are concerned not only with their ﬁrms' proﬁt and tax revenues but also
with the utility of their consumers and environmental damages resulting from a global
pollutant. We introduced two new features to the literature. Firstly, ﬁrms produce
a horizontally diﬀerentiated good, i.e. the same good but in diﬀerent varieties where
each ﬁrm produces one unique variety. Secondly, consumers can have various degrees
of taste for the varieties of this good. For analytical tractability, in most parts of the
thesis we focused on three cases of TFV. Firstly, the case of no TFV under which
varieties are perfect substitutes. Secondly, the case of partial TFV that implies
some degree of substitutability among varieties. Thirdly, the case of full TFV (or
maximum TFV) under which consumers have high preference for a balanced con-
sumption bundle and varieties are independent. Stability of a coalition leading to
an agreement was tested by invoking the concept of internally and externally sta-
ble cartels. We also check for coalition stability under exclusive membership where
appropriate.
We demonstrated that the formation of climate change agreements is globally bene-
ﬁcial. Global welfare increases with the size of agreements and obtains its maximum
if the grand coalition forms. However, the grand coalition or even smaller coalitions
may not be stable because of two reasons. Firstly, the beneﬁts from policy coor-
dination are non-exclusive, a features which we related to the property of positive
externality of coalition formation. Secondly, the gains from cooperation for those
involved in enlarging coalitions may be small or even negative.
We showed that for the no TFV scenario, signatories of an agreement increase
their taxes with the size of the agreement. Signatory governments have an incentive
to internalise two negative externalities, both associated with high quantities. A
reduction of output stabilises the price in the output cartel and also reduces envi-
ronmental damages. Non-signatories free-ride on signatories' eﬀorts and lower their
taxes. Hence, taxes are strategic substitutes between signatories and non-signatories.
In our model, this meant that no agreement was stable. In contrast, for the full
TFV scenario, foreign taxes have no eﬀect on domestic ﬁrms' output. In the con-
text of an agreement, this implies that taxes of signatories (non-signatories) have
no eﬀect on the output of non-signatories' (signatories') ﬁrms. We found that this
implies that taxes between signatories and non-signatories become strategically in-
dependent. Regardless whether signatories increase or decrease their tax with the
size of the agreement, non-signatories' equilibrium taxes do not change. This reduces
the free-rider incentive, but it remains positive, which explains that this led only to
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small stable coalitions.
In the second paper, we extended the previous paper by providing the climate change
agreement's signatories with an additional policy instrument called border tax ad-
justment (BTA). Using this policy signatory governments can impose an additional
border tax on imports from non-signtories' ﬁrms. This border tax amounts to the
tax diﬀerential between the high emission taxes that signatory ﬁrms are facing in
their domestic markets and the low emission taxes that non-signatory ﬁrms are facing
for their exports to these markets. In this setup we examined the eﬀects of border
tax adjustments in inﬂuencing countries' decisions on their emission taxes as well as
membership status by comparing two cases: climate agreements with and without
border tax adjustments, BTA and No BTA regimes, respectively.
We ﬁnd that introducing BTAs under no TFV or partial TFV enhances the
incentives to join the coalition as signatories generate additional tax revenues given
the BTA policy. Furthermore, BTAs undermine the free riding incentives as the
coalition exhibits negative externalities toward non-signatories. Under internal and
external stability, these driving forces together led to the grand coalition to be stable
in equilibrium. When the exclusive membership rule is considered, we found medium-
sized coalitions to be stable in equilibrium, as signatories of these coalitions are
enjoying the additional tax revenues they are generating through the BTAs and
hence they do not allow all countries to join the coalition.
Looking at the full TFV case, introducing BTAs doesn't lead to negative external-
ities against non-signatories anymore. In other words, each non-signatory beneﬁts
from signatories' eﬀorts. These beneﬁts outweigh the negative eﬀects of the BTAs,
leading to positive externalities. Nevertheless, given the additional BTA revenue
that signatories enjoy, countries always have the incentives to join the coalition and
hence large coalitions are stable.
In the third paper we studied the formation of joint climate change and customs'
union agreements. Governments have two policy instruments. First, they can impose
emission taxes on their domestic ﬁrm's production in order to reduce pollution dam-
ages. Second, they can impose trade tariﬀs on imports. We analyse three scenarios.
The ﬁrst is called environmental cooperation scenario, where signatories coordinate
their climate policy and set their emission taxes collectively in order to maximise
the joint welfare of the whole coalition. As for the trade policy, they neither coordi-
nate their trade tariﬀs, nor abolish them within the coalition. The second scenario
is called trade cooperation scenario, where signatories coordinate their trade tariﬀs
only, i.e. cooperate on trade and form a customs' union, with no coordination of cli-
mate policy; emission taxes. In this scenario, signatories abolish trade tariﬀs within
the coalition and impose tariﬀs on imports from non-signatories to maximise the
joint welfare of the coalition. As for the climate policy, each signatory chooses an
emissions tax that maximises its own welfare. The third scenario is called joint co-
operation, which is essentially a combination of both previous scenarios illustrating
the case of issue linkage. Signatories coordinate both their trade tariﬀs and emission
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taxes, i.e. forming a joint climate change and customs' union agreement. In this
scenario, signatories abolish trade tariﬀs within the coalition and impose tariﬀs on
imports from non-signatories to maximise the joint welfare of the coalition. They
also jointly choose a uniform emission tax that maximises the joint welfare of the
coalition. In all three scenarios non-signatories choose their own emission taxes and
trade tariﬀs in order to maximise their individual welfare.
Our results present new insights into environmental cooperation when governments
are dealing with more than one issues, namely climate change and free trade in our
context, and have two policy instruments to deal with them. In the case where
consumers have no taste for varieties, i.e. varieties are perfect substitutes following
the standard assumption in the literature, we ﬁnd the incentives for cooperation on
climate change are strong when countries coordinate their emission taxes even though
they do not coordinate their trade policy. That is, providing signatories with an
additional policy instrument, such as trade tariﬀs that can be imposed on all imports,
makes them more powerful in the sense of having the ability to generate additional
revenues as well as pose negative externalities toward non-signatories. These driving
forces together lead to the stability of the grand coalition. Unfortunately, when
varieties become independent the incentives for forming large coalitions breakdown.
The fact that signatories have an additional policy instrument does not help with
the stability of large coalitions when varieties are independent and we ﬁnd only small
coalitions are stable in equilibrium. A more detailed discussion on these ﬁndings is
presented later in the paper.
As for the trade cooperation scenario, we ﬁnd that the exclusive beneﬁts of free trade
and the negative externalities posed toward non-signatories are both providing the
incentives for cooperation leading to the stability of the grand coalition irrespective
of consumers' taste for variety. These driving forces also carry over when signatories
form a joint agreement and coordinate both their emission taxes and trade tariﬀs
leading to the grand coalition to be stable in equilibrium. In relating these results
to the current literature, while the incentives for forming climate change coalitions
are not strong enough due to positive externalities (Finus and Al Khourdajie, 2017),
the incentives for forming customs' unions are stronger given the beneﬁts of joining
the coalition and the incentives to avoid negative externalities (Yi, 1996). In our
environmental cooperation scenario we show that proving signatories with additional
policy instrument might sometimes lead to strong incentive for cooperation. As for
our joint cooperation scenario, we show that the joint agreement combines both
features of strong incentives for cooperation brought about by the customs' unions
as well as the policy instrument to deal with the damages' externality.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst attempt to introduce horizontal products' diﬀer-
entiation and consumers' taste for variety to the literature of international environ-
mental agreements. In this setting, it is also the ﬁrst attempt to analyse the eﬀects of
instrumenting climate change agreement with border tax adjustment, and the eﬀects
of issue linkage with trade agreements. Our stylized model allows for exploring future
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research avenues in relaxing the symmetry assumption and further investigations of
sub-features of TFV, such as ideal varieties or asymmetric consumers' TFV between
countries. Future research could be explored in terms of introducing an additional
policy instruments for non-signatories such as tax rebates that allow them to miti-
gate the BTAs negative eﬀects on their ﬁrms' proﬁt when they export to signatories'
markets.
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